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The Finnish economy is built upon foreign trade. Such has been the
state of things since time immemorial.1
But above all it is the forest industry that holds the key position in
Finnish economic life, not least because its exports are of
overwhelmingly greater importance than any other products.2
Finland is a small open economy and has been so since the middle of the 19th century.3
The dependence on exports is as much a foregone conclusion in modern public discussion
as it was during the early 1950s, when the above quotes were written. Even today one can
hear the phrases “Finland lives on exports”,4 or the 1980s catchphrase “Finland lives on
forests”.5
It would be a nigh heretical act to disregard the importance of exports in Finland.
However, the notion that the country’s abundant forest resources are the main determinant
of economic development above all else has had an exaggerated, even a mythical quality.
Even then Markku Kuisma describes this notion of forest fundamentalism as broadly
correct: in the long run forests were the thing that integrated Finland into Europe by the
way of foreign trade.6 While this cannot be denied in the long duration, the statement is
less accurate in the decades following the 1950s. New export industries, composed of
metal, chemical and textiles products, came into existence and surpassed the forest sector
in size.7
Although the diversification of exports and the reducing importance of forest industries
has been noted in economic historical literature, there has not been a comprehensive
empirical study of what spawned the development of new export industries in the post-
war period. There have been general overviews of foreign trade for this period, but none
that that use econometric methods of contemporary economic history. More importantly,
determinants of export structure are usually only mentioned, not analysed. If there are
empirical studies, they are restricted to a short time frame, or limited in perspective when
1 Bärlund 1951, 46. Translated from: “Suomen kansantalous rakentuu ulkomaankaupan varaan. Näin on
ollut asianlaita jo ikimuistoisista ajoista alkaen”.
2 Karjalainen 1953, 24
3 Heikkinen 1994, 106–107; Schybergson 1980, 451–452, 457–458
4 Translated from: “Suomi elää viennistä”.
5 Translated from: “Suomi elää metsästä”. See Kuisma 1999, 51–52.
6 Kuisma 1999, 51–52. Actually Kuisma’s statement is stronger since he describes not only economic but
also societal development as dependent on forest industries and resources.
7 Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151; Paavonen 2008, 11, 258
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pertaining to trade integration or intraindustry trade for instance. Therefore a study where
the determinants of export structure are inspected and analysed is justified.
The period of 1956–1989 corresponds nicely with the post-war decades, but it was chosen
according to the availability of input-output tables which form the basis of the many
measures used in the thesis.  The late 1950s is a relevant starting point for this enquiry
because it encompasses the protectionist period shortly before the free trade era whereas
the early 1950s constituted for a distinct period characterized by the Korean Boom, post-
war reconstruction, war reparations to the Soviet Union and a regulated economy. The
FINEFTA trade agreement in 1961, followed by the EEC trade deal in 1973, resulted in
gradually lower trade barriers that possibly distorted trade patterns in the previous
decades. The year 1989 is a natural ending point, since it precedes a fundamental break
in Finnish economic history: the Finnish Great Depression, the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Finland’s entry into the European Union and the meteoric rise – and eventual fall
– of Nokia.
I am specifically interested in the change that happened before the emergence of Nokia,
important as it was. As Yrjö Kaukiainen writes, Finland of the 1980s was no more a
country of cheap labour as other factors, such as capital and know-how, were more
important determinants of the country’s specialization. Even before the 1990s there had
been a decisive change in the economic life of the country and its exports.8
A comprehensive empirical study in this context, besides incorporating a suitably long
timeframe, means that the research design ought to identify the most relevant variables
based on the literature and analysed with quantitative methods. Indeed, how else to
identify significance if not by measurement? The study would need to account for
particular phenomena of the era such as intraindustry trade, which coincided in many
industrial nations and the centrally organized Eastern Trade, an institutional characteristic
specific to Finland and a few other Western countries. Furthermore, the substantial
overinflating bias in gross exports caused by foreign inputs imported into production
should be removed. A key contribution of this thesis is that it corrects for import values
with a novel series of domestic value-added of exports, calculated by the author for eight
cross-sections in 1956–1989.
8 Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151
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Based on this value-added series it is possible to examine the export industries in greater
depth than before. It is quite probable that using biased gross exports in an econometric
study would result in biased results, whereas the value-added figures can be used to obtain
more accurate levels of different factors’ magnitudes. The input-output calculations are
also used to obtain figures for many of the determinants of export structure.
Yet the question regarding which factors and determinants are explanatory is not an easy
one. I deem that the best available theoretical framework for this question consists of the
trade models found in international economics: Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and New
Trade Theories to name a few. While the nature of this thesis is decidedly empirical, it
cannot be denied that the plurality of conflicting trade models remains an issue. Since the
correct specification of relevant variables is less than clear, a substantial portion of the
thesis is devoted to considering what models and what determinants should have been
relevant. Apart from the use of value-added series, the methodological approach here is
not revolutionary, as input-output calculations and regression analyses is common in
quantitative economic history. Graphs and tables are also used. The data consists of
statistical material obtained mostly from national input-output tables, official foreign
trade statistics, industrial statistics and other statistics compiled by Statistics Finland.
In conclusion, this thesis attempts to explain asks what determined the structure of exports
during 1956–1989, a time of significant changes in the Finnish economy and export
structure. What were the drivers of exports specialization during this time? While
Eloranta and Hannikainen have noted that the service sector has often been consigned to
the sidelines of economic history, I also consider it important to study service exports.9
Therefore the Finnish export structure studied here comprises of primary and tertiary
sectors alongside the secondary one. This is another novelty of this thesis in comparison
with previous research that focuses on only manufacturing or commodity exports.10
To summarize the thesis’ main task is as follows:
To locate the most important supply-side determinants of exports’
industrial structure in 1956–1989.
The focus on the supply-side is a conventional one in economic history. Riitta Hjerppe
for example stresses that while demand-side characteristics are important in the short-
9 Eloranta & Hannikainen 2018 (unpublished), 9
10 See for example Varian 2017 or Crafts & Thomas 1986.
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term, it is the supply-side factors or “the availability of labour, capital and natural
resources; and the development of technological and institutional circumstances” that
ultimately determine the pattern of long-term production.11 Yet as Pat Hudson opines:
– – the supply-side still dominates, this despite the flowering of
global histories demonstrating that new consumption and demand
impulses and continuous product innovation came from long-
distance connections and reciprocal dynamics.12
This is not a frivolous point. It is quite feasible that the Finnish export structure could
have evolved quite differently had international demand patterns done so as well. To what
direction would have the composition of forest exports evolved, had industrialized
countries not demanded paper prompted by higher living standards?13 As another
example, it is curious to note how Finnish metal and textile exports initially developed in
the 19th century based on the Russian market, only to cease in the interwar period after
the revolutions of 1917 and then to resume in the post-war period as a part of Eastern
Trade. Here I must stress that the export structure at the heart of my research question
refers to the industrial structure, not the country structure, of exports. However, one must
account for differences in market areas in the case of Eastern Trade since there seems to
be a connection of some kind with export industries and demand-side factors there.
Generally speaking though, the demand-side is not studied here comprehensively, since
even the conventional supply-side approach is time-consuming. Furthermore, considering
that the supply-side approach has not been applied empirically before, it could be said
that the customary foundation ought to be laid first before embarking on a more heterodox
line of inquiry. However, some institutional circumstances – which Hjerppe mentions –
are included in this thesis, if literature suggests that they might have mattered. These
features include Eastern Trade alongside export cartels, customs barriers and state
activities in the form of state-owned companies and public funding of innovations. It is
important not to dismiss these aspects of the post-war economy without consideration
simply on the grounds that they are not explicitly addressed by economic trade models.
There are a number of points that this thesis will not consider. Most importantly, the thesis
considers only Finland due to excessive demands of a cross-country study. Additionally,
I will not address whether the diversification or growth of exports were useful
11 Hjerppe 1989, 169
12 Hudson, 2014: Tawney Lecture 2014. Industrialisation, global history and the ghost of Rostow
13 Saarinen 2005, 31
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developments for the Finnish economy. In other words, I do not consider whether
economic growth was export-led. I am also largely uninterested in export industries’ rates
of value-added which is a continual point of mention in Finnish economic industry.14
Although domestic value-added of exports is certainly an important topic in this thesis,
the inherent arbitrariness of industrial classifications makes it hard to say anything
meaningful about the share of value-added in individual industries. Public policy and the
persistent post-war devaluation cycle are also mostly disregarded with a few exceptions.
Finally, it should be admitted that despite the empirical nature of this thesis, the results
here cannot be construed as causal strictly speaking. As Hjerppe and Jukka Jalava argue
in the context of growth accounting, variables such as labour, capital and productivity are
proximate sources of growth, not fundamental sources. Dani Rodrik proposes that these
fundamental determinants are geography, trade integration and institutions.15 Geography
is explicitly considered here in the guise of natural resources, trade integration partly
through customs barriers and institutions in a limited fashion through Eastern Trade,
state-owned companies and export cartels. Yet with regards to labour or capital, a study
such as the one here does not reveal why these factors developed, only what was each
one’s relative contribution.16
The sections after this introduction detail the theories related to the determinants of export
structure and previous research regarding Finnish and foreign contexts that follow these
theories (chapter 2). After discussing theory and previous research, data and methodology
of the thesis are briefly considered (chapter 3) – the majority of the discussion related to
data sources is left for the appendices however (appendix chapter 6.2). Before moving
onto the econometric analysis of export structure, possible determinants are also
examined with quantitative tables across export industries (chapter 4). This section also
includes a brief review of Finnish exports in the long-term. The final chapter (5) considers
the results in the context of previous research and concludes the thesis.
14 See Paavonen 2008, 257; Kaukiainen 2006, 150 or Pihkala 1982a, 376.
15 Rodrik 2003, 3–5
16 Hjerppe & Jalava 2006, 56, 315
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2. Theoretical framework, Trade Models and Previous Research
In this chapter the choice of theoretical framework and the problems and benefits of
applying economic models into economic history are briefly considered before reviewing
the main economic theories of foreign trade. I also review different lines of research on
determinants of trade, particularly for Finland and to lesser extent concerning economic
historical studies of foreign countries. Finally, I consider what trade models and
determinants of exports structure should be relevant in analysing the Finnish economy of
1956–1989 with Rodrik’s diagnostic framework for model verification in mind. Some
attention there is also devoted to discussing institutional characteristics of Finnish export
structure that are often not considered in trade models.
2.1 On the Approach Adapted Here
A researcher’s voyage between the “Scylla” of a theoretical
straightjacket and “Charybdis” of a chaotic multitude of facts is not
easy be he an economist, historian or, working between them, a
proponent of new economic history – –.17
As Erkki Pihkala puts it an economic historical study must strike a balance between the
freedom to account for empirical facts and the need to assign those facts into a sensible
framework. Although there are no obvious solutions to this trade-off, the approach
adopted in this thesis could be characterized as the standard solution in economic history.
I deem that the research questions cannot be answered without the guidance of trade
models of neoclassical economics nor without quantitative techniques. The approach
therefore conforms to Sakari Heikkinen’s and Jan Luiten van Zanden’s definition of
economic history as a combination of economic theory and “empirical, quantitative
economic research”.18 However, economic history has also been described as an “uneasy
waltz”19 between economics-oriented and humanities-oriented research approaches.
Humanities-oriented researchers have accused economists of utilizing faulty models and
17 Pihkala 2007, 50. Translated from: “Tieteenharjoittajan matka teorian pakkopaidan ‘Skyllan’ ja
tosiasioiden kaaosmaisen runsauden ‘Kharybdiksen’ välillä ei ole helppoa, olipa tämä ekonomisti,
historioitsija tai näiden välissä toimiva instituutioiden merkitystä korostava uuden taloushistorian
harrastaja”.
18 Heikkinen & van Zanden 2004, 11. Note that the qualitative approach is implicitly ruled out here.
19 Jalava, Eloranta & Ojala 2007, 10
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statistics and being ignorant of previous research while they have been in turn criticized
of shoddy methods and impressionistic theories.20
Yet regardless of these debates between humanities- and economics-oriented schools of
thought, modern historians increasingly apply methods and theories of social and
economic sciences. This presents another problem: historians’ source criticism has failed
with the uncritical use of economics. Indeed, Jalava, Jari Eloranta and Jari Ojala assert
that while simply disparaging economics is not sustainable, economic models cannot be
given a carte blanche either. It is important to judge the relevance of the utilized models
by examining the assumptions of economics, which requires understanding those
assumptions in the first place. The argument on proper understanding of models is not
only applicable to economic history, but to economics in general. For example, as Rodrik
puts it:21
Rather than a single, specific model, economics encompasses a
collection of models. The discipline advances by expanding its library
of models and by improving the mapping between these models and
the real world. The diversity of models in economics is the necessary
counterpart to the flexibility of the social world. Different social
settings require different models.22
Rodrik writes that economics accumulates knowledge by expanding horizontally, or by
adding new models to the library of economics. The older models are not necessarily
obsolete – the new ones merely incorporate aspects that were not previously addressed
and are more relevant in certain contexts. The author criticizes economists because they
“are prone to mistake a model for the model, relevant and applicable under all conditions”
while they should instead “select their models carefully as circumstances change, or as
they turn their gaze from one setting to another”.23
The difficulty of choosing the right model is especially severe in foreign trade theory,
where there is no standard model. Three main strands exist: Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin
and the New Trade Theory. Each tried to clarify the blind spots that the contemporarily
popular model had failed to account for, yet none has managed to supplant the others
20 Jalava, Eloranta & Ojala 2007, 10–11. For an alternative approach, see Boldizzoni 2011, or Boldizzoni
& Hudson 2016 where global, “interpretive” approach to economic history is advocated.
21 Jalava, Eloranta & Ojala 2007, 10–11
22 Rodrik 2015, 5
23 Ibid., 6, 67
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completely. There has even been a Neo-Ricardian resurgence in the 2000s. On top of this
one can also combine different models.
Although the discussion here has highlighted the need for verifying the right model for
the right context, some readers might still object to usage of economic models because
they are unrealistic. That they are unrealistic is abundantly clear, but that does not mean
that they cannot be explanatory. As Rodrik maintains models are essentially attempts to
capture relevant aspects of reality by isolating certain mechanisms from confounding
effects in an artificial setting. Models leave out some aspects of reality to highlight causal
mechanisms and their implications.24
Indeed, even though conventional trade models can be considered lacking in many
grounds, Pihkala states that they are still necessary for a conceptual understanding of
historical development.25 Thus economic models can be used to interpret a multitude of
facts, but not without criticism.
2.2 A Survey of Theories of International Trade
Dostoevsky apparently once remarked that all of Russian literature
emerged from under Gogol’s Overcoat. It is at least as true that all of
the pure theory of international trade has emerged from chapter 7 of
Ricardo’s Principles.26
The first of the modern trade theories is the Ricardian one. David Ricardo’s idea of
comparative advantage is still the prism through which economics considers trade
patterns even though it was formulated in the 19th century. Anecdotally it was also Paul
Samuelson’s, a Nobel laureate economist, pick for a single economic theory that is both
true and still not self-evident.27 Conceptually Ricardian theory rests on comparative
advantage, which is caused by labour productivity and technology.
The key idea behind comparative advantage is that countries do not specialize per
absolute advantage – i.e. which country can produce the commodity cheaper. Unlike this
seemingly intuitive idea, trade patterns are determined by comparative advantage. A
country will specialize in exporting the product which it finds easier to produce than the
other product. If the domestic economy has a lower opportunity cost in this good, relative
24 Rodrik 2015, 11–12, 25–29. Models can also be treated as fables or thought experiments. See Rodrik
2015, 18–25.
25 Pihkala 2007, 50
26 Findlay 1984, 186
27 Feenstra & Taylor 2012, 27
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to the other one, compared with the foreign economy it will specialize in its production.
Even if a foreign country has absolute advantage in the production of all goods, both
countries will specialize according to their relative efficiency. It should also be noted, as
Ville Kaitila has, that comparative advantage can change in time and one can attempt to
influence it.28 Reino Hjerppe adds that specialization according to comparative advantage
leads into greater gains from division of labour, long product lines and experience in the
relevant sectors, which intensifies existing comparative advantage.29
Comparative advantage is hard to observe, since theoretically a country would export the
product whose relative price in terms of another good would be lower in autarky than in
free trade. Empirically one would need to observe a move from closed economy to free
trade, which is a unique occurrence. Since most countries, including Finland, have not
been characterized by total autarky in recorded history, indirect or general measures
related to trade or specialization are often used instead.
The Ricardian model itself states that comparative advantage is mainly determined by
productivity which is in turn determined by technological differences across countries
and industries. It is simplistic in the sense that it considers only one factor of production:
labour. This deficiency led in part to the formulation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (H–
O model) which considers a number of factors: in its most limited form only labour and
capital, but sometimes also natural resources or human capital.30 At its core it assumes
that the main determinant of trade patterns lies in the factor proportions of each country,
and in the factor intensity of different industries. In a way, countries export those factors
that they have in abundance and import those that they lack. The notion also works on an
industrial level, where a capital abundant country will focus on production that is capital
intensive and a labour abundant country on labour intensive production.31 In contrast with
the Ricardian model, Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes technology to be identical across
countries. Both the Ricardian and the Heckscher-Ohlin model share a similar focus on the
supply-side rather than on the demand-side.32
28 Kaitila 2007, 2
29 Feenstra & Taylor 2012, 38–40; Hjerppe 1975, 165–166
30 See Wright 1990, 654 for example.
31 Kauppila 2007, 41
32 Feenstra & Taylor 2012, 87–98; Kaitila 2007, 2; Hjerppe 1975, 62, 68
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Heckscher-Ohlin theory became quite influential in the 20th century, which is exemplified
by Reino Hjerppe referring to it as the “modern” perspective on foreign trade in 1975.33
Even in 2006, Kevin O’Rourke called the model “intuitively appealing” and “the bedrock
of modern trade courses”.34 The intuitive appeal of the model did not lead into empirical
validity however. In 1953, one year after Eli Heckscher’s death, Wassily Leontief tested
the theory, which predicted that the capital abundant United States would export capital
intensive goods. Leontief’s finding that the U.S. imports consisted of capital intensive
goods was a decided blow to the validity of the H–O model. The Leontief paradox
resonates even today and is routinely mentioned in different articles.35
O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson acknowledge that after Leontief’s study, “simple
versions” of the H–O model have been criticized.36 Williamson also admitted in a
different text that testing the technological rationale versus the Heckscher–Ohlinian one
has not been kind to the H–O model, though he characterizes the debate as unresolved.37
However, the authors do make a point of arguing that there is evidence for the model
being successfully applied to the late 19th and early 20th century citing Nicholas Crafts
and Mark Thomas concerning British manufacturing 1910–1935 and Gavin Wright
regarding 1870–1940 for the United States. They also refer to Antoni Estevadeordal’s
study of 18 countries and 46 sectors in 1913.38
Indeed, Estevadeordal did maintain in 1997 that the H–O model is a valid explanatory
framework for studying the era prior to the Great War.39 He evidently changed his mind
in a study with Alan Taylor in 2002. To be fair, they do state that several predictions of
the H–O model, such as the pattern of traded goods and factor price convergence, have
been substantiated by economic historians regarding the pre-1914 era. While
acknowledging the model’s primacy for research considering that period, the authors
concluded, on the basis of testing the factor content of trade,40 that the model’s fit for the
pre-1914 era is as ill-performing as it is for the modern period, although renewable and
non-renewable resource endowments are predicted relatively well by the model.41
33 Hjerppe 1975, 53
34 O’Rourke 2006, 107
35 Jones 2006, 91
36 O’Rourke & Williamson 2000, 66
37 Aghion & Williamson 2000, 172–173
38 O’Rourke & Williamson 2000, 66
39 Estevadeordal 1997, 96
40 Factor content of trade refers to the notion that countries export abundant factors of productions.
41 Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002, 383–388
11
Even if one would still argue that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is appropriate for the first
era of globalization that still does not mean that studies focusing on the modern post-war
period can apply it without problems. Williamson himself admits that the idea of
Heckscher-Ohlin model explaining wage inequality by itself in the modern era is
contested at best.42 Estevadeordal and Taylor likewise note that tests of “pure” H–O
model applied to the modern period have been less than stellar and that Heckscher and
Bertil Ohlin themselves might be critical of how modern researchers use their theory in a
context that is very different from the one they themselves lived in.43
At any rate, the number of modifications needed to incorporate into the H–O model for
the modern period is rather long.44 There seem to be two particular problems related to
the model. First is the assumption of identical production functions, technology in
layman’s terms. Secondly, the model cannot account for modern international trade
because it cannot account for the existence of intraindustry trade (IIT), the trade in goods
of the same industry, which are assumed to have similar factor intensities.45 It has been
stated that the former assumption is “generally accepted as one of the – if not the – major
obstacles for the empirical applicability of the Heckscher-Ohlin model”.46
One additional issue is the question over natural resources. Crafts and Thomas designate
them as “Ricardo goods” that cannot be plausibly explained with the factor endowment
model.47 They do not explain the rationale in great detail, but the issue can perhaps be
understood through Pekka Parkkinen’s comparison of natural resource content of exports
versus imports in Finland during 1970. Exports containing renewable natural resources
were not as intensive in physical capital compared with exports containing non-renewable
resources. Since the former dominated Finnish exports and the latter was consigned to
imports, Finnish exports were less capital intensive relative to imports. Parkkinen
mentions that a similar situation characterized U.S. foreign trade. Leontief paradox could
be thereby solved by separating natural resources in the empirical approach.48
42 Aghion & Williamson 2000, 173, 175
43 Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002, 383, 385
44 O’Rourke 2006, 107. Referring to Davis and Weinstein, O’Rourke mentions technology differences,
factor price equalization not holding, non-traded goods and trade costs as the necessary modifications
needed in the standard H–O model in order ensure its consistency with the data.
45 Aunesluoma 2011, 154; Parjanne 1992, 6
46 Hamilton & Söderström 1981, 198–199
47 Crafts & Thomas 1986, 631
48 Parkkinen 1977, 161–162. Note that the imports here refer to hypothetical import-substituting production.
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After the Leontief paradox and the appearance of intraindustry trade, yet prior to the New
Trade Theory (NTT) that would become the textbook alternative to the H–O model, there
emerged new demand-side theories. Take for instance Staffan Burenstam Linder’s theory
which emphasized market area expansion as a possibility for trade. Supposing that two
countries are in the same customs area and have similar demand structures, there is scope
for expanding domestic production abroad. That would not apply to export industries
based solely on satisfying foreign demand though.49
Additionally, there was Irving Kravis’ theory of availability which stressed that countries
import products which are not obtained domestically or are, but only under great cost.
While Hjerppe criticized this theory for not having an explicitly defined testable
hypothesis, he did mention that one can postulate on it that export industries have faster
technological growth than in other industries. Parkkinen also mentions the technological
gap theory, developed by many authors including Kravis, which centres on innovation.
The model states that technologically advanced countries export products without close
substitutes and which require innovation whereas poorer countries have to compete with
lower production costs and abandon monopolistic pricing that the original companies
could sustain. However, in the theoretical timeline of the model developed countries and
companies are already creating new innovations at this point.50
These notions developed into the product cycle theory which underlined the level of
technology as the main determinant of trade pattern. It was developed by Raymond
Vernon who theorized that novel products are developed in short assembly series by
different companies using different technologies. When demand for these novelties
increases, the production process is honed and eventually becomes common knowledge
allowing less-developed countries to produce these goods and diminishing the
comparative advantage of developed countries in manufacturing them.51
Moving on to New Trade Theory, we first need to define the phenomenon that gave
impetus to its formulation. Marja-Liisa Parjanne defines intraindustry trade as
“simultaneous import and export of differentiated products within the same industry or
49 Pihkala 2007, 38–39
50 Parkkinen 1977, 44; Hjerppe 1975, 67
51 Pihkala 2007, 39; Parkkinen 1977, 45. Pihkala adds that while product cycle theory assumed that home
market advantages of large companies would support exports, production based on U.S. development was
increasingly moved and sometimes even offshored to U.S. companies’ foreign subsidiaries.
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product group” exclusive of homogenous goods or re-exporting for example.52 The
general gist is this: France might export Renaults to Italy, but it also imports Fiats from
Italy.53 IIT should be positively associated with similarity of production structures and
high income per capita in both countries and negatively with distribution of per capita
income in each country. Empirical studies have confirmed the size of a country, low trade
barriers and similarities between countries as further indicators of IIT. A related discovery
has been that geographic proximity and similar consumption patterns result in trade with
differentiated products of the same category.54
On the other hand, intraindustry trade has been criticized on the grounds that the
phenomenon is simply a by-product of statistical aggregation where similar product types
are added together – there might be back-and-forth trade in the same industry and even
on the SITC 3 and 4 digit levels, but not on the product level. Pihkala is quite sceptical
with regards to this claim. In his mind the phenomenon is more related to branding and
not statistical falsehoods. I am inclined to agree with Pihkala. If IIT, which increased in
the post-war period, is merely a statistical accident, there would have had to have been a
growing tendency of trade statisticians to group different products into same categories.
However, it is true that aggregated categories overestimate the amount of intraindustry
trade and disaggregated product levels would be preferable.55
Parjanne denotes two critical characteristics of models related to intraindustry trade:
“diverse consumer preferences and increasing returns”. The latter feature is especially
interesting, since allowing a departure from the simplified assumption of constant returns
to scale by explicitly including increasing returns in the model has showcased an
alternative source of specialization to that of comparative advantage. However, despite
calling economies of scale a particularly simple explanation for trade, Parjanne notes that
there is a great deal of difference between models and there is lack of a general theory of
imperfect competition or of preference for differentiated products.56
Product differentiation is empirically difficult to measure and could be theoretically either
technological, vertical or horizontal in nature. Horizontal differentiation reflects goods
that have similar prices and production functions – and quality – but are different in colour
52 Parjanne 1992, 14
53 Ibid., 6
54 Pihkala 2007, 39–40
55 Ibid., 40
56 Parjanne 1992, 8
14
or concerning other attributes. Vertical differentiation reflects different levels of quality.
Average cars with different models are horizontally differentiated whereas Volkswagen
or Mercedes reflect vertical differences of quality. Technological differences are not
connected to NTT, but to product cycle and technological gap theories, and they arise
from technical innovations that transform goods into new and improved ones regardless
of quality. In empirical terms research intensity could be related to either horizontal or
vertical differentiation. In fact, if it increases beyond some point it may reflect
technological differentiation, which has a negative relationship with intraindustry trade.57
The new insights into intraindustry trade concerning monopolistic competition,
differentiated products and increasing returns to scale were combined by Elhanan
Helpman and Paul Krugman in 1985. According to their model there will be gains from
trade due to product differentiation which will most likely lower prices and also increase
the variety of products. Furthermore, economies of scale and specialization should
increase industries’ efficiency and lower their average costs. It should be noted though,
that according to Parjanne, this model is compatible with Heckscher-Ohlin theory – “two
kinds of trade are thus distinguished: inter-industry trade based on comparative advantage
and intraindustry trade based on scale economies”.58
Lisbeth Hellvin and Johan Torstensson claim that the empirical relevance of Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem was vindicated by the emergence of New Trade Theory once the theorem
was shown to be combinable with “imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale and
trade impediments”.59 The possibility of combining elements from two main models of
foreign trade has to be considered then. There are two alternative Heckscher-Ohlin
augmented models that can account for both inter-industry and intraindustry trade:
Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model and Robert Falvey’s neo–H–O model.
In the Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model (C–H–O model) factor endowments
determine industrial structure of a given country, but economies of scale and product
differentiation may also affect the internal structure of these industries, creating intra-
industrial specialization. Free trade will create export patterns per comparative advantage
as with the H–O model but preferences for and production of different varieties can also
lead into simultaneous intraindustry trade. IIT encompasses all foreign trade if trade
57 Parjanne 1992, 27–28, 91. This non-linear relationship can be captured with a quadratic specification.
58 Ibid., 7, 10–12
59 Hellvin & Torstensson 1991, 380. One should note that they did not test such a combination in their own
article – only the basic H–O model with capital and labour.
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partners’ factor proportions are identical. However, the converse is not true since different
factor proportions lead to both types of trade. Another way of expressing the C–H–O
model is to think of H–O model explaining inter-industry trade and economies of scale
and horizontal product differentiation explaining intraindustry trade.60
The impact of economies of scale is not clear though. Don Clark suggests that it is
unrelated to intraindustry trade, which should be explained with product differentiation
instead, and that most tests of NTT find a negative relationship between IIT and scale
economies.61 Helpman elaborates that “what matters is that economies of scale exist, not
their size”.62 While the existence of economies of scale alongside product differentiation
could determine specialization and trade volume, this complicates its testing. No trade
model has argued that, holding other variables fixed, the partial correlation of scale
economies on intraindustry trade would be positive.63 It should also be noted that the type
of increasing returns in the C–H–O model is internal, not external, although Parjanne adds
that the model’s predictions are broadly similar if external returns are assumed.64
A model that concentrates solely on product differentiation is Falvey’s neo-H-O model,
which Parjanne defines as a “minor extension of the H-O model” as it does not alter its
set of assumptions greatly, particularly not the constant returns to scale.65 Falvey
essentially assumes that there is income-determined demand for products characterized
by vertical differentiation or different levels of quality. Goods of higher quality are
exported by relatively capital intensive countries, which conversely import low-quality
products. Parjanne points out that Falvey’s model is reminiscent of Linder’s idea of
market extension.66 The Neo–H–O model can be tested by unit-value dispersion of
exports compared with imports, assuming that prices therein are determined by.67
However, NTT’s general relevance has been questioned in an empirical study by David
Hummels and James Levinsohn who conclude that intraindustry trade seems more
60 Parjanne 1992, 31, 46
61 Clark 2010, 190–191
62 Helpman 1999, 136
63 Leamer 1994, 87
64 Helpman 1999, 136; Parjanne 1992, 11, 46–47
65 Ibid., 10
66 Ibid., 10
67 Varian 2017, 140; Greenaway, Hine & Milner 1995, 1508–1509; Falvey 1981. Varian’s cut-off point is
+/- 15% while Greenway et al. use both it and +/- 25% thresholds. These can be considered somewhat
arbitrary. The idea is that large deviations can be accounted only by quality and minor price differences are
caused by horizontal differentiation or consumer preferences.
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associated with country-pairs than with factor differences.68 Indeed, model literature after
the emergence of NTT began to revolve around different schools of though and
economists began to combine Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models.
For example, Donald Davis argues that an H–O model augmented with technological
differences, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo model, can result in IIT. His argument is that
there is a rationale for trading products characterized by similar factor intensities if there
are even small technology differences across countries considering this industry. Davis
asserts that if these differences exist, expanding the production of one intraindustrial
product can be done by releasing factor inputs from another intra-industrial good without
rising marginal opportunity cost. However, the model is not verified empirically.
Additionally, its concept of technical advantage is more absolute than comparative.69
Helpman, perhaps unsurprisingly considering that he formulated NTT with Krugman,
argues that Davis’ approach of homogenous products with differing production
technology is more cumbersome than explaining IIT more “naturally” with product
differentiation.70 Kwok Tong Soo on the other hand states that the impact of Davis’ model
is driven by consumer appreciation of technically differentiated goods relative to
technically identical goods.71 The intuition is quite close to Falvey’s neo–H–O model.72
Unfortunately, neither Soo nor Davis offer much guidance in on how to adapt the theory
in an empirical framework. Davis did consider a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model
application in 1997, but its cross-country approach is outside of the scope here.73
Other combinations of H–O and Ricardian models were formulated by James Harrigan in
1997 and Peter Morrow in 2010. I must praise Harrigan for actually empirically verifying
the relevance of his trade model, although this was based on GDP shares and not on
measures of trade. He attempts to model technology differences by benchmarking sectoral
technologies relative to a given country,74 which requires a cross-country study that is
beyond the scope of this thesis. Morrow’s study is rather simplistic in the sense that it
considers only skill intensity as a factor endowment.75 Yet he does show that while
68 Hummels & Levinsohn 1995, 813–814, 828. They consider income, capital and land per worker.
69 Davis 1995, 206–207, 209–218. The model also assumes that the technologically advantageous good is
produced at home completely.
70 Helpman 1999, 139
71 Soo 2009, 752
72 Soo 2005, 3
73 See Davis 1997.
74 Harrigan 1997, 476–478
75 Morrow 2010, 144
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productivity differences across industries should not constitute an omitted bias for H–O
model, there is some evidence that the reverse is true. A key point of interest is that
Morrow argues that both the H–O and Ricardian models are explanatory in explaining
commodity structure. These associations are robust and factor endowments’ impact is as
twice as strong as Ricardian productivity.76
It should be noted that most of the discussion here predates Jonathan Eaton’s and Samuel
Kortum’s article from 2002.77 According to David Chor, older Ricardian models were not
easily applied empirically since they were two-country models with complete
specialization. Indeed, Ricardian models were criticised for lacking the qualities of the
H–O model namely “simplicity, clarity and intuitive appeal” in 1981 for example.78 Eaton
and Kortum were game-changers in a way since the pair managed to obtain a good fit
with Ricardian theory and empirical data. I will not go over the mechanics of the model,
as what is important is how it was viewed as “an important piece of evidence of the role
productivity differences in determining comparative advantage”.79 What ensued in its
wake was a growth in neo-Ricardian modelling.80
One such trade model was formulated by Arnaud Costinot, Dave Donaldson and Ivana
Komunjer who explicitly refer to this “seminal” article.81 The trio maintain that the lack
of an interest in Ricardian empirics was not due to a lack of appreciation for technology
among economists, but rather because there was no theoretical foundation for guiding
empirical studies. The authors derive a model that can be tested empirically by using a
differences-in-differences regression where log of exports is explained by trade and
productivity data. The model can be viewed as ground-breaking, if it is indeed “the first
theoretically consistent Ricardian test” that captures what the authors call fundamental
productivity, which consists of institutions, infrastructure and climate here.82
There seems to be an increasing acknowledgement of the plurality of explanations in
modern trade literature, which can be seen in Costinot’s, Donaldson’s and Komunjer’s
list of empirical studies of comparative advantage – ranging from institutional to factor
76 Morrow 2010, 138, 149. The author’s argument is based partly on an IV variable of lagged values, which
is not a good IV measure. See Morrow 2010, 147.
77 See Eaton & Kortum 2002
78 Hamilton & Söderström 1981, 198–199
79 Chor 2010, 152
80 Eaton & Kortum 2012
81 Costinot, Donaldson & Komunjer 2012, 581
82 Ibid., 581–582
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endowment explanations.83 Chor mentions two strands of literature in addition to the
Ricardian resurgence: models based on institutional variables such as contract
enforcement, financial development and labour market flexibility and those pertaining to
the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin theory. On one hand this reveals that “moving beyond
this neoclassical focus” institutional theories have become more prominent, if not
standard, explanations.84 On the other hand, New Trade Theory is not mentioned by the
author at all which is quite telling in its own way.85
The appreciation of institutions and a variety of models is perhaps exemplified by articles
where comparative advantage is explained with factors unmentioned by conventional
models. One study for instance argues that institutional differences, especially labour
market flexibility, can give rise to comparative advantage,86 whereas another one
concludes that financial liberalization tends to increase exports, particularly in “sectors
intensive in external finance and softer assets”.87 Infrastructure has also been suggested
as a source of total factor productivity differences between countries and industries by
Stephen Yeaple and Stephen Golup, although they note that Finland’s rapid productivity
growth did not coincide with increases in infrastructure during 1979–1997.88
While one often assumes that the discussion of foreign trade pertains to commodities,
there is evidence to suggest that the notions suggested here do apply also to trade in
services. According to André Sapir and Chantal Winter, empirical studies have suggested
that within the framework of H–O model a country abundant in physical capital enjoys
an advantage in transportation exports whereas a country well-endowed in human capital
will specialize in insurance and private services. There is also non-empirical research that
suggests that theories of comparative advantage apply to service trade, but these industries
are more likely to be subjected to increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition.89
It could also be noted that there are alternatives to the neoclassical and institutional trade
theories reviewed here such as structuralist theories that interpret international trade as a
83 Costinot, Donaldson & Komunjer 2012, 583
84 Chor 2010, 152
85 Ibid.
86 Cuñat & Melitz 2012, 225–226, 236, 247–248. The model implies that a country with inflexible labour
can import flexible labour from other countries. Finland’s labour market flexibility index is 56 for the year
2004, which is larger than indices for France or Spain, but much smaller than Singapore and Hong Kong.
87 Manova 2008, 33–35. The result is based on the idea that industries which can satisfy their financial
needs internally have lesser need for external finance.
88 Yeaple & Golup 2007, 223–224, 232–237
89 Sapir & Winter 1994, 282–283
19
form of exploitation. Yet they are not easily combined with the Finnish development of
the recent decades.90
Another blind spot in the discussion here is the implicit assumption that industries,
products and companies are equivalent. In fact companies may differ to great extent in
their productivity even if they belong to the same industry. Exporting companies tend to
be “larger, more productive, more capital intensive and more research and development
-oriented” than home market companies.91 Since this applies to present-day developing
countries, one might assume that it also applies to the Finnish economy of the past. In
conjunction with institutional and policy indicators, firm-level factors, such as quality and
firm appeal, explain a significant amount of differences in competitiveness across
countries. This is a potential source of the Leontief paradox as exporting companies tend
to be capital and skill intensive. It has also been suggested that international trade requires
more skill intensity than domestic production in the first place.92
2.3 Previous Research on Determinants of Export Structure
A typical feature of the literature on international trade is that there is
an infinite amount of theorems, models and logical argumentation,
but not much attention has been paid to the operationalization and
testing of these theoretical relationships.93
Arguably, formulation of trade theories is more common than their estimation in
economics. That is not say there have not been empirical studies, but that the link between
the two is often flimsy. However, in the Finnish case economic studies of trade structure
during 1956–1989 tend to be few and far between. The situation is not that different in
historical studies. Although the diversification of Finnish exports has been noted, there is
no comprehensive text on the determinants of exports structure nor have there been
econometric cross-sectional, time-series or panel data analyses on the question. Relevant
research tends to entail either general overviews or studies covering a limited time span.
There are also some contemporary economic studies or historical research on certain
industries. Forest industries have been researched to a great extent in Finland,94 and there
are also studies regarding metal industries. Tuomas Larjavaara’s study of metal
90 Paavonen 2008, 23
91 Haaparanta et al. 2017, 68
92 Ibid., 68–70; Bernard et al. 2012, 287; Melitz 2003.
93 Parjanne 1992, 14
94 See Jensen-Eriksen 2007, Heikkinen 2000 or Ahvenainen 1984 for example.
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engineering exports is somewhat like mine since he noted that the H–O model could not
explain these exports comprehensively and a wider approach was required.95 Yet these
studies do not consider the determinants of all exports. I will therefore only mention them
when they can illuminate certain observations or points of detail.
Here I consider several strands of research pertaining to the topic: general economic
histories, monographies on trade integration by Juhana Aunesluoma and Tapani
Paavonen, contemporary input-output studies influenced by Heckscher-Ohlin model by
Reino Hjerppe in 1975 and Pekka Parkkinen in 1977 and index calculations by Ilkka
Kajaste for the 1980s. Additionally, there are interesting economic historical applications
of the H–O model, both by Finnish researchers and others. International research that
does not focus on Finland, but is relevant to the approach at hand is considered too then.
The only economic historical research in Finland that is influenced by the H–O model
consists of an article by Heikkinen and Hjerppe for the years prior to both the First and
the Second World War respectively, and its critique by Jari Kauppila. Since the latter is
based on the historical input-output tables for 1928, it is the more convincing one.
However, H–O notions are covered only to a limited degree in both texts. Labour intensity
was the only factor quantified explicitly by Heikkinen and Hjerppe with the wage sum’s
share of value added, which was also compared to value-added.96 Applying this approach
on nine industries, the authors conclude that there were no capital intensive sectors with
high value-added in Finland. In fact, only paper and foodstuffs, beverage and tobacco
industries were capital intensive in this framework. The authors explain the results on the
grounds that paper industry had raised its productivity through mechanization and more
effective production processes. Metal and woodworking industries were conversely
labour intensive.97
Following Leontief,98 Kauppila calculates the ratio of comparative capital/labour
intensity of imports compared to exports for 1928: 0.5. He concludes that “Finland
exported commodities which absorbed more capital and less labour, on average, than
95 Larjavaara 1978, 194
96 Capital intensity was assumed to be inversely related labour intensity.
97 Heikkinen & Hjerppe 1983, 122–123
98 The basic calculation is as follows: total labour and capital requirements are calculated for exports and
competitive imports, which are then used to calculate capital/labour ratios for both. The ratio for imports
divided by that of exports yields an index number which Leontief assumed to correspond with relative
capital abundance when less than 1.0 and with relative labour abundance when over 1.0. See Leontief 1956
for more details.
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would have been required for the production of the goods it found cheaper to import”.99
However, there were only two industries with capital-labour ratios clearly higher than
average: paper manufactures and mining, with chemical and non-metallic mineral
industries being borderline cases. The paper industry’s high ratio is related to the
development identified by Heikkinen and Hjerppe – mechanization and the
rationalization of production – whereas woodworking was relatively labour intensive
probably due to seasonal labour force used in the exploitation of forest resources. Taking
into account both direct and indirect requirements, Kauppila notes that the Heikkinen and
Hjerppe seem to have overemphasized capital intensity of food manufacturing.100 Metal
manufacturing’s labour intensity increased substantially when including indirect
requirements, but it was still more capital intensive than what was argued by Heikkinen
and Hjerppe.101
In conclusion, there exists “partial support to Heckscher-Ohlin theorem” in the Finland
of 1928, since the country exported relatively more capital intensive products and
imported relatively more labour intensive products.102 However, woodworking industry
was relatively labour intensive export industry, which is contrary to what the model
predicts. Kauppila argues that this industry was based on forest resources and on log-
floating on Finland’s river network which was effectively a natural infrastructure
endowment. Therefore Finnish comparative advantage was based on natural resources
and “a sufficient stock of labour to exploit these advantages”, but this changed when
capital intensive paper exports became predominant during the depression of the 1930s.103
Although I argued before that Finnish economic historians have not engaged in empirical
work with the intent of locating the most important determinants of Finnish export
structure in the post-war period, I am not claiming there has been no discussion on the
topic. Justification on the choices of determinants is not always explicit however, and
these statements are not verified with econometric methods for example.
99 Kauppila 2007, 122–124
100 Ibid., 123–125
101 Ibid., 122–125. Kauppila criticises Heikkinen and Hjerppe on several grounds. First, their measure is
calculated with wages instead of working hours or years, secondly they forego the possibility that an
industry is simultaneously using capital and labour inputs less than average and lastly they consider direct




Take Kaukiainen who states that labour costs rose in the post-war decades to the extent
that export specialization began to depend on other factors. Both export diversification
and intraindustry trade indicate that “comparative advantages, at least those that depend
on resources and other natural endowments, have lost in importance compared with
capital and know-how”.104 However, how the author arrived at such a conclusion is not
clear: the statement seems to have been derived from Pihkala’s description of the
increasing amount of demand, neo-technological and New Trade theories.105
As mentioned before, Riitta Hjerppe stresses that in the long-term Finnish economic life
was shaped by supply-side factors such as “labour, capital and natural resources” but also
by technology and institutions.106 She mentions human capital, but argues that it and
professional skills, know-how and technological innovation depend on each other. She
concludes that while wood is the most abundant resource in Finland, production based on
other materials has grown. Yet this is only a general account on Finnish economic
development and regarding specifically post-war exports Hjerppe only notes that they
tended to be capital intensive “with regard to their resource base”.107
The claim there is based on Reino Hjerppe’s model, which is considered later.108
Elsewhere she maintains that Finnish manufacturing as a whole was primarily based on
forest resources in the 1950s. From the late 1950s to the 1960s, liberalization of foreign
trade induced an investment programme in wood and paper industries – which can be
considered as capital intensity. Hjerppe mentions that the ability to use foreign technology
– as most novel technology was acquired through the imports of production machinery
and licences – reflected satisfactory professional skills of labour which can be interpreted
as human capital’s newfound importance. Hjerppe’s views are very much framed in a
Heckscher–Ohlinian perspective.109
Paavonen adds that Finland’s foreign trade was based on comparative advantage during
the protectionist period before the 1960s. Although not explicitly stated as such
Paavonen’s idea of comparative advantage is related to the H–O model as well. Finland
104 Kaukiainen 2006, 151
105 Based on Kaukiainen 2006, footnote 21 and Pihkala 1988. There is no description quite like
Kaukiainen’s in the pages mentioned. It is also not explicitly argued how IIT is connected with capital or
know-how, although Kaukiainen could be considering Falvey’s model or product quality implicitly.
106 Hjerppe 1989, 169




was endowed with “forest resources, relatively abundant ore of non-ferrous metals, water
resources and log floating ways and cheap, uneducated workforce”.110 Aside from forest
industries, comparative advantage was also found in particularly clothing industry, due to
abundance of cheap labour. In the 2000s, the forest endowment and the respective sector
remain significant – though in smaller scope – whereas hydropower was already fully
utilized by the 1970s which was followed by the depletion of ore resources in the 1980s.
During the same time Finland ceased to be a source for cheap labour, which Paavonen
partly attributes to solidary wage policy of the time. This effectively meant that wage
differences between productive and unproductive industries were flattened, which
according to Erik Dahmén led to slower structural transformation.111
Aunesluoma argues that unlike the 19th century globalization, characterized by raw
materials and comparative advantage, the post-war period was conversely defined by
manufactures and taking advantage of economies of scale.112 Paavonen sees this shift into
scale advantage as linked with the integrationist period starting in the 1960s and export
diversification.113 Neither researcher empirically verifies whether scale advantage was a
determinant of exports. Both of them seem to derive the claim’s validity from New Trade
Theory and its ability to explain IIT. While Paavonen does link IIT to product
differentiation, he treats NTT primarily as a synonym for economies of scale, which is
somewhat misleading since product differentiation is an important topic there as well.114
Economic historical research has mentioned other possible determinants of trade as well.
Pihkala juxtaposes structural changes in foreign trade with free trade integration and
remittent devaluations of markka. For instance, the devaluation of 1957 was motivated
by the expansion of paper industry and the exploitation of forest resources. The resulting
growth in exports ended in the mid-1960s, after which focus shifted onto increasing the
value-added of forest sector – from pulp to paper and then to paper products – due to the
limited availability of forest resources. The devaluation of 1967 was also not only related
to the general competitiveness of exports but also to the marketing of “new exports”
comprised of metal, textile and chemical exports.115
110 Paavonen 2008, 257
111 Ibid., 257, 262–262; Dahmén 1963, 44
112 Aunesluoma 2011, 154
113 Paavonen 2008, 260. Paavonen argues that comparative advantage still had a role in increasing the value-
added in traditional export industries.
114 Aunesluoma 2011, 154; Paavonen 2008, 22
115 Pihkala 1982a, 376
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I already mentioned studies by Aunesluoma and Paavonen. They are mostly concerned
with free trade integration and hence connect the changes in Finnish export structure to
trade liberalization and tariff reductions beginning in the 1950s. Indeed, trade was
liberalized to some extent already between 1956 and 1959 – for example 76% of Finland’s
imports from Western Europe were liberalized in conjunction with the devaluation of
1957. Subsequent trade agreements included FINEFTA in 1961, EEC agreement in 1973
and different global agreements related to GATT.116
At the time, predictions on FINEFTA’s impacts were mostly interpreted through the
conventional H–O model. Free trade was believed to enlarge labour intensive industries,
since Finland was poor in capital yet rich in relatively affordable labour – although this
was not necessarily the case based on Pohjola’s arguments in 1996.117 Free trade
integration ended up affecting the formerly protected labour intensive textile industry the
most, but also metal industry which was dependent on both home markets and Eastern
Trade. As a consequence of FINEFTA, trade to signatory countries both increased and
diversified. That trade integration might have been an important determinant of exports
structure needs to be acknowledged then.118
To understand this argument more in detail, one needs to remember that there was a clear
division between Finnish industries. The internationally oriented forest industry was
counterbalanced by an uncompetitive domestic manufacturing. This fact of economic life
harkens back to the interwar period. Finnish domestic manufacturing, protected by tariffs,
was diverse in sectorial terms – but basic on a product level.119
That changed when domestic manufacturing was subjected to foreign competition. Some
sectors suffered while others managed to specialize and compete in the world markets.
At least by the 1980s, terms like “domestic manufacturing”120 and “new exports”121 had
lost their meaning due to diversification of exports. Only food manufacturing, graphic
industry and manufacture of construction goods could be defined as home market
industries at that point. However, Aunesluoma adds that the term “domestic
116 Aunesluoma 2011, 286; Pihkala 2001, 194–197
117 Aunesluoma 2011, 221; Pohjola 1996, 111–112
118 Aunesluoma 2011, 216–217; Paavonen 2008, 252–254
119 Ibid., 11, 258; Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151; Hjerppe 1982, 408
120 Translated from: “kotimarkkinateollisuus”.
121 Translated from: “uusvienti”.
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manufacturing” was replaced by concepts like “sensitive sectors”122 or “labour intensive
industry”123 so the development might not have been that clear-cut.124
Evaluating the exact importance of trade integration on export structure is difficult, since
one cannot simply assert what the counterfactual autarchic development would have
entailed. Economic changes would have probably been similar, though occurring at a
slower pace.125 Aunesluoma thinks that had FINEFTA been discarded, exports into the
West would have continued, but from a more handicapped situation. Exports of more
highly refined products would have been more difficult whereas those of low quality such
as wood pulp would have been more viable. It is interesting to note that Swedish forest
companies ultimately and in spite of trade integration chose the latter option while Finnish
firms invested heavily in new paper production, which led into fast development.126
Additionally, Swedish textile companies invested in Finland at the end of 1960s due to
lower labour costs, which was made possible not only by the FINEFTA trade agreement
but also by the devaluation of Markka in 1967.127
Another important characteristic of the era was the emergence of intraindustry trade.
Paavonen does not focus on the economic determinants for Finnish IIT himself, but he
does refer to studies performed in the 1980s which have identified a vast set of
explanatory factors such as income levels, small differences in size of market areas or
high R&D expenditure. Aside from Soviet trade there was an increasing tendency for IIT
to grow after 1960, whether with Sweden, Britain, Efta or EEC or EU. Trade with Sweden
was especially of intraindustrial nature, and noticeably more than the total trade with
Western countries. Paavonen thinks that Efta integration likely promoted this
development, although the general trend is not as drastic when also including non-
manufacturing SITC categories.128
I will not discuss research on intraindustry trade greatly, since explaining its magnitude
in comparison with inter-industry trade is not the main topic of this thesis. Besides, there
is ample research already on the topic. Yet determinants of IIT across industries cannot
122 Translated from: “arat alat”.
123 Translated from: “työvoimavaltainen ala”.
124 Aunesluoma 2011, 289
125 Paavonen 2008, 252–254
126 Aunesluoma 2011, 213, 216. Aunesluoma believes this to be a form of Nordic division of labour and
specialization, and a result of free trade integration.
127 Ibid., 213–216
128 Paavonen 2008, 260–261
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be ignored insofar as they determined a substantial portion of Finnish trade structure, or
so is presumed in many studies.129 Parjanne probably has the most comprehensive study
on IIT, but she considers only the year 1985. She found several NTT variables to be
statistically significant with correct signs: relative advertising expenditure reflecting
brand, average plant size reflecting scale advantage, and decreasing concentration ratio
reflecting monopolistic competition.130 While Parjanne’s study shows that intraindustry
trade in Finland can be explained with New Trade Theory, it does not actually control for
factor endowments nor does it explain their relevance in a meaningful way.131
Jan Otto Andersson and Yrjänä Tolonen have an especially pertinent study concerning
IIT for this thesis. They argue that it increased in Finland during 1960–1980 when the
country was a net-importer but then ceased when Finland became, if it already was not
on some industry, a net-exporter. According to the authors, this tendency indicates that
this type of trade was not “real” intraindustry trade, but rather a cause of change in
Finland’s place in international division of labour. They assert that IIT would have
increased in the absence of trade liberalization anyway since it grew in Finnish trade with
West-Germany in the 1960s, before the EEC agreement.132
The authors’ explanation for increasing trend of IIT is that Finland managed to leverage
its position between Sweden and Soviet Union. Swedish trade flourished due to cultural
proximity and low labour costs according to product cycle theory.133 The authors also
mention, perhaps referring to Linder’s theory, that Sweden was also used as an expanded
home market for highly income-elastic products. Trade with Soviet Union allowed
Finland to specialize in products which were relatively technologically demanding. The
extent of these exports grew in accordance with imports thanks to Eastern Trade’s
bilateral clearing system. However, these arguments are not tested, only suggested.134
The third part of previous research is comprised of Reino Hjerppe’s and Pekka
Parkkinen’s input-output applications written in the 1970s. Indeed, both share a
perspective close to the H–O model. However, their approach there differs from mine,
since even if factor intensities are considered in this thesis, it remains a cross-industry
129 See Erkkilä 1993; Parjanne 1992; Parjanne 1989; Andersson 1987 or Andersson & Tolonen, 1982.
130 Parjanne 1992, 194–195
131 Ibid., 82. GDP per capita is used as a proxy variable for factor compositions.
132Andersson & Tolonen 1982, 33, 35
133 I must admit that I find their argument over cultural proximity slightly impressionistic. One could
speculate that their Swedish-speaking background in Åbo Akademi has something to do with it.
134 Ibid., 33, 35. They are explicitly based on product cycle and market area theories.
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study that estimates different variables’ impact on export structure. Parkkinen’s approach
is actually completely opposite since he studies how commodity structure of trade
changed input structure and not the other way around.135
Reino Hjerppe’s study on Finnish factor intensities and their efficiency during 1965–1970
is primarily focused on capital and labour whereas natural resources are only considered
in discussing the results and human capital is mostly disregarded. It should be noted that
his study is more of a theoretical exercise where alternative models for input-output
analysis are estimated.136 More specifically he constructed a model with 34 industries that
maximizes private consumption, with alternative criteria to test whether the estimated
situation in 1965 corresponded with 1970.137
Hjerppe generalized the situation leading to the 1970s thus: Finland specialized as
Heckscher-Ohlin model implied by exporting goods of forest industries, which are
characteristically relatively capital intensive processing industries at an advantage if there
is an abundance of raw materials. The technological level of forest industries was also
quite high, which leads Hjerppe to characterize Finland as a dual economy with a
relatively developed export sector and a traditional domestic one. Hjerppe mentions
natural resources as having been thought of an important determinant for Finnish exports
and also suggests that it is possible that the long tradition of Finnish wood manufacturing
has produced related know-how and technological and marketing skills to the extent that
affects Finland’s position in the international division of labour.138
Hjerppe concludes that it seemed that capital intensive production was not optimal and
economic policy that propagated expansion of that kind of basic industry ought to be
avoided unless that expansion was not targeted on a sector which had an existing
comparative advantage.139 This is reminiscent of Matti Pohjola’s argument that the level
of capital intensity of Finnish post-war economy was inefficiently high.140 Hjerppe’s
model implied that pulp and paper production had expanded too much.141 The basic, raw
material-producing industries whose expansion was also criticized consisted of textile
135 Parkkinen 1977, 3
136 Hjerppe 1975, 130, 136–140
137 Ibid., 1–6, 150–161
138 Ibid., 159–161
139 Ibid., 160
140 See Pohjola 1996.
141 Hjerppe 1975, 149–150. Also see Ibid., 160 for welfare-maximizing predictions which include growth
in industries – some of which could be considered belonging in new exports.
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industry and the basic manufactures of wood and metal industries. A better alternative in
Hjerppe’s mind would have been increasing production of industries with high value-
added. At least in the case of textile exports, which eventually collapsed, Hjerppe’s
argument was far-sighted, although basic metal exports did not share the same fate.142
Parkkinen’s licentiate thesis discusses input and natural resource structure of Finnish
commodity exports in 1964–1975, the period which broadly reflects the changes driven
by Efta integration.143 This study is interesting since it does not only contain empirical
findings, but it also tests Ricardian and H–O models, and to a lesser degree, scale
advantage and new technology theories.144 In other words, Parkkinen shares my
appreciation for considering multiple models though his focus is more on testing them.
Parkkinen concluded that the H–O model was not supported by comparisons of capital
intensity between exports and imports. For 1970: out of 12 export market areas, there
were only four in which the Leontief paradox did not hold.145 However, with human
capital and natural resources there was some evidence for H–O model’s validity.
Particularly renewable natural resource exports were distinctively intensive in Finnish
commodity and service exports during 1970.146
The structure of commodity exports became more labour intensive in 1964–1975 while
human capital intensity, measured by income level, decreased. Based on the H–O model,
one should frame Finnish comparative advantage during 1964–1975 to be found in
industries requiring low skills. Textile and assorted industries, containing a great deal of
labour but not much physical nor human capital, increased their export shares rapidly.
Parkkinen also argues that this was related to the devaluation of 1967 and trade
liberalization. The former lowered Finnish labour costs while the latter was especially
conducive to lowering trade barriers concerning textile and assorted industries. There was
also a similar effect for resource intensive exports.147
Unlike H–O model, Ricardian theory was supported by the finding that commodity
exports were more productive than imports except with Sweden and Soviet Union. That
is, the Ricardian notion predicted the structure of trade correctly in ten market areas out
142 Hjerppe 1975, 168
143 Parkkinen 1977, 3–5
144 Ibid., 152
145 Ibid., 49–50. Essentially the figures for imports suppose what the input structure would have been had
hypothetical domestic production substituted imports.
146 Ibid., 161–162, 165–166
147 Ibid., 95, 152
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of 12 – decidedly better than the H–O model.148 Tests pertaining to scale advantage and
technology theories are less certain.149 Concerning novel technologies, Finland imported
goods reflective of human capital from technologically advanced countries at least
relative to its exports. On scale advantage, Parkkinen mostly notes that Finland had a
tendency to export forest products to large countries characterized by scale advantage and
imported non-renewable resources therefrom.150
While Parkkinen and Hjerppe analysed, if not early, then at least the middle post-war
period, Kajaste studied sectoral specialization for the late post-war era of the 1980s. Using
different proxies for comparative advantage he notes that the hypothesis that “strongly”
competitive fields should grow did not hold in the 1980s. Only a third of these increased
their standing in production and exports. It is noteworthy that the share of forest exports
in both EEC trade and elsewhere decreased, even when the last tariff barriers concerning
forest products were finally lifted in the 1980s. The EEC agreement seems to have created
more diversification since it increased metal engineering and chemical exports alongside
those of weakly competitive fields. While this might reflect a shift in comparative
advantage, Kajaste was also clearly aware of new developments in international trade
theory as he also refers to the possibility that specialization might have been also
determined by economies of scale, technology, and product differentiation.151
By the latter half of 1980s, the aforementioned “weak fields” of business, designated
beforehand by previous studies, tended to reflect specialization in labour intensive
industries, and to some extent industries with low factor intensities across the board.152
Finland was not especially capital intensive or skill intensive. On the other hand,
Finland’s dependence on skill intensity increased after the early 1980s when the country
had been even more labour intensive and less skill intensive. Capital intensive industries
with low R&D intensity were less at a comparative advantage in the late 1980s while
capital intensive industries with high R&D intensity were marginally better off. The loss
of comparative advantage in labour intensive industries was a general European
phenomenon that affected South European countries alongside Finland and Austria. Yet
148 Parkkinen 1977, 137–138, 141
149 Ibid., 121, 131, 142. Scale advantage and technology countries were assigned, not measured, on a
country level by Parkkinen. Finland was neither. Additionally, Parkkinen’s sample size is quite low.
150 Ibid., 142–150
151 Kajaste 1991, 481–482
152 “Weak” fields include consumption goods industries whereas industries with low factor intensities are
mostly related to machines used in forest industry, mining, agriculture etc. and production of wool, electric
cables and flooring. See Ibid., 483–487, 491.
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Sweden, for example, was more specialized than Finland in industries related to capital,
research and education and the country’s exports were not labour intensive.153
There are also a few international cross-country Heckscher-Ohlin studies which have also
examined Finnish trade patterns. Robert Feenstra and Gregory Clark calculated upper and
lower bounds for efficiencies of land and labour for India relative to Finland for the years
1910 and 1990 with the conclusion that Finnish labour has become more productive than
land and vice versa in the Indian case. However as noted by Joel Mokyr, they do not
address human capital and there is no tangible attempt to explain what happened and one
could still view the results as an example of the Leontief paradox.154
Hellvin and Torstensson tested the H–O model in the case of Finnish and Swedish trade
with Eastern Europe during 1985. While communist economies were characterized by
administrative pricing and a lack of market competition, they claim that the general
hypothesis of factor endowments determining trade patterns can still be tested. Finland
and Sweden were found to be more abundant in human and physical capital than the
Soviet Union, but Finland was paradoxically a net importer of physical capital intensive
goods and an exporter of human capital, though the latter variable was statistically non-
significant.155 The authors believe that the result might be due to politics associated with
Eastern Trade. Furthermore, they mention that it tended to be more capital intensive than
what the H–O model predicts because the Soviet preference for labour theory of value
underrates capital. Therefore, one can treat the unpredicted trade pattern as a symptom of
either H–O model’s weakness or Eastern Trade’s distortionary effects.156
Although the chapter so far has incorporated both economic historical and economic
studies in discussing studies of countries other than Finland I will focus on just economic
historic studies, since they reflect the empirical approach adopted in this thesis more
closely. Naturally, there are numerous empirical applications of trade models within
economics that focus on other countries. Robert Baldwin for example studied Heckscher-
Ohlin factors in conjunction with unionization, scale advantage and monopolistic
competition concerning U.S. trade structure in 1971, well before the general formulation
153 Kajaste 1991, 484–488
154 Clark & Feenstra 2003, 302–311; Mokyr 2003, 316–317, 320
155 It is written in the text that Finland was a net exporter of physical capital against theoretical predictions
which must be a writing typo since the regression table and the rest of the writing imply otherwise.
156 Hellvin & Torstensson 1991, 380, 383–387. One might criticize the study for assuming that Finland and
Sweden share the same factor intensities as those obtained from US data.
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of NTT.157 Yet I do not discuss these studies here, since that has already been done in
more depth elsewhere.158 Furthermore, since they are similar in approach with economic
historical trade studies, there is not much sense in repeating the same intuition.
It has been noted that Ricardian empirics tended to be quite rare, because comparative
advantage is difficult to measure. Indeed, a real study of comparative advantage should
test productivity growth across both countries and industries: sectoral productivity growth
has no effect on trade if it coincides in every country nor would general growth since it
does not change relative competitiveness between industries.159 Observed correlation
with trade and sectoral productivity growth could be biased by omitted variables and not
relate to anything real comparative advantage then.
There are some historical studies relying on a Ricardian intuition such as those regarding
the British trade prior to the First World War and productivity of British manufacturing
in the long-term.160 However, the Ricardian approach is too simplistic for the Finnish
context in 1956–1989. Neither labour productivity nor total factor productivity, at least
in its standard formulation, explicitly show the different impacts of forest resources,
human capital or scale advantage that one might suppose are explanatory.161 Additionally,
these studies may confuse comparative with absolute advantage.
In comparison, there is a great deal of historical trade research relying on the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework. Estevadeordal’s article from 1997 has already been mentioned.
Although the main focus there is on trade policy in 1913, Estevadeordal estimates a cross-
country model with different factor endowments: skilled labour, unskilled labour,
agricultural lands, mineral resources and total capital stock. Additionally, distance to
markets was included, since the point was to account for trade barriers. The model itself
is not based on examinations of industrial structure however, so its applicability is limited
here. Although Estevadeordal’s net trade regressions are mostly statistically significant,
particularly labour variables tended to be less significant than the others.162 However as
157 Baldwin 1971
158 See Deardorff 1984 for a review of studies concerning the post-war U.S. with tests of Ricardian, H–O
and technology theories and NTT insights to a lesser degree. For testing trade theories see Leamer 1994.
159 Dollar & Wolff 1993, 144
160 See for example Allen 1979, and the discussion between Temin 1997 and Crafts & Harley 2000. See
Broadberry 1998 considering British productivity although the focus there is not on trade patterns.
161 Total factor productivity in fact absorbs the impact of all of these.
162 Estevadeordal 1997, 89–90, 97–101
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already noted, in a later paper written with Taylor, Estevadeordal’s model performed
quite badly for the pre-1914 period apart from resource intensity related to minerals.163
There are also cross-sectional regression analyses of the H–O model concerning Great
Britain: Crafts and Thomas studied British specialization in 1910–1935, which was
followed by the dissertation by Brian Varian regarding late-Victorian exports. Crafts and
Thomas concluded that the H–O model, modified to account for human capital in addition
to capital and unskilled labour, was an explanatory one.164 Varian likewise included
human capital, measured through industry wages, as a determinant in regression
analysis.165 Indeed, human capital and natural resources have been described as the two
“third factor” solutions to the Leontief paradox.166 The two studies here highlight that
cross-industry factor endowment regressions can be explanatory, but that one needs to
account for more than just labour and capital. When considering the Finnish factor
endowments, natural resources are of special interest. While Varian did not find natural
resources to be a statistically significant determinant of British trade in the late 1800s,167
Wright’s article on factor content of U.S. trade for 1879–1940 is quite interesting.
Wright asserts that U.S manufacturing exports were primarily intensive in non-renewable
resources and increasingly so from 1880 to 1920. While capital intensity of exports was
clearly higher than that of imports until 1940, there seems to be no evidence for growing
capital intensity in the period when U.S. industrial production was heading for world
domination. The same applies to human capital: higher level in exports relative to imports
but a slightly decreasing trend. Conversely the largest difference in favour of U.S. exports
can be seen in non-renewable natural resources.168
Wright’s article is important for this thesis due to its finding that the fact that resource
intensity is the single determinant of U.S. trade that is consistently both statistically and
historically significant. This was mirrored by Estevadeordal’s and Taylor’s finding that
factor content theory works best when it comes to resource endowments,169 and  by
Parkkinen in Finland as discussed previously.170 This could reflect the fact that the H–O
163 Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002, 383–388
164 Crafts & Thomas 1986, 629, 633
165 Varian 2017, 127
166 Wright 1990, 654
167 Varian 2017, 121–122
168 Wright 1990, 651, 656–658
169 Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002, 391–392
170 See Parkkinen 1977.
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model assumes that factors do not move across borders, which is sensible when it comes
to natural resources, but perhaps not when it comes to labour and capital.
On the other hand, Wright maintains that resources were not a separate factor, but
associated with capital and technology. According to him, capital intensity should not be
rejected as a characteristic of U.S. manufacturing, but interpreted as rising through
“specialization in an industrial technology in which capital was complementary to natural
resources” rather than abundance of capital.171 Additionally the availability of fuel and
raw materials were linked to organizational innovations, like the moving assembly line.
Technological innovations were not irrelevant, but they were specific to the U.S. resource
environment of the time. Indeed, the importance of natural resources was less due to
geological endowment itself and more due to efficiency in exploiting it.172
Besides standard trade models, there are also demand and neo-technological theories,
which I have mentioned previously. I have not discussed them in detail since they are not
often mentioned in the literature with comparison to the standard trade models. Wright’s
H–O article does include mentions of both Linder’s market area and Vernon’s product
cycle theories, although he proceeds to argue that they are not relevant to the U.S. context
and that supply-side factors ought to be considered instead. On the other hand, at least the
so-called neo-technological approach, which stresses R&D intensity and managerial
practices and science-based production processes, is not mutually exclusive with H–O
factors. Applications of NTT in historical trade studies are also not common, although
there are a few economic historical studies concerning IIT at least.173
2.4 Choosing between Trade Models
These models are only tools, each of which is appropriate in some
circumstances and inappropriate in others. Empirical enterprises
should therefore not attempt to test the validity of the theories.
Instead, empirical work might identify the circumstances under
which each of the tools is most appropriate, or measure the ‘amount’
of trade that is due to each of the sources. Neither of these tasks has
been accomplished or often even attempted.174
171 Wright 1990, 660
172 Ibid., 651, 661
173 Ibid., 654–655. Neo-technological theory is not applicable to the U.S. in Wright’s opinion since U.S.
exports were not appreciated by European tastes and their novelty was due to “technical specifications or
quality”. See Varian 2017, 129–137 or Petersson 1987 for historical IIT studies.
174 Leamer 1994, 69
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Edward Leamer’s quote, while otherwise insightful, errs in separating contextual validity
from quantifying the importance of determinants. Even if the latter line of inquiry is my
primary interest, one needs to choose the correct variables according to some framework,
some model. If there are various major and minor models of foreign trade, and possible
combinations such as the Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model, one needs to “identify the
circumstances” in order to determine which one is the most appropriate. It is useful to
consider what Rodrik recommends when choosing between economic models:
 1. Verifying critical assumptions of a model to see how well they
reflect the setting in question.
2. Verifying that the mechanisms posited in the model are, in fact,
operating.
3. Verifying that the direct implications of the model are borne out.
4. Verifying whether the incidental implications, those that the model
generates as a by-product, are broadly consistent with observed
outcomes.175
One can interpret these diagnostic questions from a validity perspective: while economic
models ought to be internally valid in the sense that they are consistent in their
mathematic, theoretical setting, their external validity, i.e. their representation of the real-
world conditions at hand, can be questioned. Rodrik asserts that external validity is
contingent on the setting. On the other hand, there is no scientific method per se for
determining external validity related to assumptions, mechanisms and predicted
outcomes, only subjective reasoning.176
Verification of competing trade models according to Rodrik’s four questions, albeit
necessary, is of magnitude requiring its own graduate thesis. For example, testing critical
assumptions is time-consuming since one would not only need to evaluate whether a
given model’s conclusions change drastically if these assumptions are altered but also in
testing whether they are in place. However, some rationales for choosing models can be
considered. On the other hand, one has to emphasize that the approach here is empirical.
A choice of one model as a primary framework does not preclude taking into account
different determinants. Indeed, certain characteristics that are not explicitly considered by
any model here such as trade liberalization and Eastern Trade have to be discussed.
175 Rodrik 2015, 94
176 Ibid., 112
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On the basis of previous studies, one can draw some generalizations on the most important
determinants of trade. In particular, resource intensity is something that cannot be side-
lined. First, Finnish economic history has canonized the importance of forest resources
on wood and paper exports. Secondly, raw materials have been found to be statistically
significant, indeed more so than other factors of production, in a number of studies.177
Thirdly, as Romalis points out, many capital intensive industries are also raw material
intensive which means that omitting the latter will overestimate the importance of capital
as a determinant of trade, especially when considering poor countries that mostly refine
raw materials into exports.178 Forestry-dependent Finland of the 1950s and 1960s could
be characterized along those lines. Conversely one could argue that resources can distort
the H–O model, yet I would point out that theoretical consistency of an imperfect model
ought not to constrain us here. Since this thesis is primarily an empirical, not a theoretical
study, resources have to be explicitly considered. Another third-factor addition to the H–
O model is human capital. According to Parkkinen it may have had some relevance
although exports became less intensive with regards to it over 1964–1975.179
It seems evident that the need for a third-factor solution should be inspected. Since testing
the Leontief paradox in post-war Finland requires a thesis of its own, I merely imitate
Kauppila’s ad hoc approach for 1928 in studying factor intensities of manufacturing
industries. Chart 1. details the situation in 1959, prior to large-scale intraindustry trade
and trade integration, when H–O model should have been more applicable.180
For now, I will forego the calculations behind the scatterplot – they are described in
chapter 3.1 – and instead note that under the basic intuition of the two-factor H–O model
countries should be either exporters of capital and importers of labour, or vice versa. As
Kauppila puts it regarding 1928 “Finland exported commodities that absorbed more
capital and less labour on average, than would have been required for the production of
the goods it found cheaper to import”.181 This implies that export industries should have
been collectively situated on the upper left-hand side of a scatterplot – such as the one
here: Chart 1. – that signifies high capital intensity and low labour intensity, or a high
capital/labour ratio, and importer industries should have been located on the lower right-
177 Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002; Wright 1990; Parkkinen 1977
178 Romalis 2004, 79
179 Parkkinen 1977, 42, 163
180 Kauppila 2007, 123–126
181 Ibid., 123
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Chart 1. Total Working Hour and Total Net Capital Requirements (€) per 1 Million Euros of
Gross Output in Manufacturing and Mining during 1959
Notes: Both capital and labour are measured with total factor requirements defined as the number of working hours or
net capital stock required to produce one million euros worth of output both directly and indirectly through the use of
inputs. Dark green triangles refer to industries where value-added of exports relative to gross value of production
exceeded 30%, brown squares to 10% – both being ad hoc thresholds for export industries – and light green circles
otherwise signifying home market industries. The use of gross value of production as a denominator follows the logic
of input-output calculations. Axis units in thousands. See the appendices for the industrial abbreviation.
Source: The author’s own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input–Output Tables 1959; see the appendices on labour and
capital.
hand side with low capital intensity and high labour intensity. Kauppila concluded that
the notion that Finnish exports were capital intensive was confounded by woodworking
exports which had a slightly lower capital/labour ratio than the average, whereas paper
industry was characterized by high capital intensity.182
The same situation applied in 1959 as woodworking industry clearly more labour
intensive less capital intensive than paper industry.  However, while metal ore mining
was similar to paper industry in this regard exports of transport equipment and machinery
exports were not conclusively either capital or labour intensive. Export industries and
domestic manufacturing did not differ clearly according to capital and labour intensity.183
While this exercise is by no means a formal test, Chart 1. can be interpreted as a blow to
the validity of the two-factor model, even if Kauppila found some qualified evidence in
favour of H–O model concerning the interwar export structure.184 And while capital
182 Kauppila 2007, 124–125
183 Furthermore, the scatterplot highlights that capital and labour do not have an inverse relationship, in
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intensity was certainly a characteristic of paper manufacturing, other factors need to be
examined in order to understand what gave impetus to other exports.
Yet the two-factor H–O model does give good indications on the topic. Parkkinen for
example notes that exports, especially of textiles and assorted goods, became more labour
intensive after the devaluation of 1967 and trade integration at least up to 1975. Since
textiles were a key industry in new exports, labour intensity should be studied. Physical
capital is more problematic due to, as argued by Pohjola, excessive capital
fundamentalism, but capital intensity may have still been important.185
In conclusion, a four-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, for all its deficiencies, presents a
natural starting point in search of export structure’s determinants. Yet it is not sufficient
alone, as it can be criticized from two points of view: intraindustry trade and productivity
differences. Pihkala has stated that export diversification was driven by growth in
intraindustry trade, which can be observed from Table 1.186 Statistical artefact or not, IIT
implies that New Trade Theory’s variables, such as product differentiation and scale
advantage, should complement the four-factor model. Aunesluoma and Paavonen both
claim that scale advantage became more important in the integrationist period.187 On the
other hand, Ricardian theory, recently back in fashion, that emphasizes productivity or
technology can be complemented with Heckscher-Ohlin framework as well. Such a
model, with constant returns to scale, can account for IIT as well according to Davis.188
Many of the models mentioned here lack an empirical test, which makes the choice
between them more difficult. For example, Davis does not show empirically whether his
model is predictive, nor is it apparent how to measure technology based on it.189 Indeed,
there is not much empirical evidence on whether technology was important or not,
although Parkkinen offers limited proof that trade pattern was determined by
productivity.190
185 Pohjola 1996; Parkkinen 1977, 98, 163
186 Pihkala 1988, 84. However, the rate of IIT was still low in 1960 apart from trade with Sweden and it
was still on a lower level than in other Nordic countries during the 1980s.
187 Aunesluoma 2011, 154; Paavonen 2008, 260
188 See Davis 1995.
189 Ibid.
190 Parkkinen 1977, 137–138, 141. The problem there is that Finnish export sectors having a higher
productivity than import, or hypothetical import-substituting in exact terms, sectors does not necessarily
account for relative productivity differences or comparative advantage in a meaningful way
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Table 1. Grubel-Lloyd Indices for Intraindustry Trade in Manufacturing 1959–1989
1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
FOO 55.9 73.7 82.8 97.0 86.2 76.9 86.9
BEV 14.5 30.7 83.5 66.0 73.3 82.1 92.2
TEX 18.8 54.9 83.0 94.2 94.0 95.4 64.9
LEA 13.8 53.7 84.4 91.9 90.2 84.8 71.3
WOF 3.3 12.6 11.4 9.2 16.0 23.6 35.9
PAP 1.1 3.6 3.6 6.2 6.6 7.6 9.9
GRA 27.7 42.5 80.0 78.2 82.7 98.0 85.9
CHE 20.3 30.4 34.4 69.7 66.3 72.9 67.6
OIL 0.7 1.1 20.9 71.1 61.3 67.6 48.1
RUB 5.9 19.0 49.0 61.6 76.9 82.1 64.2
MIN 74.3 66.7 61.9 99.0 86.5 89.6 94.5
MET 34.8 64.2 58.9 99.9 93.5 82.4 86.6
MFM 52.3 34.7 60.3 79.2 93.2 90.0 81.5
ELE 34.7 45.3 56.9 77.1 78.8 79.9 80.0
TRE 71.6 55.3 70.3 76.1 95.9 93.0 75.5
OTH 8.9 23.8 31.1 66.8 64.2 79.6 47.4
Median 19.5 38.6 59.6 76.6 80.8 82.1 73.4
Notes: A score of 100 refers to complete intraindustry trade whereas 0 refers to complete inter-industry trade. G-L
indices were multiplied by 100 for easier perusal.
Source: The author’s own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input-Output Tables 1959–1989.
The question then is whether one should consider factors pertaining to NTT or Ricardian
notions. Whose assumptions correspond more aptly to Finland in 1956–1989? Consider
for instance returns on scale. One can consider this to be an a priori critical assumption
since it is the main difference between the conventional models and NTT. A Heckscher-
Ohlin-Ricardo model is based on constant returns whereas as Chamberlin-Heckscher-
Ohlin model is based on increasing returns. Measuring whether returns on scale were
constant or increasing, or even decreasing, is largely out of the scope here. There is
limited proof concerning the presence of increasing returns as Paul Hansen and Stephen
Knowles have estimated the returns on scale with labour, capital and human capital
inputs, following endogenous growth theory, for 1960-1985 with eleven OECD countries
including Finland and observe increasing returns to scale.191 It has been also suggested
that paper and metal engineering industries had increasing returns to scale.192
While this gives evidence in favours of NTT, it also presents something of a conundrum:
the lack of IIT in the era when paper exports were the most dominant form of trade as
observed in Table 1. There is a possible game theoretical reason for this: pulp and paper
companies’ fear of retaliation. For example, the sales association Converta, representing
191 See Hansen & Knowles 1998.
192 Niemeläinen 2000, 281; Larjavaara 1978, 123
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Finnish paper and board converters, entertained an idea of a marketing network in Sweden
during the mid-1970s. But as the Vice-President of G.A Serlachius Oy put it, there was a
“‘peaceful coexistence’” between Swedish and Finnish companies that might end if
Converta would “‘go and mess your neighbour’s affairs’”.193 Exporting to Sweden carried
the risk of reprisals. In a sense, low levels of IIT might generally reflect high levels of
cartelization. Of course, as seen in Table 18. customs barriers probably impeded paper
imports to Finland during the primacy of forest exports to some degree, prior to free trade
integration. Kaukiainen adds that the “demise of customs duties was almost contemporary
with a big decrease in ocean freights”, and it stands to reason that both developments
should have reduced the cost disadvantage of imports and increased IIT.194
Indeed, another argument for the relevance of New Trade Theory is its direct implication
of IIT. It is not too much of a logical stretch to argue that, while the forest sector probably
depended on extensive forest resources, the observed levels of IIT meant that something
else caused export growth in other industries. Of course, there are competing models here
as well. There is Davis’s model that explains IIT with technological differences, Falvey’s
neo–H–O model which explains it with capital-driven product quality and C–H–O model
with horizontal product differentiation and increasing returns to scale. Again, if returns
to scale were actually increasing in the time period, the C–H–O model might be the most
appropriate option. Yet it and Falvey’s model differ critically also in their assumptions of
the nature of product differentiation, in whether it is vertical and quality-driven or
horizontal and feature-driven.195
Falvey’s neo–H–O model can be essentially summarized thusly: vertical intra-industry
trade, pertaining to quality instead of attributes, will occur assuming that quality is
determined by capital intensity.196 Intra-industry trade is measured with Grubel–Lloyd
index where 1.0 refers to total intra-industry trade and 0.0 to total inter-industry trade.
Vertical differentiation is usually measured with unit price dispersion where a value
exceeding +- 15% threshold is assumed to reflect vertical intra-industry trade. For neo–
H–O model to be relevant here an industry would have to have a high G–L index score,
193 Jensen-Eriksen 2017, 7
194 See Kaukiainen 2006, 161–163. For a theoretical treatise on these effects see Eaton & Kortum 2002,
1751–1754, 1768–1771, 1774–1775.
195 See Varian 2017, 140 or Greenaway, Hine & Milner 1995, 1508–1509 on measuring differentiation.
196 Varian 2017, 109
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a high rate of capital intensity and a unit price dispersion over +15. This score should be
positive since Falvey assumes that capital is used to produce high quality commodities.
The results can be viewed in the appendix Table A 24. The only industry that fulfils the
conditions above is forestry in 1980. Generally speaking, there seems to be little evidence
of Falvey’s theory’s applicability. For example, electrotechnical industry has a high score
of unit price dispersion in 1989 but it was not a capital intensive industry. Considering
that the late post-war period was more affected by intraindustry trade than the early post-
war period, Falvey’s model probably lacks relevance in the earlier period as well.
If it is conversely accepted that IIT is caused by technological differences as suggested
by Davis’ model – the one considered a theoretical curiosity by Helpman – one could
adapt a combination of Ricardian and H–O characteristics along the lines of Harrigan.
Harrigan’s trade model, which is not actually tested on any trade variables, rests on
assumptions of free trade, constant returns to scale and competitive market-clearing.197
The approach there cannot be adopted here straightforwardly since the author attempts to
model technology differences by benchmarking sectoral technologies relative to a given
country.198 Since this thesis is not a cross-country study, this approach is unfeasible.
However, E. Young Song and Chan-Huyn Sohn argue in an empirical paper that in trade
between developed countries the negative relationship between IIT and productivity
differences is larger than that its negative association with factor endowment
differences.199 Since IIT was increasing throughout the post-war period, this would imply
that productivity differences were not probably not growing. Therefore, one can speculate
that technology in the guise of productivity would not be relevant in the post-war period.
Then there is the neo-Ricardian model family originating from the work of Eaton and
Kortum. While particularly the Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer model has some
alluring characteristics, namely its link to Ricardian idea of comparative advantage and
its focus on innate productivity differences that can be separated from exporter-to-
importer or industry-importer trade characteristics, the model has some drawbacks.
Although its definition of comparative advantage includes country-industry specific
factors like infrastructure, institutions and climate, the focus is still the Ricardian one on
labour, when it is apparent that there are other factors of interest concerning the Finnish
197 Harrigan 1997, 447
198 Ibid., 478
199 Song & Sohn 2012, 469–471, 477–478. The dataset covers the years 1976–2001.
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post-war context. During the period of interest, forest resources were the backbone of
forest exports, high investment ratio was pervasive and human capital was growing in
importance in the whole economy. This model does not account for these facets
explicitly.200
Furthermore, the issue there is with the parameter θ of intraindustry heterogeneity related
to technological knowledge, or the “elasticity with which increases in observed
productivity levels, ceteris paribus, lead to increased exports”.201 The parameter is
obtained by estimating exporter-industry fixed effects with estimates of different
magnitude by using measures such as R&D expenditure or total factor productivity. In
the absence of such data for Finland and its trade partners, θ of some magnitude selected
beforehand could be used to capture exporter-importer fixed effects, and to calculate
“revealed measures of productivity”.202 While the authors have a preferred estimate for
1997, it is dubious to believe that it would hold for the entirety of 1956–1989 in Finland.
It is not clear what magnitude should be chosen then, especially since the results could be
unpredictably biased by that decision. Therefore, one must decree that, while perhaps
useful for modern exercises, this model is too narrow theoretically and too uncertain in
its methodology to be adapted in the Finnish post-war context.203
There are also reasons to believe that Linder’s market expansion and Vernon’s product
cycle theories are not entirely useful models. While Pihkala maintains that Linder’s theory
is better suited than the H–O model for Swedish-Finnish trade of 1960s he wonders
whether demand preferences would have really been that different between the countries
decade before, or whether the difference between Swedish and French demand was so
large relative to Finland at the time of intraindustry trade to constitute for a reason to trade
with former but not with the latter. Vernon’s theory lost credibility for two reasons. First,
when economic convergence of the U.S.A, Western European and some Eastern Asian
countries did happen there were no drastic changes in trade structure which was contrary
to the model’s predictions. The model also predicted that home market advantages of
large companies would support exports in their home countries, but production based on
200 Costinot, Donaldson & Komunjer 2012, 582–583, 595
201 Ibid., 607
202 Ibid., 601–602
203 Additionally, the parameter θ is assumed to be identical in all industries and countries which seems
unrealistic. See Ibid., 582–583, 595–598
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U.S. development was increasingly relocated abroad and sometimes even offshored to
companies’ foreign subsidiaries.204
In conclusion, with there being limited support for increasing returns to scale and the clear
implication of intraindustry trade, it seems that the C–H–O model is the relevant
foundation for my empirical approach. All that being said, one should not overemphasize
the link between theory and regression framework too much. Leamer for example openly
questions whether cross-industry regressions are even valid accounts of H–O theory and
is also quite critical of empiric applications of New Trade Theory.205 But as Wright asserts
concerning H–O regression analysis of his own:
On no account should the coefficients be viewed as structural
estimates within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework – – they are best
considered as descriptive summaries of trade patterns in a multi-
factor setting, a way of pointing out areas of distinctive strength and
tracking changes over time.206
The approach adopted in this thesis is and cannot be more than just that – a descriptive
survey of Finnish trade patterns that accounts for magnitude of and changes in multiple
factors over 1956–1989. And while theory is needed for guidance in locating the relevant
factors, the approach should not be constrained into a theoretical straightjacket, Pihkala’s
Scylla, either. Since all models, and particularly trade models, are false by definition, one
need not disregard important factors in an empirical exercise simply because they are not
accounted by theoretical models.
Rodrik points out something that is relevant here: not all models’ assumptions are explicit
and not all of those are uncritical. One such assumption of many models is that the
institutional framework includes property rights, contract enforcement and rule of law.
Although one could characterize post-war Finland in this manner, it must be
acknowledged that possible institutional features are ignored by the trade models here.
Such characteristics consist of export cartels and Eastern Trade for instance. It is also true
that free trade was not among the qualities of international trade initially, which also
necessitates closer inspection on how industries were protected in Finland. Lastly, one
might also wonder if the development of new exports might have been determined by
204 Pihkala 2007, 39; Pihkala 1988, 81. Protectionism of the 1950s probably affected IIT though.
205 Leamer 1994, 78, 84–85
206 Wright 1990, 658
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government activities which I will review primarily through the share of state-owned
companies’ gross output across industries.207
Trade models often assume that the country in question operated under perfect
competition, which did not characterize the Finnish economy during the period here.
Finland, defined as a coordinated market economy, did not ban cartels opting instead for
oversight and interfering only in the most harmful of cases. The immediate post-war
period was heavily cartelized because war-time regulation of the economy was practically
left in the hands of commerce with the effect that cooperation from production to sales
and acquisitions between companies intensified. Finnish legislation failed to resolve these
curtailments of competition. Although there was increasing tendency towards economic
liberalization in the 1980s, legislation on competition was not reformed wholly until
1988.208 The institutional framework did eventually change however and in 1992 cartel
register was finished, partly due to the negotiations to join the European Union.209
Niklas Jensen-Eriksen has emphasized that the stricter, post-war cartel legislation did not
actually lead to decartelization, at least in the case of the pulp and paper industry in Nordic
countries. Instead, pulp and paper cartels began to operate informally under the guises of
club meetings, research institutes and committees for example. He suggests that such a
development was possible in other industries as well, since the incentives for profit and
stability did not disappear in the post-war era.210
Export cartels had the practical benefit of allowing small producers to access otherwise
risky international markets. For example, Finnish paper producers effectively operated as
a single company through their representative sales association: Finnpap.211 The general
opinion of the early post-war period on export cartels was downright positive. The
committee report on cartels of 1952 maintained that export cartels should not be targeted
by cartel legislation since their activity benefited the whole country.212 As Jensen-Eriksen
writes “cartels could promote economic stability and growth and make companies from
small countries stronger players in international trade and negotiations”.213
207 Rodrik 2015, 96–97
208 Jensen-Eriksen 2017, 13; Fellman 2010, 156
209 Ibid., 141–145
210 Jensen-Eriksen 2017, 6–8. Sales associations were sustained through telecommunications, personal
contacts and networks of trust. See also Eloranta & Ojala 2005, 170.
211 Eloranta & Ojala 2005, 170–171. See also Heikkinen 2000.
212 Fellman 2010, 147
213 Jensen-Eriksen 2017, 4
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However, it may be equally the case that cartels allowed certain companies to produce
products of poorer quality in the absence of direct company-consumer relationship and
they impeded growth of novel ideas and companies.214 Innovation and technological
progress may have been curtailed through passive satisfaction of the companies, whose
export quotas were decided collectively in the sales association, meaning that a given firm
had to only adjust production to match its quota.215
The theoretical question of how cartels affected Finnish trade structure is uncertain. Song
and Sohn suggest that at least Ricardian rationales for trade work in a context where each
industry is a duopoly with one domestic and one foreign firm, which should reflect a
market controlled by export cartels.216 Parjanne writes that it is difficult to draw clear
conclusions from oligopolistic theories, but it been suggested that competition between
oligopolistic companies can be a cause of trade, even with identical commodities.217
In conclusion, I would argue that international export cartels could have affected Finnish
export structure through fears of reprisal and price-setting. An export industry would not
have necessarily developed if the commodity market was already controlled by an
international cartel. On the other hand, since international cartels operated, to the best of
my knowledge, in the capitalistic world, it is possible that Finnish industries were able to
channel their exports to a location where cartels of the Free World had no reach.
Indeed, a peculiarity to Finnish foreign trade of the time was trade with the Soviet Union
and other communist countries. Another violation of perfect competition, the so-called
Eastern Trade was centrally organized and operated through a clearing system. As one
proof of its lack of a market mechanism was the fact that the prices and therefore the
probability gained tended to be higher than with Western countries. Finnish companies
had access to the market system – a source of price information that their Soviet
counterparts were disbarred from using even if they tried to negotiate lower prices. The
central budget covered possible losses, so Soviet operators could not evaluate whether
the price negotiations were successful. As a result, there was a systematic bias in favour
of Finnish exporters.218
214 Kuisma 1999, 80; Heikkinen 2000, 479–480
215 Eloranta & Ojala 2005, 171
216 Song & Sohn 2012, 466
217 Parjanne 1992, 11–13
218 Laurila 1995, 99–103
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As with cartels, the profitability of Eastern Trade has been thought to have had its
downsides. In protecting uncompetitive industries, it “in the longer run distorted the
structure of production”.219 Another downside was that the trade systematically
disfavoured small companies due to the size of Soviet orders. On the other hand, Eastern
Trade has been thought of as a “springboard” for certain industries such as shipbuilding,
which could grow in a protected environment before moving into Western markets. There
were other pros including smaller transaction costs, countercyclicality and cons such as
costs of bureaucracy and currency issues. Industries engaging in Eastern Trade tended to
be more labour intensive than others and tended to have lower unit costs because of low
marketing costs and economies of scale.220
The considered literature therefore suggests that Eastern Trade did not operate under
perfect competition nor was it a close approximation of it, calling into question whether
the standard trade models can be used to analyse growth in those exports that depended
on it. Eastern Trade can also be viewed as a form of international protectionism as
Paavonen argues.221 At any rate, it should not be omitted here.
I will not discuss in detail how international trade policy began to shift from interwar
protectionism back to free trade that had characterized the decades prior to 1914, since
one can consult Aunesluoma’s and Paavonen’s research on this point. Efta and EEC trade
agreements did create new patterns of trade, even if the development did not happen
overnight since the reductions in customs barriers were gradual.222 While it is not possible
here to examine how trade liberalization opened new markets to Finnish exporters, the
reduction in Finnish protectionism can be inspected. Changes in tariff rates reveal which
industries were highly protected and at which pace protectionism receded in each
industry. Since an increasing amount of exports was directed to signatory countries of
Efta and EEC from what had been described as domestic manufacturing, these industries
evidently adjusted to international competition.223 One could speculate on this point that
early protectionism might have enabled some fields of business to develop “in peace” to
reach that level of competitiveness. Although I will at times refer to this possibility, I will
not dwell on ascertaining the possible merits of this infant industries argument.
219 Laurila 1995, 102
220 Ibid., 99–103, 107
221 Paavonen 2008, 285
222 Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151
223 Paavonen 2008, 11, 98; Kaukiainen 2006, 163
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Finally, it is possible that some export industries would not have developed to the same
extent without public investment. This interpretation is not prevalent in the economic or
economic historical literature reviewed in this thesis, but Dahmén mentioned the
possibility that the state could support domestic manufacturing in a variety of ways in
order to increase its internationalisation, although he regarded this point as uncertain.
Matti Huomo supports this notion by mentioning that there was public interest in
developing new exports of chemical and metal industries in the 1960s.224
Yet what was the channel of this public interest? Kuisma himself argues that state-owned
companies were important for economic development.225 State-owned forest companies
at least received capital through parliamentary decisions. Then again Dahmén later on
stated that state-owned companies did not influence development since for all intents and
purposes they behaved as private companies would, though initially they were important
concerning basic and metal industries.226 Kuisma himself refers to Outokumpu where he
argues that while a private company would have merely utilized the mine to acquire raw
materials, only the state was prepared to establish a whole production process with
forward linkages to metal, chemical and paper industries, in the name of national
interest.227 Modern-day Kemira too was established in 1920 as a state-initiative to provide
fertilizers in order to modernize agriculture.228 Additionally the state company, Gutzeit,
defied the European Chemical Cartel when it established a chlorine factory in 1935,
which perhaps demonstrates that a state company was more resistant or less fearful of
cartel reprisals than a private one.229
It is therefore possible that a high rate of state-owned companies might have been
conducive to the development of export industries. Yet the obvious problem in Kuisma’s
interpretation is its implicit denial of the counterfactual that these industries would have
developed on their own but proving this is not easy either. Considering the cold-war
entanglements related to Neste Oil at least, it is unlikely that a private company could
have expanded in the manner that a state-backed one could in that context.230
224 Huomo 1986, 67–68
225 See Kuisma 2016.
226 Dahmén 1984, 24; Dahmén 1963, 35, 83
227 Kuisma 2016, 197–198
228 Ibid., 129
229 Ibid., 210–214. The European Chemical Cartel did retaliate, but by establishing another chlorine plant
in Finland, which actually increased the size of the chemical industry even more.
230 Ibid., 207–208
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It is not straightforward to determine if this was the only channel of state activities that
affected Finnish export structure. Indeed, the relative scope of state-owned companies’
activities across industries is more of experimental exploration on whether positive
benefits may have existed. The lacking availability of industry-level data and time
constraints limit examination of other policy-related variables. Alongside state-owned
companies, I have only included a brief review of innovations involving public funding.
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3. Methodology Used in this Thesis
While it is customary to discuss the sources and conceptual issues concerning the data, I
deviate from this practice due to the sheer size of that discussion. This chapter is mostly
methodological whereas data-related discussion is consigned to appendix chapter 6.2.
Here the basics of input-output (I–O) methodology utilized to obtain both the estimates
of value-added of exports and factor intensities are reviewed. The need to use the former
variable instead of gross exports is also discussed before addressing regression model
specifications and potential pitfalls there. Admittedly most of the chapter is devoted to
discussing econometric methods rather than quantitative tables even if the latter are
utilized to great deal in the empirical section of this thesis. This arises from the simple
fact that tables usually require fewer assumptions and computations than econometrics.
3.1 On the Use of Input-Output Methodology
As one example of the opportunities of economics’ new methods is
the so-called input-output study.231
Input-output analysis has a lot to offer economic history. Its virtues
are in its operational simplicity and the high level of disaggregating it
makes possible in the analysis of any issue.232
There are two underlying, but related, methodological points in this thesis: the need to
use value-added instead of gross figures in exports and the importance of appreciating
both direct and indirect factor intensities. Indeed, unlike standard analyses on foreign
trade, this thesis relies on value-added figures calculated by the author.233 The issue with
gross exports is that their values does not only reflect domestic activities, but also the
value of imported raw-materials and intermediate products used as inputs in export
production. This is not a frivolous point. Even in 1956 the bias caused by imported inputs
raises total export value by 15.5% and this gap widens over time.
Secondly, industries are not separate entities, and they had at times significant indirect
connections to other industries. While direct factor intensity, the use of a factor in the
industry itself, can be easily quantified by weighing input measures by output – by
measuring i.e. labour input as working hours per one million 2017 euros worth of
231Jalava, Eloranta & Ojala 2007, 14. Translated from: “Yhtenä esimerkkinä taloustieteen uusien
menetelmien mahdollisuuksista on niin sanottu panos-tuotostutkimus.”
232 Kauppila 2007, 26
233 The figures were originally calculated by yours truly for Haaparanta et al. 2017.
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production – indirect factor intensities require similar calculations as value-added of
exports. Therefore, I will summarise the I–O approach used to calculate these figures.234
Direct and indirect uses are calculated with input-output tables pioneered especially by
Leontief, who also applied them to testing trade theory as already mentioned. Leontief,
who published the first modern input-output tables for the U.S. in 1936, emphasized that
economics should be based on observable structural relationships instead of unobservable
equilibrium theories of neoclassical economics.235 As a result, input-output approach is
atheoretical, though it rests on a few assumptions concerning economic activities. In
particular, it is assumed that a product is only produced with one production method and
that a production method can only be used to produce one type of a product that is
characteristic of that production. Input-output calculations assume constant returns to
scale. This is admittedly contradictory on my part since the C–H–O model assumes
increasing returns to scale but the need to account for import content of exports and factor
intensities allows for no other research strategy.236
Despite this limited unrealism, input-output models are still the best available method of
untangling total factor or value-added requirements of industries. The input coefficients,
which reflect the production method of an industry through its use of other industries’
inputs, is derived from an input-output table, an example of which is Table 2.







Exports Imports Sum of
End
Products
Production 1 x . x . x x . y y y -y y
. .  .  . . . . . . . .
i x . x . x x . y y y -y y
. .  .  . . . . . . . .
n x . x . x x . y y y -y y
Sum of Inputs x. . x. . x. x..
Imported inputs m. . . . . m..
Wages 1 z . z . z z .
Operating
Surplus
2 z . z . z z .
Taxes less
subsidies




z. . z. . z. z..
Total . . y. y. y. -y. y..
Source: Modified from Forssell 1985, Table 4.
234 For a review of the input-output approach and related studies in Finland see Forssell 1985. For their use
in economic history see Kauppila 2007, 71–75.
235 Kauppila 2007, 43–44
236 Forssell 1970, 18–22
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The input coefficients for each industry-pair are defined as:
= 	
The input coefficient 	tells us how much production inputs from industry  is needed
to produce one product of industry . As a result, one can compose the matrix  from all
the input coefficients. In the case of value-added of exports, we start with the following
equation:237
= ∗ +
Where  reflects a vector of total production,  the vector of a final use category, in this
case gross exports, and  the matrix of input coefficients. Note that in the following all
of these are matrices, not vectors – that is, the information is in rows and columns instead
of only columns or rows. Since the input coefficients essentially express how much raw-
materials or intermediates from different industries are used in an industry, ∗  conveys
the total amount of inputs. The remaining part of total production is in final use. However,
the problem is that while  can be composed of only domestic inputs, even without
considering imports, we do not know if a domestic input’s producer would have imported
inputs of its own. And the same issue applies with that secondary input’s input and so on.
Wassily Leontief solved this veritable Gordian knot of endless input chains with the
Leontief inverse:
( − )
Leontief inverse matrix is the inverse of the subtraction of the identity matrix, a diagonal
matrix with only unit values, from the input coefficient matrix. It includes all the direct
and indirect inputs that are needed to satisfy the demand of a final use category, such as
exports. However, an equation of that kind would still not tell us anything about value-
added. We need to add a third term:
= ∗ ( − ) ∗
This is the final equation for the domestic value-added of exports. The term  is the
diagonal matrix containing ratios of value-added relative to total production. Its
multiplication with the Leontief inverse corresponds with value-added levels needed to
237 The following is based on Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2016, 42–44. The main difference is that my calculations
here are based on only one country: Finland.
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satisfy the demand of a final use category. Exports  is a diagonal matrix as well.
Therefore, our result reflects the value-added that is needed to satisfy exports in the entire
production chain, considering both direct and indirect contributions. In this manner, we
can see how much, let’s say, forestry contributed to the value-added of paper and paper
product exports by locating the cell on row “Forestry” and column “Paper and paper
products”. These sums of sectoral value-added relative to total value-added of exports
also form the basis of variables such as resource intensity and the share of infrastructure
or of financial services used in this thesis.238
While using gross exports or its derivatives is commonplace, the need to use of domestic
value-added content of exports instead can be proven succinctly. Consider Chart 2. Here
we can observe a clear downward trend in the share of domestic value-added relative to
gross exports in the 20th century. That difference is perhaps more intuitive to interpret as
the rising share of imported inputs, or foreign value-added in gross exports.
Compared to the interwar period, production of exports in 1956–1965 was somewhat
more dependent on imported inputs. Approximately 15% of gross value of exports
embodied their value. By 1970 this ratio had increased to a fifth. The gap between the
actual domestic benefit of exports and gross value widens after the 1970s. While there
was a brief respite after 1982 – and even a clear reversal coming to 1989 – after the
depression of the 1990s the relative use of imported inputs increased to an unprecedented
scale. As a result, if one were to compare the domestic value-added of exports, relative to
GDP, during 2015 to 1913 he or she would conclude that the ratio is virtually the same:
23%. Even with a clearly higher gross value of exports in 2015 and an impression of
globalization of unseen scope, the export dependency of modern Finland is not different
from the grand duchy of Finland of the first globalization period.
While Chart 2. illustrates that there have been interesting developments in domestic
value-added of Finnish exports, the point here is not to examine the whys of it. I will only
point out that potential causes for the general decline could be the decreasing importance
238 There is an extensive literature in different ways of measuring domestic and foreign value-added content
of exports. See Timmer et al. 2013 and Koopman et al. 2010 for example.
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Chart 2. Domestic Value-added Content of Exports relative to Gross Exports in 1913–2015, %
Notes: The value-added data is the same as in Haaparanta et al 2017, but to ensure better compatibility throughout the
period, the value-added of exports for 1928–1989 were recalculated as GDP shares: the sum of labour income, capital
income and indirect taxes less subsidies. The data from 1995–2015 is not based on national input-output tables, but on
international I–O tables which also account for the amount of Finnish inputs that are exported only to eventually return
to Finland as imports. The estimate for 1913 was calculated on the assumption that a given industry’s inputs embodied
foreign inputs to the same extent as the main industry supplying those inputs did.
Source: The author’s own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input–Output Tables 1956–1989; Haaparanta et al. 2017;
Kauppila 2007.
of forest exports, which relied heavily on domestic forest resources, or lower trade
barriers in the post-war period which may have enabled growth in imported inputs. It is
also likely that the oil crises of the 1970s both increased the value of imported inputs and
exports into the Soviet Union, which were relatively import-dependent.239
The real interest of mine is to point out that while gross values reflect the true economic
effect of exports well enough in the first half of the 20th century, it leads to biased results
in the post-war era. Even if the value of imported inputs was only 14% relative to gross
exports in 1956, a cross-industry study like this thesis will overestimate the magnitude of
metal industries’ exports in comparison with forest industries, since the former tended to
use imported inputs more than the latter. The same applies to all new exports. This is the
rationale for using value-added of exports as the dependent variable in this thesis.240
The factor intensities for labour, capital and R&D expenditure are also calculated with
similar input-output formulas as value-added of exports. Indirect factor intensities were
239 Forssell 1986, 20–21







































calculated following the example of labour input formula of Statistics Finland’s input-
output studies concerning the 1980s:241
= ∗ ( − )
Where  refers to direct labour input of working hours per one million 2017 euros worth
of production and  to the demand for labour required to satisfy one million 2017 euros
worth of production when all multiplier effects are accounted for. Hence, factor intensities
are referred to also as factor requirements. Requirements related to capital stock and R&D
expenditure are expressed in monetary terms but calculated in the same manner.
Note that output here refers to gross value of production, not value-added. Calculating
factor coefficients by measuring them per some unit of gross output is the standard
approach in input-output studies.242 The total requirements for working hours for instance
reflect the entire production process from start to finish in a given industry and its
suppliers. Deardorff asserts that this is a conceptually proper way of measuring factor
intensities in a comparison with using merely direct inputs.243 Hence the same approach
was adopted here.
It ought to be mentioned that labour, capital and R&D inputs therefore include the impact
of their respective factor productivities. While, for example, labour intensity measured
with direct or total working hour requirements is related to labour productivity, it should
not be interpreted simply as its corollary. Low labour intensity of oil and petrol
manufacturing does not necessarily mean that it was a highly productive industry, but
rather that those exports’ root causes lay somewhere else.
There are some conceptual issues with the using national input-output tables. For
instance, it is possible that a Finnish company would produce raw-materials, export them
for processing abroad and import them back for assembly. The Finnish value-added in
these intermediate products is effectively assumed to be zero in this thesis. However, it is
unlikely that the problem would distort historical figures meaningfully as even in modern
times this ratio is negligible.244 At any rate, fixing the bias would require historical,
241 See for example Tilastotiedotus, KT 1985:4.
242 See Eurostat 2008, 497–503 and Kauppila 2007.
243 Deardorff 1984, 479–480
244I thank Saara Tamminen for pointing this out.
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international input-output tables that do not exist. The method based on national data is
the best one available for the foreseeable future.245
3.2 Methodology Concerning Determinants of Export Structure
The tools of formal econometrics may be useful here, but tables and
graphs can often be more persuasive.246
The standard method of empirical trade studies is the same as in empirical economics and
economic history in general: regression analysis, or Ordinary Least Squares regression
analysis in formal terms.247 Due to the possibility that there are omitted variables, export
cartels for instance, the approach here does not utilize OLS but fixed effects regression
analysis. This is a major difference with the previous trade studies mentioned in this
thesis, since industry characteristics which are assumed to be constant over time are
controlled in the fixed effects approach. Time fixed effects, which control characteristics
that vary over time but not by industry may also be included, but omitted variables which
change both over time and across industries remain uncontrolled in both cases.
Yet as Leamer and Levinsohn point out, different trade models can apply for distinct
industries: lumber trade might be better explained with H–O model whereas monopolistic
competition model might be more applicable furniture exports.248 Thus, it is important to
consider the determinants of exports not only generally across industries as in fixed
effects regression analysis, but also specifically by industries. Since the data here is based
on input-output studies which cover only eight years and their level of aggregation is on
the industry rather than on the product level, econometric analysis is an unfeasible
approach for examining individual industries. As an alternative, quantitative tables are
used instead. While simplistic in comparison with econometrics, this approach is more
reliable when faced with a low number of observations.
Even the question of what kind of an export variable should be explained is less than
certain. Since the link between comparative advantage and empirics is not clear, there are
quite a few alternatives. Alan Deardorff himself prefers simply using net exports, since
gross exports reflect intraindustry trade which is not determined by factor proportions
model. Since I include both variables accounting for inter-industry and intraindustry trade
245 Haaparanta et al. 2017, 130
246 Leamer 1994, 67
247 See Leamer 1994 for a review of empirical trade studies.
248 Leamer & Levinsohn 1995, 1342. These two industries are combined in this thesis, however, due to
potential issues caused by changes in classification in Statistics Finland’s data.
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here, using value-added of exports as an explanatory variable is not an issue. The point
here is to explain growth in industries’ exports acknowledging that both H–O and NTT
theories and their variables are working simultaneously.249
Net exports were deemed to be a less than satisfactory measure here, since utilizing value-
added of exports tends to deflate the net exports values. In the context of the regression
framework it ensures that variables have consistently negative signs, which removes one
way of determining if a factor was important for export structure or not. Net exports will
also tend to deflate the importance of new export industries due to high amount of imports
from these industries, which is not desirable since explaining the emergence of these
exports is one of the major topics of this thesis. Additionally, while a low rate of net
exports could be interpreted as a lack of comparative advantage, it should be remembered
that industrial groupings are always arbitrary to some extent, so it is possible net exports
could be sizeable on a product level even if the same does not apply for industry level.
It is important to note here that while econometrics and the lure of statistical significance
is hard to resist, “in economically oriented economic history method has regrettably often
replaced source criticism”.250 Kauppila also maintains that reliability of data is always a
potential issue in economic historical calculations.251 For the sake of brevity, I have not
included a detailed discussion related to the measures and proxies of explanatory
variables in this section. Instead the conceptual and empirical discussion on explanatory
variables can be found in appendix chapter 6.2. If one is uncertain on some point
concerning the measures here, that is the section to be consulted.
As a starting point for the econometric approach, two regression equations were derived.
The first is based on the four-factor H–O model and the second on the C–H–O model:
(1)			 = + + + + +
(2)	 	 = + + + + + +
+	 +
Where  is value-added of exports,  the constant term, betas refer to slope coefficients
of each explanatory variable and  to the variance unexplained. In practice, the estimated
models did not correspond with these theoretical starting points. While the advantage of
249 Deardorff 1984, 487
250 Ojala 2017, 453
251 Kauppila 2007, 26
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using a regression with more than one explanatory variable is that it estimates the effect
of a single variable holding other variables constant, the interdependence between
variables tends to make these specifications unstable. Labour productivity and average
wage rate in particular tended to be correlated with the former absorbing most of the
latter’s effect. This necessitated dropping the average wage rate out of the specifications
(1) and (2) with new specifications in the following form:
(3)			 = + + + +
(4) 		 = + + + + +
+
There are a variety of conceptual issues that can distort the results of econometric
analyses. For example, a high number of variables can lead to “kitchen sink” regressions
where data-mining is used to sort out the most explanatory variables without due
consideration of their relevance. This problem can be avoided by including only variables
that are theoretically legitimate – although I do depart from this approach in inspecting
institutional characteristics that are unaccounted by trade models. The legitimacy of this
choice arises from previous research however. On the other hand, the issue is accentuated
due to multiple comparisons problem: variables can be measured in a number of different
ways, some of which will be statistically significant by chance resulting from accidental
data-mining. I do not see how this problem could be avoided in all certainty unless future
studies take upon themselves to replicate the approach here.252
While increasing the number of variables unnecessarily is an issue, it is also harmful to
disregard relevant ones. One such omitted variable here could be transport costs, which
should be a determinant of trade at least in a two-country scenario.253 However, supposing
that exports’ market area composition did not change by industry, reductions in transport
costs in the post-war period should be captured by time fixed effects if transport and
communications services are dropped.254
Additionally, it has been noted by Leamer and Levinsohn that unscaled exports of an
industry will absorb the possible effect of an industry comprising a larger share of
production than another industry. The authors state that this creates an omitted variable
252 Leamer & Levinsohn 1995, 1378. See Gelman & Loken 2013 concerning multiple comparisons.
253 Deardorff 1984, 470
254 See Kaukiainen 2006 for a discussion related to transport costs.
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bias if that scale effect is correlated with any explanatory variable. Yet since the authors
do not suggest what these variables are I have disregarded the problem here.255
A related problem is that the level of aggregation might somehow bias the results by
combining disparate product groups, which may be determined by different factors in the
same industry grouping. Based on the disaggregation of the input-output tables of 1956 –
see chapter 6.2 concerning this – the differences arising from aggregation are usually
negligible, but in a few industries differences as large as 7% or 11% were found. The
possibility of the bias has been noted in input-output studies, but for practical purposes
one cannot do much about it.256 This thesis’ level of aggregation, of 30 or more industries,
was necessitated by the levels found in existing input-output tables. At any rate, Kauppila
considered this level as acceptable, though he noted that some characteristics may go
unnoticed.257 In other words, the level of aggregation and its bias in this thesis are at least
not worse than in other similar studies.
While aggregating diverse products is a problem of its own, the division between
manufacturing and service industries can be superficial in some cases. For instance, in
2015 half of the electrotechnical exports consisted of services, not commodities, even if
one would usually interpret these figures as commodity exports. The ratios of services in
manufacturing and forestry, agriculture and fishing were 18% and 16% respectively in
2015. Service exports were not quite so affected, though exports in trade mostly
comprised of commodities.258
Therefore, merely reporting service exports on an industrial level will not give a clear
account of the importance of services relative to commodities. It is feasible that the
analysis in this thesis might not be able locate the right determinants of export structure
correctly if commodity and service products have fundamentally different determinants.
It is, of course, possible that historically the difference between commodity and service
exports followed industrial categories. This point cannot be confirmed one way or another
within the scope of this thesis. However, I must stress the fact that this thesis even
considers exports of the tertiary sector as something of a novelty. Most economic
255 Leamer & Levinsohn 1995, 1370
256 See Blair & Miller 2009, 161 or Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002, 367.
257 Kauppila 2007, 78
258 Haaparanta et al. 2017, 55.
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historical treatises focus on manufacturing industries and “services have generally been
ignored by trade economists”.259
Aside from product-related issues, sectoral analyses will disregard firm characteristics
that might be important determinants of trade. Trade in each industry could be, and indeed
was, concentrated into the hands of few large export companies which makes this an
important point. This is especially the case in small countries such as Finland. One could
certainly argue that the rise and fall of electrotechnical industry was determined more by
Nokia’s characteristics than by the average characteristics of the industry itself. In
conclusion, there is ample evidence to suggest that firm and product level research would
be more fruitful to discern different determinants of trade in value-added. However, the
data requirements of such an exercise are formidable and out of the scope of this thesis
and must therefore remain an area of further study.260
259 Sapir & Winter 1994, 274
260 Haaparanta et al. 2017, 56, 68
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4. Analysis of Export Structure
In this chapter, the insights of trade models and previous research are applied in
untangling the determinants of export structure. I begin by briefly reviewing how Finnish
exports developed from the late 19th century to the late 20th century. After putting post-
war exports into context, export industries are defined. Due to the possibility that trade
models and determinants are industry-specific, I begin by inspecting factor intensities,
New Trade Theory variables and institutional features across these industries. The chapter
concludes by discussing the determinants of export structure in general in light of the
results obtained through econometric fixed effects regressions.
4.1 Finnish Export Structure in the Long-term
Finnish development has been dependent on how central export
markets have had demand for Finnish products: have there been
obstacles to trade – such as customs barriers or wars – and how well
Finnish products have managed to compete with price or quality with
rival countries.261
Before discussing the determinants of trade structure, it is worthwhile to review the
general development of export industries in the long-run. This evolution is summarized
in Chart 3. The period of this thesis, 1956–1989, is demarcated by black vertical lines.
Note that the chart is not based on the same value-added of exports data as in the analysis
soon to follow, but on gross value of exports inclusive of imported inputs. Thus, it
overestimates the importance of new exports of metal, chemical and textile products to
some extent, but the overall impression of greater diversification of export structure,
which is main topic here, does not change.
It is apparent that Finnish export structure in the long duration has undergone significant
changes. While exports were comprised of forest products in the first globalization period
to a great extent, the dependence on these industries is in actuality more characteristic of
the interwar period. Prior to the First World War, there were metal and textile exports
Russia, but its eventual closure effectively brought exports from these industries to nil.262
261 Eloranta & Ojala 2018, 165. Translated from: “Suomen kehitys on riippunut siitä, miten keskeisillä
vientimarkkinoilla on ollut kysyntää suomalaisille tuotteille: onko kaupankäynnissä ollut esteitä – kuten
tullimuureja tai sotia – ja miten hyvin suomalaistuotteet ovat voineet kilpailla hinnalla tai laadulla
kilpailijamaiden kanssa”.
262 On the other hand, these exports’ success in the Russian markets had already been hampered by increases
in Russian tariff rates before the First World War.
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Chart 3. Export Structure of Finland in 1892–2016 in Gross Value, %
Notes: Percentages are measured in five-year averages. Note that the classification of commodities changes at several
points in 1917, 1949, 1969, 2002 and 2008. While most discrepancies are small, chemical industries between 1969 and
2002 include also rubber, plastic and petroleum exports which are included in other manufactures from 2002 onward.
The data on chemical and textile industries in the 1950s is not available. The service exports during 1892–1939 are
estimates, and there is a classification change in 1949. Electrotechnical exports are included in exports of machinery
and transport equipment prior to 1985. Forest exports are denoted in dotted pattern and new exports of metal, chemical
and textile industries in striped pattern. Note that other manufactures and services do not have a pattern, since they are
not included in what is “traditionally” understood as new exports of the post-war period.
Source: Haaparanta et al. 2017; Statistics Finland; Board of Customs.
While paper exports were also directed to Russian markets, companies managed to
redirect their sales to Western Europe after the war. Service exports were to some extent
based on Russian tourism, and during the Great War on payments gained from Russian
civilians and Russian fortress constructions.263
After the regime change in Russia, the export structure became more uniformly based on
forest resources. As Hjerppe puts it, the division of Finnish manufacturing into export
industries and domestic manufacturing can be traced back to the interwar period.264
Indeed, even the most marked development in export structure during the period was an
internal shift in the internationally oriented forest sector: the structural change from wood
to paper products in the 1930s. This was not meaningless, since the shift partly helped
Finland to cope with the Great Depression.265
263 Haaparanta et al. 2017, 32–33
264 Hjerppe 1982, 408; Pihkala 1975, 19
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The export structure immediately after the Second World War did not differ significantly
from that of the 1930s. While service exports’ share of total exports was larger, this might
be due to a change in statistical sources.266 Agricultural exports were also more negligible
than before the war, which is probably due to the need to ensure food security after the
war. Yet Finnish manufacturing could still be characterized along the lines of export-
oriented forest industries and domestic manufacturing, consisting of many industries,
with only basic products and protected by tariffs from international competition.267
In the 1950s and clearly by the 1960s, export structure began to change. Exports of
machinery and transport equipment grew to a larger scale than ever before in statistically
recorded history. While metal industries’ share of total exports was still small compared
to that of forest industries at the time, the gap would decrease over time. By the late 1960s
chemical and textile industries began to grow as well, though in a more limited scope.
However, as in the first globalization period, metal and textile exports were initially based
not on Western European but on Eastern economies. The nature of the trade with the
Soviet Union and its allies was qualitatively different, since it was based on a clearing-
system which was state-directed even if private Finnish companies handled the
negotiations, and it protected Finnish exports to the Soviet Union from foreign
competition.268 Since Eastern trade did not operate according to the logic of a market
economy, it moderated economic shocks such as the oil crises of the 1970s. From a
sectoral point of view, shipbuilding and machinery production used Eastern trade as a
“springboard” for future Western trade.269 Indeed, it has been suggested that war
reparations to the Soviet Union were instrumental in the transformation of industrial
structure, specifically with regards to metal industries, though the argument has been also
described as a “myth”.270 Conversely, Inkeri Hirvensalo and Pekka Sutela remarked in
2017 that both Soviet and Swedish markets were drivers of export diversification.271
266 The estimates on service trade during the interwar period was calculated by Lappalainen, whereas the
post-war data is based on Finnish national accounts and balance of payments data. See Lappalainen 1997
and Airikkala et al. 1976.
267 Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151; Paavonen 2008, 11, 258
268 Ibid., 284–286
269 Ibid., 309
270 Heikkinen 2014, 92–93
271 Hirvensalo & Sutela 2017, 183
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Regardless of the increasing importance of new exports of chemical, metal and textile
goods, paper industry remained the primary export industry until the 1980s.272 However,
its relative primacy lessened over time. This was even more accentuated in the case of
other forest industries. Woodworking and forestry exports’ share of total exports
increased in the early 1950s on the account of the Korean boom but began to decrease
noticeably afterwards. In a sense, this relates to the increasing level of value-added in
forest industries – as in the 1930s – when woodworking and forestry gave room to paper
industry. Indeed, in both woodworking and paper production there were significant
structural shifts as production of pulp, veneer and cotton roll declined. Most of the pulp
was processed now into paper and paper products.273
By the late 1980s, new exports had solidified their presence and Finnish manufacturing
had reached a level of international competitiveness that was not simply based on price
competitiveness, but on actual competitiveness.274 According to Kaukiainen, Finland had
ceased to be a provider of cheap labour in the global marketplace since its labour costs
had risen and its exports were more highly refined than before.275 However, while metal
industries had managed to diversify their export markets by the late 1980s, the relatively
unproductive textile industries had not. The problems in Eastern Trade, brought on by the
collapse of oil prices in 1986, that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union led
to the collapse of textile exports, in parallel to closure of the Russian markets in the
aftermath of the October Revolution.276
The discussion so far has focused on commodity exports, yet Chart 3 also illustrates that
service exports have had a continuous presence in the Finnish export structure. While
classification changes obfuscate the development of the immediate post-war period, there
seems to have been a trend towards a lesser share of services in total exports – perhaps
reflecting the resumption of world trade in commodities after the war. From the late 1950s
to the late 1980s, the share of services in total exports remained fairly constant, though
there was some growth there in the early 1970s.
272 This statement applies both in gross exports and in value-added exports. However, care should be taken
in noting that it was, first, the combined total of metal exports that surpassed, secondly, paper exports and
not paper and woodworking exports. The level of aggregation is obviously crucial here.
273 Hjerppe 1982, 414–417
274 Paavonen 2008, 309
275 Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151 On the other hand, the relative value of high-technology goods in exports
was still low: approximately 2.5% in the early 1970s and 6% after 1985. In the latter period the amount of
high-tech imports was still twice as large as in exports.
276 Laurila 1995, 48
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Table 3. Domestic Value-added of Exports in Secondary Sector in Finland in 1959–1989, in Mill.
of Euros and as Percent Shares of Total Value-added of Exports
1959 % 1970 % 1980 % 1989 %
FOO 259.2 7.3 443.1 5.8 441.0 3.3 583.8 3.2
BEV 0.8 0.0 21.8 0.3 61.4 0.5 60.2 0.3
TEX 17.4 0.5 308.2 4.0 657.6 4.9 424.6 2.3
LEA 0.6 0.0 40.2 0.5 142.3 1.1 89.8 0.5
WOF 738.6 20.7 1 100.1 14.3 1 957.8 14.7 1 257.0 6.8
PAP 1 362.3 38.1 2 668.4 34.7 3 499.3 26.2 5 291.8 28.8
PRI 2.1 0.1 37.5 0.5 167.1 1.2 205.0 1.1
CHE 31.1 0.9 135.1 1.8 505.8 3.8 954.9 5.2
OIL 0.1 0.0 14.0 0.2 105.8 0.8 78.9 0.4
RUB 1.9 0.1 45.7 0.6 125.6 0.9 176.0 1.0
MIN 15.5 0.4 43.8 0.6 168.1 1.3 268.2 1.5
MET 42.9 1.2 300.2 3.9 634.4 4.7 1 127.5 6.1
MFM 161.3 4.5 488.6 6.4 1 265.4 9.5 2 322.0 12.6
ELE 28.7 0.8 146.2 1.9 517.4 3.9 1 199.4 6.5
TRE 174.4 4.9 396.2 5.2 572.6 4.3 1 163.1 6.3
OTH 2.8 0.1 42.8 0.6 71.1 0.5 63.2 0.3
Total 2 839.6 79.5 6 231.8 81.1 10 892. 81.5 15 265 83.0
Forest
Exports
2 100.9 58.8 3 768.6 49.0 5 457.0 40.8 6 548.8 35.6
New
Exports
458.4 12.8 1 874.3 24.4 4 526.9 33.9 7 536.0 41.0
Notes: Deflated with Statistics Finland’s export price index. Note that total refers to sum of manufacturing
industries. New exports comprise of TEX, LEA, CHE, OIL, RUB, MET, MFM, ELE, TRE and forest exports of
WOF and PAP.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input-Output Tables 1959–1989.
It is not a point of this thesis to compare gross exports to value-added of exports, but I
have replicated the same value-added data as used in the rest of this thesis in Tables 3. –
5. The relatively high degree of value-added of exports found not only in forest industries
(WOF and PAP), but also in foodstuff exports (FOO) which accounted for 7% percent of
value-added of exports in 1959, is likely related to the importance of agricultural and
forestry inputs in these industries.
Yet the general impression of rising share of new exports and of decreasing one of forest
exports can be confirmed in Table 3. That is not to say that the value-added of forest
exports did not increase. Moreover, Finnish forest industries also led to production of
forest machinery which are classified in metal exports.277 Some of the new export
industries seem less remarkable after imported inputs are removed. Petrol refining (OIL)
277 Hoffman 1988, 145
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Table 4. Domestic Value-added of Exports in Primary Sector in 1959–1989, in Mill. of Euros and
as Percent Shares of Total Value-added of Exports
1959 % 1970 % 1980 % 1989 %
AGR 49.5 1.4 175.5 2.3 223.9 1.7 271.1 1.5
FOR 221.4 6.2 60.1 0.8 61.2 0.5 29.1 0.2
FIS 0.4 0.0 1.3 0.0 2.9 0.0 12.1 0.1
ORE 34.7 1.0 39.9 0.5 19.4 0.1 30.6 0.2
OMI 1.0 0.0 10.2 0.1 30.3 0.2 48.3 0.3
Total 307.0 8.6 287.1 3.7 337.6 2.5 391.2 2.1
Notes: Deflated with Statistics Finland’s Export Price Index and measured in millions of 2017 euros. Note that
total refers to the sum of Primary Sector, but percent shares are calculated relative to all exports.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input-Output Tables 1959–1989.
in particular accounted for 4–5% of Finnish gross exports in 1980–1985, but its value-
added share of value-added does not even exceed a percent.278 Conversely, metal
industries which include basic metal industry (MET) and metal engineering industries
(MFM, ELE and TRE) did constitute for a major part of exports in value-added terms.
Industries of primary sector were not meaningless either. Forestry (FOR) was a
formidable export industry during the late 1950s although its importance decreased
considerably afterwards. Agricultural exports’ (AGR) relative importance conversely
increased. It is worth pointing out that its small export share in 1959 may reflect the loss
of agricultural land in Karelia to the Soviet Union.279 Additionally, the industry’s export
share in 1985 was actually 3.2%, so its development was not of constant decline in the
1980s. Although agricultural exports were never very important in 1956–1989, their
relative importance exceeded that of chemical exports (CHE) on 1970 and that of trade
(TRD) in 1985, for example. However, as Pihkala notes that agriculture’s share of gross
exports declined after the middle of the 1970s due to global overproduction – this is the
long-run trend even in value-added data.280 At any rate, while fishing and mining
activities are not important here, exports of agriculture and forestry warrant some study.
In the case of service exports, it should be noted that sales from tourism are not included
in the export figures of the input-output tables that are the main data sources of this thesis.
While tourism comprised approximately less than 10% of gross service exports in the
1950s, the ratio increased to 20-30% in the 1970s.281 Therefore the total value-added of
service exports is underestimated here. Based on Table 5. transport and communications
278 Paavonen 2008, 277
279 Pihkala 2001, 191. The loss of Karelia was apparently less of a problem for forestry although these
products were increasingly imported. See Ahvenainen 1984, 412–413.
280 Pihkala 2001, 258
281 Airikkala et al. 1976, Appendix 2
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(TRC) was the main export industry in services, though to lesser degree in the 1980s,
which is probably related to Finland’s high labour costs and the “great shipping crisis”,
associated with the expansion of Japanese shipbuilding, of the late post-war era.282
The trade industry was likewise important, which highlights that service exports were still
related to commodity trade, though this could also reflect that data on these exports was
easier to obtain. Exports of services proper, or financial (FIN), business and other real
estate (BUS) and community, social and personal services (CSP) truly emerged in the
1980s, but even then, their combined value-added was less than 5% of all export
industries. The slow emergence of BUS, the most important exporter of the three, is not
surprising since professional expert services only began to develop in the 1960s.283
Since it is not practical to review the characteristics of every industry in the quantitative
tables of the next section, I have resigned myself to merely studying industries that could
be designated as exporters. Any threshold can be viewed as arbitrary here, not least due
to arbitrariness of industrial classifications themselves. I have included only industries
whose share of total value-added of exports exceeded 2.0% of the total at some point in
1956–1989. While it would be interesting to review if there were aspects shared by
industries which were not exporters, in practice this would prove too cumbersome.
Table 5. Domestic Value-added of Exports in Tertiary Sector in 1959–1989, in Mill. of Euros and
as Percent Shares of Total Value-added of Exports
1959 % 1970 % 1980 % 1989 %
EGW 1.0 0.0 31.5 0.4 35.1 0.3 5.3 0.0
BUI 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
OCO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TRD 9.5 0.3 140.4 1.8 274.5 2.1 232.7 1.3
TRC 364.4 10.2 891.2 11.6 1 185.7 8.9 1 661.0 9.0
FIN 23.4 0.7 37.3 0.5 145.8 1.1 133.5 0.7
DWE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BUS 0.0 0.0 55.9 0.7 409.4 3.1 568.6 3.1
CSP 26.5 0.7 8.8 0.1 79.8 0.6 124.2 0.7
Total 424.8 11.9 1 166.2 15.2 2 131.7 16.0 2 725.3 14.8
Notes: Deflated with Statistics Finland’s Export Price Index and measured in millions of 2017 euros. Note that
total refers to the sum of Tertiary Sector, but percent shares are calculated relative to all exports. BUS and CSP
have been scaled up for 1959 according to 1965 data and balance of payments data of Bank of Finland. The data
for early post-war period is not necessarily as reliable as that concerning the 1980s when it comes to services or
its exports. Note that sales obtained from tourism are not included here. EGW is often characterized as a
manufacturing industry, but I have included it in tertiary sector due to its role in infrastructure.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input-Output Tables 1959–1989; Airikkala et al. 1976.
282 Kaukiainen 2006, 154–155; Saarinen 2005; 34; Pihkala 2001, 260
283 Pihkala 1982c, 465
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4.2 Factor Intensities of Heckscher-Ohlin Model
It seems that the comparative advantages, at least those that depend
on resources and other natural endowments, have lost in importance
compared with capital and know-how.284
In order to study possibly relevant factors that determined exports structure one should
not only peruse determinants other than labour and capital, but also individual industries.
I will not analyse in detail the development of each industry, however. I will also
concentrate on total factor requirements, which reflect not only the direct use of a factor
but also its indirect use through the industry’s backward linkages to other industries. The
root causes of changes in total factor use arise from changes in either the composition of
input industries, their productivity or some mixture of both. Whether changes in factor
intensities arose from one or another is largely beyond the scope of this thesis – one only
has room here to signify levels and their changes.
In 1959, the most important export industries were woodworking and furniture and paper
industries (WOF and PAP). In terms of direct labour inputs, paper exports were not labour
intensive at all whereas woodworking exports were so on an average level. However, total
working hour requirements reveal that WOF was the second highest user of labour in
manufacturing industries through its linkages with forestry. This also explains also why
the paper industry had a higher rate of total working hour requirements, close to the
manufacturing median. One could therefore argue that paper industry in 1959 was more
dependent on labour than what has been thought of before. Forest industries were in the
aggregate, and in total terms, not unintensive in labour at least, which could be therefore
asserted of Finnish exports of 1959 as well.
In the course of three decades labour intensity decreased in forest industries likely due to
increases in labour productivity as in other industries, or i.e. due to higher output relative
to labour input. This was a result of growth in investments which meant that less workers
were required to produce each unit.285 Yet PAP’s total use of labour had fallen below the
manufacturing median by 1970 suggesting that labour productivity in the industry’s
whole value chain was especially impactful. WOF also managed to decrease its labour
intensity to the median level by 1980. Regardless, it seems that higher labour intensity of
284 Kaukiainen 2006, 151
285 See Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 125 concerning the investments after the 1970s and Heikkinen 2000, 267–270
for the investments of the early post-war period.
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Table 6. Direct and Total Working Hour Requirements in 1959–1989, in 1 000 Hours
1959 1970 1980 1989
Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
AGR 208.6 329.2 127.5 190.3 85.9 112.2 60.5 78.1
FOR 139.7 161.0 48.7 54.6 26.0 28.4 19.4 21.1
FOO 15.9 185.8 11.3 126.4 9.5 84.2 7.4 60.5
TEX 63.6 93.1 40.2 61.4 32.1 44.4 24.6 34.6
WOF 52.9 137.8 32.7 64.1 19.4 38.1 13.6 27.1
PAP 20.1 89.3 11.7 39.4 7.8 26.1 5.7 18.3
CHE 19.4 56.2 15.3 30.0 7.7 19.1 7.7 16.7
MET 15.2 56.2 8.2 27.7 7.2 22.4 4.8 13.6
MFM 63.1 83.3 33.0 45.2 24.2 37.1 14.2 22.5
ELE 57.3 81.5 34.2 48.8 23.3 32.8 13.9 20.9
TRE 39.4 56.9 30.2 45.4 22.3 35.3 13.5 22.2
TRD 134.9 146.1 62.8 76.7 41.8 55.2 28.7 36.2
TRC 57.5 78.5 42.6 57.2 27.0 39.2 20.8 29.4
BUS 99.7 144.9 22.4 40.5 25.1 40.2 12.4 20.3
Median
Manuf.
52.5 86.3 31.5 47.1 19.7 37.5 13.4 22.7
Median
Tertiary
75.8 112.2 39.9 58.8 26.1 40.2 17.6 27.7
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1959–1989; Tiainen 1994; see the
appendices for labour.
WOF in comparison with PAP, identified by Kauppila for the year 1928, was still more
or less an accurate statement 60 years later.286
Considering that forest industries’ direct use of labour was clearly lower than their total
use, it is likely that the fall in labour intensity is related to developments in forestry (FOR).
The industry was the source of inputs used in forest manufactures – and its own value-
added of exports comprised 7.4% of the total in 1959 – so labour productivity there tended
to make forest manufactures’ value chain less dependent on labour. Since FOR’s own
export share almost disappeared after the 1950s, it seems that its exports were heavily
dependent on labour. The same labour intensity can also be observed in agriculture (AGR)
where the level of labour use declined, most likely related to emigration from rural
areas,287 but less markedly suggesting that its relatively favourable export development
in 1980–1985 was still determined by labour intensity.
Backward linkages to agriculture were evidently important for foodstuff manufacturing
(FOO), the most labour intensive manufacturing industry in 1959. During this time
foodstuff exports were greater than those of transport equipment in value-added terms, so
286 Kauppila 2007, 125
287 Nummela & Ojala 2006, 74
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this too reinforces the notion that Finnish exports were relatively labour intensive in 1959.
Exports of transport equipment (TRE) and fabricated metal products and machinery
(MFM) exports were also important in 1959. While TRE was clearly not labour intensive
in either direct or total use, MFM was rather close to a median industry in manufacturing.
In the case of metal industries, it is rather interesting how stable the labour intensity of
MFM, TRE and electrotechnical industry (ELE) was throughout 1970–1989,
approximately at the level of manufacturing median. While TRE had been very
unintensive in the use of labour in 1959, this was no longer the case compared to other
industries in 1970. Basic metal industry (MET) was the only metal industry that had a
clearly low rate of labour intensity. The same can be said for the chemical industry (CHE),
but not for textile industries (CHE), which were relatively labour intensive – though the
difference was not great in 1980. Foodstuff manufacturing (FOO) continued to be labour
intensive, but its importance as an export industry declined.
Services were more labour intensive than manufacturing, but the difference in their
respective medians had diminished by 1980. The same can broadly be stated regarding
transportation and communications services (TRC). Conversely business and other real
estate services (BUS) were not especially labour intensive with regards to other services,
but they were so compared to manufacturing when the industry started exporting in 1970.
By 1989 the industry had reached a similar, if a slightly lower, rate of labour intensity to
manufacturing median. While retail and wholesale trade (TRD) was extremely labour
intensive in 1959 one can witness how labour productivity brought on by the industry’s
rationalization decreased its labour input.288
If labour intensity was not a conclusive determinant of export structure, and specifically
in the case of most metal industries, it is natural to consider capital along the lines of two-
factor Heckscher-Ohlin model. It is interesting to note here that capital intensity did not
change to the same extent as labour intensity did. This is in line with Pohjola’s
observation that the share of investments in GDP was fairly constant after the 1950s up
to the 1990s.289 However, changes in direct and indirect use of capital indicate that capital
productivity of a median industry in manufacturing increased between 1959 and 1970 but
288 Lastikka 1984, 30–32
289 Pohjola 1996, 112
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Table 7. Direct and Total Net Capital Stock Requirements in 1959–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1959 1970 1980 1989
Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
AGR 1 568.5 2 757.4 1 322.6 2 259.9 2 054.4 2 971.0 2 017.1 2 903.2
FOR 1 140.4 1 374.4 1 016.7 1 132.6 1 524.1 1 604.1 1 612.5 1 699.7
FOO 302.9 1 965.3 285.4 1 866.1 375.8 2 612.2 427.7 2 751.8
TEX 388.4 809.2 341.8 711.4 350.0 719.7 492.3 986.5
WOF 417.0 1 467.2 416.0 1 212.4 489.8 1 518.5 517.2 1 542.9
PAP 901.0 2 806.8 797.8 2 033.7 722.7 2 191.3 965.2 2 362.3
CHE 871.2 1 839.9 897.4 1 629.7 598.8 1 416.8 712.9 1 499.8
MET 499.1 2 103.2 562.1 1 705.3 638.3 1 800.9 577.6 1 484.4
MFM 593.2 1 152.8 414.0 868.0 432.5 1 081.9 390.9 972.4
ELE 284.0 920.6 324.0 750.6 433.7 907.2 403.0 887.6
TRE 693.8 1 112.5 571.9 1 058.6 667.1 1 276.4 622.0 1 158.1
TRD 1 761.0 2 253.6 1 123.9 1 722.9 1 069.0 1 794.5 1 136.2 1 774.1
TRC 1 586.9 2 012.9 1 817.0 2 214.2 1 695.2 2 171.5 1 430.0 2 377.4
BUS 2 857.4 4 162.2 1 918.7 2 411.1 1 906.1 2 531.1 1 638.4 2 263.3
Median
Manuf.
546.1 1 341.3 551.4 1 036.5 433.1 1 307.8 569.7 1 362.6
Median
Tertiary
2 035.3 2 500.8 1 409.3 1 955.1 1 069.0 1 794.5 1 136.2 1 774.1
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated by wholesale price index of engineering goods, including electrotechnical
goods, for machinery and construction cost index for buildings and other capital. The net capital stock
requirements reflect the amount of capital required to produce one million 2017 euros worth of production.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1959–1989; Tiainen 1994; see the
appendices for capital.
declined to its initial level by 1980. Note here that net capital stock refers to not only
machinery and transport equipment, but buildings and other construction as well.
PAP certainly was capital intensive in 1959 both in direct and total terms. The latter is
due to the industry’s dependence on transportation services and energy industry’s inputs
– PAP is estimated to have accounted 40–50% of Finnish electricity consumption – both
of which were highly capital intensive.290 PAP’s high direct use of capital intensity is a
result of what Heikkinen has described as “an investment mania” in the decade following
the Korean boom, which led to Finnish paper exports reaching Swedish levels in 1960.291
The “mania” was partly encouraged by FAO’s predictions of rising global demand of
pulp and paper, but also by the inability to decrease wages and stumpage prices due to
domestic interest groups.292 Thus investments remained the only venue for expansion.
PAP’s capital intensity declined between 1959 and 1970. Considering that its direct use
did not change as much, it seems that the industry’s input providers became less capital
290 Jensen–Eriksen 2007, 232–233; Hoffman 1988, 139
291 Heikkinen 2000, 267–270
292 Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 194–195
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intensive. This could have been caused either by capital productivity or compositional
shifts in input structure. After 1970, PAP’s total capital requirements did not increase
markedly whereas its declining direct requirements in 1959–1980 reflect underutilization
of production capacity.293 However, in the early 1980s the industry invested in new paper
machines once more, as can be seen from its growth in direct capital use.294
Woodworking and furniture manufactures were less capital intensive than the paper
industry, which corresponds with the situation in 1928 as identified by Kauppila.295 On
the other hand, when considering WOF’s total use of capital, the entire production chain
of woodworking was quite close to the manufacturing median. This probably reflects
forestry’s relatively high capital intensity.
Indeed, it is slightly surprising that primary sector’s capital stock in general was so large
relative to its gross output in comparison with manufacturing. This could, of course,
reflect inefficient use of capital, but AGR underwent mechanization in the form of tractors
and combine harvesters from the 1950s to the 1970s and Ojala and Ilkka Nummela argue
that the industry went from labour intensive to a capital intensive one. A similar statement
of labour-saving mechanization can be made of forestry. Indeed, capital intensity grew in
both primary sector industries after 1970.296
WOF’s capital intensity had increased as well after 1970. The industry’s lower rate of
capital intensity, at least in the early post-war period, related to forest companies tending
to favour investments in PAP rather than in WOF due to its lack of efficiency-increasing
technical innovations and lower global demand for its products.297 Even after 1970,
WOF’s investment rate was curtailed by Bank of Finland and the Central Association of
Finnish Forest Industries.298 Yet its capital intensity was still higher than in many
industries, such as MFM or TRE. This clearly illustrates that WOF was more mechanized
than what had been the case in the interwar period. Its undergoing modernization was
293 Hjerppe 1982, 419–421. PAP expanded excessively more than what the demand for its products would
have necessitated. Since production capacity in the industry took a long time to construct, the expansion
was intended to secure market shares in a forward-looking manner.
294 Heikkinen 2000, 378–379. The invention of Thermo-Mechanical Pulp also increased the demand for
energy, which should have increased total requirements here. See Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 130-131.
295 Kauppila 2007, 124–126
296 Nummela & Ojala 2006, 86–88; Pihkala 1982b, 405
297 Ahvenainen 1984, 404
298 Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 89. PAP avoided a similar fate due to its considerable economic influence.
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exemplified by the automatization of sawmills during the 1960s and how furniture
production moved from workshops to factories.299
What is perhaps most striking regarding capital intensity is its relative absence in metal
engineering industries, although this has been noted in previous research.300 ELE  in
particular was not capital intensive even when compared to other metal industries.301 Its
exports which truly emerged only in the 1980s seem unrelated to capital intensity. The
same lack of capital intensity can be observed in MFM as well, although TRE’s total
capital use was approximately on the level of manufacturing median in 1970–1980.
However, both industries tended to become less capital intensive in 1980–1989.
Unlike metal engineering industries, MET was clearly intensive in the use of capital.
However, its total capital intensity declined during 1959–1970 and 1980–1989 as well.
While the decline of the 1960s may simple reflect the rapid growth of the industry, the
latter decrease was probably related to the field’s overcapacity crisis related to Eastern
Asian competition and decline in demand for its products due to new materials and
environmental concerns.302
TEX had a low level of capital intensity in both total and direct terms in 1959–1989,
though its capital intensity grew in the 1980s. However, Mika Maliranta sees this as partly
resulting from the industry’s rundown.303 Since TEX comprised 4.0% of total value-
added in exports already in 1970 and its export share declined to 2.3% in 1989, this
indicates that capital intensity was likely unrelated to its exports. The foodstuff industry’s
high total capital intensity is reminiscent of Hjerppe’s statement that it had developed into
large-scale industry, but this is perhaps more on point with beverage and tobacco
manufactures, not detailed here. However, its low direct capital use implies that it was
not large-scale itself but had backward linkages to more capital intensive sectors.304 At
any rate, since FOO was gradually losing its status as an export industry, capital intensity
may not have been an important determinant there.
299 Hoffman 1988, 150; Hjerppe 1982, 417
300 Larjavaara 1978, 190
301 On the other hand, this industry also includes production of instruments, previously categorized in other
manufacturing, during 1980–1989. Instruments were most likely less capital intensive than other types of
electrotechnical goods.
302 Leiponen 1994, 21, 24
303 Maliranta 1996, 110
304 Hjerppe 1982, 410. The author does not differentiate food manufactures with beverage and tobacco
industry here though.
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Unlike consumption goods and metal engineering industries, CHE was a capital intensive
industry as Maliranta notes.305 It continued to be so throughout the period, even if at a
lower rate, but one cannot simply state that its exports growth was driven solely by capital
intensity. After all, its export share was relatively low prior to the 1980s: 0.9% in 1959
and 1.8% in 1970. Had capital intensity been the sole determinant of chemical exports,
CHE might have expanded earlier. Still capital intensity probably had a role here.
In comparison with the relatively stable capital intensity in manufacturing – disregarding
the decline observed in 1970 – capital intensity of services declined gradually in 1959–
1980, which indicates that capital productivity possibly increased more in tertiary than in
secondary sector. In the 1980s, the median in both did not change by much. Even so,
exports in services were more capital intensive than in manufacturing. This seems to be
the case in all three major service export industries: TRC, TRD and BUS. While BUS
clearly decreased its use of capital, it was still roughly as capital intensive as PAP in 1989.
One might speculate that services tend to have fewer employees per establishment and
therefore there is more need for constructions there, or transport equipment in the case of
TRC.
The traditional third-factor addition to the H–O model is human capital. While Wright
maintained that wages can be used to infer skill requirements,306 the possibility of a high
rate of unionization wage rates warrants a more multifaceted approach. Additionally, it
could be argued that this measure merely reflects the ability of productive industries to
compensate their employees. The counterargument would be that employers are not
willing do so unless labour is skilled enough. Secondly, it is possible that the share of
women in the workforce could bias the wage rate downwards.307 Thirdly, wage solidarity
of the post-war period probably means that differences in average wage rate across
industries are smaller than differences in true skill intensity.308
Due to these issues, which I discuss in more detail in the appendices, it is prudent to
consider more than one measure. While I will begin with average hourly wages across
industries, I have also included tables concerning the ratio of office workers to total
employees and R&D intensity in this section. Although the concept of office worker is a
305 Maliranta 1996, 71
306 Wright 1990, 654
307 This was apparently the case at least in apparel, shoe and partly in textile manufacturing. See Paavonen
2008, 309.
308 See Paavonen 2008, 257 and Dahmén 1963, 44 concerning wage solidarity.
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Table 8. Average Hourly Wage Rates in 1959–1989
1959 1965 1970 1980 1985 1989
AGR 3.2 3.4 6.3 6.1 6.8 7.9
FOR 4.7 6.1 7.9 11.2 11.8 13.2
FOO 4.8 6.0 7.6 11.5 13.2 15.6
TEX 4.6 5.4 6.6 9.2 11.0 12.5
WOF 4.9 5.9 7.1 10.9 12.4 14.4
PAP 6.2 8.0 9.7 15.8 18.3 20.8
CHE 8.3 7.9 10.2 13.9 16.6 18.7
MET 5.9 7.8 10.3 14.4 16.5 18.5
MFM 6.1 7.6 9.6 13.0 15.1 17.4
ELE 5.1 7.1 9.3 12.6 14.7 16.8
TRE 8.8 7.9 10.4 13.6 15.6 17.0
TRD 4.6 6.5 7.6 11.3 12.4 14.8
TRC 5.7 7.6 10.2 12.7 14.4 16.4
BUS 7.8 7.4 10.0 14.9 16.3 19.0
Median
Manufacturing
5.9 7.4 9.5 12.8 14.9 16.9
Median
Tertiary
5.7 7.4 9.0 13.2 14.4 16.4
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated with Statistics Finland’s Cost-of-Living index.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for human capital.
crude measure for human capital in some respects,309 the general increase in the relative
amount of office workers in manufacturing still probably reflects a higher rate of human
capital. Data concerning R&D expenditure is survey-based and only covers 1970–1989
which means that it is perhaps less reliable than the other measures for human capital.
Furthermore, one might suppose that R&D intensity does not exactly measure the same
thing as skill intensity, even if both are types of human capital.
Median wage rate in both manufacturing and services approximately tripled during 1959–
1989. As Kaukiainen asserts, Finland had ceased to be a provider of cheap labour in
international markets and implies that know-how was increasingly important. Pihkala
also mentioned Finnish production shifter away from raw material and capital based
production towards one characterized by knowledge and skill intensity in the 1980s.310
He also argued that R&D inputs began to grow during this time. Especially the late 1980s
was characterized by attempts to increase the R&D share of GDP. While this view is
309 See appendices concerning human capital measurement for a brief discussion on this point. Also note
that Industrial Statistics, used as a data source here, do not cover enterprises with fewer than five employees.
310 Pihkala 2001, 306
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supported by data on R&D intensity of Table 10. it should be noted that the share of high-
tech products in commodity exports was only 5–6% in the 1980s.311
Taking the figures at face value, agriculture and forestry were low-wage industries as can
be expected. The same can be stated of WOF, which is in concordance with its low ratio
of office workers as can be observed in Table 9. Indeed, Jani Saarinen notes that WOF
has been traditionally viewed as a low-tech industry.312 While the industry trailed behind
the wage rate of the manufacturing median, PAP had clearly higher wage rates than WOF,
though the difference was not great prior to 1980, when employees of paper industry had
the highest average wage rate in export industries detailed here.
This might reflect PAP’s high degree of unionization and it has been suggested that
investments there indirectly caused wage rates to rise – as the relative share of wages in
production costs declined there was less of a reason to argue against trade unions attempt
to raise them.313 The industry’s office worker ratio and R&D intensity were not especially
different from the manufacturing median either which does not support the notion that
the PAP utilized human capital to great extent.314 Indeed, the CEO of Neste Oy, Uolevi
Raade, is said to have remarked that “the forest industry’s capacity for innovation stopped
on the level of toilet paper”.315 While this relates to the early post-war period, Jensen-
Eriksen is of the opinion that the industry’s human capital intensity increased later on as
he concludes that by the 1990s “the forest cluster’s most high-class product may have
still been a Finnish engineer specializing in wood-processing technology”.316
Metal engineering industries’ do not stand out here as their average wage rate was
generally close to the median. MET conversely tended to have a higher wage rate than
other metal industries especially in the 1980s, though not necessarily with regards to the
share of office workers of R&D expenditure. However, Maliranta noted that the
industry’s workforce tended to be more educated than in the U.S. and West-German metal
industry.317 MET and PAP seem similar regarding this factor too.
311 Pihkala 2001, 306, 311
312 Saarinen 2005, 30
313 Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 195
314 Lack of office workers could partly be explained by the sales association, FINNPAP, which removed
the need for paper companies to employ marketing staff of their own.
315 Ibid., 248–249
316 Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 145–150, 189
317 Maliranta 1996, 133
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TRE seems to have been initially skill intensive, as its employees had the highest average
wage rate in manufacturing in 1959, and it was characterized by a relatively high ratio of
office workers in 1959–1970. ELE and MFM do not appear especially skill intensive
when considering wage rates. On the other hand, a good deal of employees in ELE were
office workers and the industry did have an extremely high rate of R&D intensity.318
MFM also had a relatively high rate of R&D intensity, but to considerably lesser degree
than ELE, and its office worker ratio remained above the median throughout 1959–1989.
But the evidence there is not as overwhelming as compared to ELE. This is in line with
Larjavaara’s finding that skill intensity was not a determinant of metal engineering
exports in the 1970s.319 However, it could be that ELE and MFM became R&D intensive
in the 1980s whereas TRE lost its edge in skill intensity for some reason.
Evidence for human capital intensity in CHE seems more certain as all three measures
for it indicate that it was skill and R&D intensive. However, despite how the industry’s
average wage rate was consistently above the median it was not especially high in 1965
or 1980. Nevertheless they did increased during the 1980s when CHE’s export share grew
from 3.8% in 1980 to 5.2% in 1989. Moreover, the ratio of officer workers was
exceptionally high in CHE, even more so than in ELE, indicating that skill intensity was
a factor in chemical exports. The industry’s R&D intensity was also high, which supports
Hjerppe’s statement that CHE was especially affected by technological progress.320
Consumption goods industries TEX and FOO tended to have low wages throughout the
post-war period, which is not exactly a surprise. This certainly reinforces the notion these
exports were based on low-cost, unskilled labour. Indeed, Swedish textile companies
invested in Finland at the end of 1960s due to lower labour costs, before they increased
to the extent that the Swedes began once more to offshore, but now to somewhere else
than Finland.321 Exports of TEX seem particularly unrelated to human capital as evidently
TEX either could not or would not imitate other consumption goods industries’
employment of office workers or level of R&D intensity. This could partly explain why
the industry did not manage to compete in international markets after the 1980s. On the
other hand, higher labours costs in FOO relative to TEX might explain why its export
318 While instrument production is classified in electrotechnical production in the 1980s and not in other
manufacturing industry, the office worker ratios of ELE without it are almost identical.
319 Larjavaara 1978, 184–185. The exception here included wood-processing machinery which suggests
that know-how related to forest industry played role, if small, here.
320 Hjerppe 1982, 428
321 Aunesluoma 2011, 215; Saarinen 2005, 29
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share diminished over 1959–1989. At any rate, FOO’s export performance seems largely
unrelated to human capital. Low R&D intensity of consumption goods industries may
also reflect the fact that most of their machinery and technology tended to be imported
from abroad.322
There is more evidence for human capital intensity in services. Of course, the results here
could be influenced by how services tended to employ a higher share of women in general
and might have consequently had lower wages compared with more masculine
manufacturing. TRC, generally the most important service industry, tended to have an
average wage rate close to the manufacturing median whereas its R&D intensity was
lower than in other industries. It seems that technical progress related to
telecommunications and shipping did not translate to R&D expenditure in the industry.323
While TRD was mostly a low-wage industry, there is evidence that exports of BUS might
have been driven by the use of skilled personnel as the industry had a higher wage rate
than most manufacturing industries during 1980–1989 when its exports grew noticeably.
Although its R&D intensity was not different from the manufacturing median, Lastikka
noted that rapid technical development of the times was related to growth in ICT and
leasing services, which should be related to business services.324 Indeed the industry’s
R&D intensity was higher than in many manufacturing industries, but skill intensity may
still have been the more pertinent type of human capital. Although the smaller exports of
financial services are not detailed here, skill intensity was a feature of this industry too.
Table 9. The Ratio of Office Workers to Total Employment in 1959–1989, %
1959 1970 1980 1989
FOO 15.4 18.8 23.9 25.0
TEX 11.3 14.2 16.3 19.2
WOF 10.8 12.3 15.7 23.5
PAP 14.1 19.6 23.5 26.2
CHE 24.2 32.3 37.6 47.0
MET 15.9 22.2 24.7 28.6
MFM 17.4 23.3 27.6 31.8
ELE 18.8 20.1 31.9 43.1
TRE 18.6 28.5 26.0 28.0
Median Manufacturing 15.9 20.0 24.3 27.1
Notes: The share of office workers also includes owners working in establishments.
Source: The author's own estimates; Industrial Statistics; see the appendices for human capital.
322 Saarinen 2005, 28–29. This was a general feature of Finnish technology at the time though.
323 Lastikka 1984, 38–40
324 Ibid., 67–68
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Table 10. Direct and Total R&D Expenditure Requirements in 1970–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1970 1980 1989
Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total
AGR 0.0 2.5 0.0 2.6 0.3 6.9
FOR 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.2
FOO 1.1 3.6 1.5 5.2 4.9 14.5
TEX 0.6 2.0 1.3 2.8 4.1 8.4
WOF 1.6 3.3 1.2 3.3 4.6 9.5
PAP 4.7 8.4 2.6 6.3 5.3 13.3
CHE 17.0 22.2 10.1 14.2 35.0 45.0
MET 9.4 20.1 6.3 13.0 4.4 12.0
MFM 9.5 13.7 13.8 19.7 17.2 25.7
ELE 39.2 45.1 39.3 44.7 83.5 94.3
TRE 2.1 7.0 7.5 13.3 13.0 22.6
TRD 0.3 1.4 0.5 2.3 0.4 3.2
TRC 0.9 2.2 0.9 2.5 1.5 5.5
BUS 3.0 4.6 6.3 8.1 9.1 12.5
Median Manufacturing 2.4 6.4 2.9 6.3 10.2 17.8
Median Tertiary 0.9 3.7 0.9 3.4 1.5 8.0
Notes: “0.0” are very small amounts of R&D expenditure. In constant 2017 euros deflated by Statistics Finland’s
Wholesale Price Index. The R&D expenditure requirements reflect the amount of R&D expenditure required to
produce one million 2017 euros worth of production. Total requirements could be biased by untrustworthiness of
data on primary and tertiary sectors so direct requirements are preferable.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland: Input-Output Tables 1970–1989; see the appendices for
human capital.
The final factor endowment in the four-factor H–O model is resource intensity. Natural
resources is measured simply as the share of an industry’s value-added of exports that can
be attributed to the primary sector: agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry and mining. Note
that I am referring only to domestic resources. Foreign resources might have been
important for some industries, but the point here is to examine the importance of domestic
factors, or the endowments provided by Finnish terrain.
The reliance on domestic natural resources declined over time. This transformation was
not driven solely by export diversification away from forest industries since almost all
industries shifted their production away from the use of natural resources. No export
industry had a higher share of value-added of exports originating from primary sector in
1989 than in 1956. Even in agricultural exports, the share of primary sector inputs
declined after 1965.
While forest manufacturing industries were reliant on forest resources throughout the
post-war period, this tendency waned to great extent. In 1956, half of value-added in
WOF’s exports and a third in PAP’s exports originated from natural resources. However,
forest industries had a reversal of resource intensity during 1959–1965, which is probably
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Table 11. The Share of Direct and Indirect Value-added Originating from Primary Sector in 1956–
1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1985 1989
AGR 81.5 83.0 81.5 78.2 74.2 76.3 72.3
FOR 97.6 96.5 97.6 96.1 97.3 96.3 96.1
FOO 52.1 45.6 51.8 50.4 51.1 54.1 45.7
TEX 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
WOF 47.5 43.5 45.7 39.3 35.9 35.8 30.2
PAP 32.5 27.5 32.7 27.4 22.7 20.9 20.8
CHE 7.4 7.0 5.8 4.4 3.5 3.7 2.7
MET 12.8 25.9 22.5 21.9 10.6 8.8 7.4
MFM 3.0 3.3 3.0 4.4 2.2 1.6 1.4
ELE 4.3 5.6 4.5 3.5 1.8 1.1 1.1
TRE 2.9 2.1 2.5 3.4 2.2 1.4 1.3
TRD 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4
TRC 2.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.8
BUS - - - 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.7
Median Manufacturing 6.4 6.3 5.7 4.4 3.8 3.5 2.9
Median Tertiary 1.3 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.9
Notes: “-” denotes that industry did not have any exports in that year and as such had no figure corresponding with
resource intensity. Primary sector is defined as the industries of agriculture (AGR), forestry (FOR), fishing (FIS),
metal ore mining (ORE) and other mining (OMI).
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland, Input–Output Tables 1956–1989; see the appendices for
natural resources.
related to the programme to utilize forest resources to greater degree after the devaluation
of 1957. Improved transportation also enabled easier access to resources. The decline in
1965–1970 corresponds with how the potential of these logging operations had been fully
exploited and forest industries began to increase their level of refinement instead. Even
sawmill production was curtailed primarily by lack of raw material by the 1980s and it is
quite telling that Finland started to import raw wood from the Soviet Union.325 Of course,
the high investment ratio in PAP also meant that forest material was less needed.326
Between 1956 and 1989 the share of primary products in WOF and PAP had fallen 17%
and 12% respectively whereas forestry continued to be based on natural resources, which
presumably had characterized its exports during the 1950s.327
Another very resource intensive industry was FOO, which reflects its backward linkages
to agriculture. Indeed, one could characterize the industry simply as a refiner of
agricultural goods. While foodstuff exports are not very important in the long-run
325 Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 333; Ahvenainen 1984, 435
326 Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 125
327 Saarinen 2005, 30; Pihkala 2001, 255–256. The availability of forest resources was developed with
silvicultural programmes though. See Pihkala 1982b, 402.
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narrative of Finnish exports, its modest export performance in the early post-war period
was likely determined partly by the availability of natural resources.
Yet comparing these exports’ natural resource intensity to the manufacturing median
illustrates that these industries were clearly outliers among the fields of business. The
only metal industry that utilised domestic natural resources to great extent was MET. 13%
of its exports were initially composed of primary sector inputs, but that ratio doubled to
26% in 1959. As Hjerppe notes, the industry was primarily a refiner of domestic mining
products.328 And indeed there were non-ferrous metal deposits such as copper in Finland,
but by the 1980s these deposits had been depleted as well, which can be seen in MET’s
lower resource intensity during that time.329 Metal engineering industries were not very
dependent on natural resources as even ELE with its traditional cable production based
on domestic copper, had only a negligible level of resource intensity in 1956.330
TEX was also among the industries that used natural resources the least during 1956–
1989. CHE had a relatively “average” rate of natural resource use in the late 1950s, but
one that decreased continuously. Therefore its development into an export industry by the
1980s was probably determined by other factors. This indicates that chemical production
based on forest companies’ inputs was not necessarily important in the grand scheme of
things here. As expected, service industries were not dependent on resources either.
4.3 Variables of New Trade Theory
The “gilded age” of applying neoclassical foreign trade theory broke
with regards to Finland at the beginning of free trade integration with
FINEFTA-agreement 1961 and free trade agreement with EEC
1973.331
The emergence of intraindustry trade was a blow to the validity of factor endowment
model, or neoclassical foreign trade theory as Pihkala calls it. If factors of production of
even a four-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model – labour, capital, human capital and natural
resources – are incomplete explanations, variables of economies of scale and product
differentiation might be explanatory instead. Since data is lacking on primary and tertiary
sectors, I will mostly discuss manufacturing industries here. Services of a certain industry
328 Hjerppe 1982, 421
329 Paavonen 2008, 257
330 Ibid., 275
331 Pihkala 2007, 47
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are often close substitutes of one another, but still different, so they could be automatically
considered to be horizontally differentiated, but I will not study this point in further detail.
In the case of economies of scale, average plant size – here average establishment size –
is a standard measure although it can also reflect product standardization. One should be
mindful of the possibility that there are two forces at work here. First, there is product
standardization that is an independent cause of exports, likely to increase net exports and
to decrease IIT since it reflects homogenous products instead of differentiated ones. This
perhaps corresponds with what Aunesluoma and Paavonen have described as scale
advantage. Economies of scale along the lines of NTT is the second force. Here only the
existence of economies of scale on some level is relevant for IIT to emerge. It is uncertain
which level of average establishment size that would be, especially since Parjanne asserts
that high levels of average plant size probably stand more for product standardization.332
Average establishment size almost tripled between 1952 and 1989 when considering the
manufacturing median. Yet there was a wide disparity in scale advantage among
industries. Most manufacturing industries did not have as large establishments as PAP,
which operated on a large scale relative to the U.S. and Western European countries as
well.333 Indeed, since Heikki Niemeläinen asserted that increasing returns to scale were a
characteristic of the industry it should be no surprise that PAP’s establishments were on
average over ten times as large as the median establishment in manufacturing.334
The investment programme of the early post-war period seems to have increased plant
sizes in 1952–1965, though the largest increases in size happened in the 1980s. The
increase in average establishment size therefore reflects its capability to rationalize its
production. On the other hand, Finnish forest companies during this time were
characterized by a “more of the same” attitude which led to larger and larger
establishments that might have been more technically advanced but were still producing
similar products.335 This suggests that paper products were perhaps homogenous. In
comparison with the paper industry, woodworking industry was conversely not a large-
scale industry.
332 Parjanne 1992, 95
333 Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 200–201; Maliranta 1996, 128–129
334 Niemeläinen 2000, 281
335 Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 126
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Table 12. Average Establishment Size in 1952–1989
This is not surprising. According to Ahvenainen, there were not many large sawmills in
the 1960s despite modernization of old facilities.336 Interestingly enough, the data for
1989 suggests that forestry might have been operating on a relatively large-scale at that
point. In the early post-war period the primary sector had still been characterized by small
establishments according to Dahmén.337
While MET operated on a smaller scale than PAP, its average establishment size was still
high and had an increasing trend in 1959–1972 and 1980–1989. Product standardization
and homogeneity unrelated to horizontal differentiation may have been features of this
industry as well then. Larjavaara argued that increasing returns to scale were present in
metal engineering industries, but the evidence here does not support this argument.338 Of
course, drawing on the argument that only a certain level of scale advantage is important
to attain horizontal differentiation, it is also possible that MFM, TRE and ELE reached
this threshold at some point. ELE in particular had larger establishments than the
manufacturing median which is in line with Larjavaara’s findings.339 Establishments in
336 Ahvenainen 1984, 404
337 Dahmén 1963, 51–53
338 Larjavaara 1978, 123. His argument rests on the notion that these industries’ net exports correlated with
their home market shares, which is perhaps not the best evidence for increasing returns to scale anyway.
339 Ibid., 128
1952 1959 1964 1972 1980 1986 1989
AGR . . . . . . .
FOR . . . . . 3.1 3.5
FOO 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4
TEX 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
WOF 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5
PAP 4.1 4.6 6.0 6.7 5.9 10.8 14.9
CHE 0.9 1.4 2.2 1.9 2.3 3.8 6.9
MET 2.4 1.7 2.5 4.1 4.6 5.9 11.1
MFM 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8
ELE 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.5
TRE 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.8 1.7
TRD 0.1 . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
TRC 0.1 . . . . 0.7 0.9
BUS 0.1 . 0.1 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.7
Median
Manufacturing
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1
Notes: “.” refers to a missing value. Measured as value-added in millions of 2017 euros, deflated by Statistics
Finland’s Wholesale Price Index, divided by the number of establishments. Several industries were dropped due
to unreliability of data and possible systematic breaks in the series. The median of the tertiary sector is not
included due to missing values arising from these issues.
Source:  The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; see the appendices for scale advantage.
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TRE also grew in size during the 1980s, though they were still relatively small compared
to MET or PAP.
Conversely CHE’s establishment size grew more strongly in the 1980s. Since its average
establishment was relatively large compared to the median during 1959–1972, scale
advantage might have been a determinant there. While beverage and tobacco industries –
not detailed here – were characterized by large establishments, other consumption goods
industries were not. The results here do not suggest that textile and foodstuff exports
would have had scale advantage or economies of scale to the extent that made product
differentiation possible. Indeed, Hjerppe’s remark that foodstuff industry had transformed
into a large-scale one seems unjustified.340
Similarly, there is not much evidence for scale advantage being a determinant of service
export industries either – although this might arise from concrete lack of evidence as there
is not much reliable data concerning TRC for example. Most services were operated from
a large number of small enterprises. For example, while retail trade was rationalized from
the 1960s, the larger establishment sizes are barely visible there.341
Product differentiation is another determinant of intraindustry trade, which can be
measured through R&D intensity or marketing intensity. The R&D data is essentially the
same as that used in previous section, but it is classified here according to product groups,
not industries. Industries can and do have expenditure devoted to research in products
outside their own characteristic product line. For example, the high level of R&D intensity
in rubber and plastic goods – not detailed here – during 1985 can be explained with R&D
expenditure that largely originated from CHE. Product groups have been weighted
according to industry size though.
Product differentiation can be also studied with innovation data. Admittedly the number
of innovations does not account for all research activities, but it is perhaps conceptually
closer to the notion of horizontal differentiation. R&D expenditure can theoretically
simply reflect a large company investing huge amount of funds into increasing the quality
of a single commodity or a single breakthrough. Innovations are defined here as specific
inventions, or products.342 However, eight cross-sections, the years accounted for input-
340 Hjerppe 1982, 410.
341 Lastikka 1984, 30–31
342 Saarinen 2005, 59. See Ibid., 67–72 for a more comprehensive definition of an innovation and
additionally the collection methods concerning the number of inventions.
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Table 13. Direct R&D Expenditure Requirements across Product Groups in 1970–1989, in 1 000
Euros
1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
AGR 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9
FOR 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.6
FOO 1.1 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.9
TEX 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.7 3.0
WOF 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.3
PAP 6.7 4.0 4.6 5.2 7.5
CHE 19.3 14.9 19.4 10.9 32.0
MET 8.1 6.2 7.2 7.2 6.9
MFM 9.2 13.2 13.8 18.9 20.2
ELE 36.5 51.8 63.9 74.4 93.7
TRE 1.9 4.8 5.2 12.1 9.0
TRD 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
TRC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 3.1
BUS 2.2 0.9 2.0 2.5 3.5
Median Manufacturing 5.1 4.3 5.0 8.5 9.7
Median Tertiary 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated with Statistics Finland’s Wholesale Price Index. While R&D expenditure
is calculated according to product groups it is scaled according to industry size, or gross value of production.
Total requirements that also cover backward linkages are disregarded, since in the case of product differentiation
only the end product’s qualities matter.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland: Input-Output Tables 1970–1989; Vuori 1994; see the
appendices for product differentiation.
output tables, are used in the regression analysis soon to follow. There is a degree of
arbitrariness about this approach. A year might have had more or fewer innovations
released in comparison with years just prior or after it. Therefore, aggregate sums over
1945–1998 reported by Saarinen are included in this descriptive section whereas the data
used in regression analysis is in appendix Table A 15.
Similarly to scale advantage, horizontal product differentiation is difficult to identify due
to possible non-linearity. High levels of R&D expenditure might refer more to
technological rather than horizontal differentiation. In technological differentiation “one
or more attributes of a particular product will be changed technically and it will become
a new, different product”.343 This type of differentiation is more related to product cycle
and technological gap theories mentioned in previous sections, whereas horizontal
differentiation relates to NTT.344 Therefore special care should be taken in interpreting
these figures. For this reason I have included proxies for industrial concentration in this
section, which should be negatively associated with horizontal differentiation.
343 Parjanne 1992, 28
344 Ibid., 27–28, 46
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Table 14. The Number of Innovations according to Product Class in 1945–1998
1945–66 1967–84 1985–98 C4-index
Foodstuffs 4 2 81 28.7
Textiles, clothing 4 7 17 25.0
Wood products 47 51 34 11.4
Pulp & paper products 10 9 53 30.6
Oil & chemicals, + pharmaceuticals 46 81 145 19.1
Non-metallic mineral products 10 23 27 20.0
Basic & fabricated metal products 56 68 109 21.9
Machinery and equipment 222 335 321 14.0
Electrical, electronics 72 108 169 30.6
Instruments 41 137 160 16.6
Transport equipment 68 101 44 26.3
Electricity, gas & water supply 10 39 19 23.5
Software 0 40 221 12.6
Others 2 0 48 21.7
Total 592 1001 1456 21.6
Notes: Total C4-index refers to the average index score. The index is the share of the four largest innovatory firms
in a given industry for the entire period.
Source: Saarinen 2005, Table 5.2.
In addition to R&D intensity, we may also consider marketing intensity although the data
for it is rather deficient. There is only one cross-section, for 1985, and total requirements
cannot be reliably interpreted due to lack of figures for primary and tertiary sectors.
Additionally, one would assume that technologically differentiated products would
require some advertising as well. There is also the issue that joint sales companies, or
export cartels, effectively operated as marketing divisions for their host industries. Thus,
it is not surprising that paper companies had such a low rate of marketing intensity as
most of this was likely classified in figures for trade industry.345
Both series for R&D intensity and the number of innovations, based on Tables 13. and
14., indicate that forest products were not especially differentiated, this is despite there
being forest-based research centres in Finland, founded jointly by several companies prior
to the post-war period, such as Keskuslaboratorio Oy.346 Indeed, Jensen-Eriksen
maintained that forest industries’ products were “highly standardized bulk products”
where inventions were process-innovations which tended to be unobservable to the
general public.347 Paper industry was also not viewed as market-oriented by contemporary
observers.348
345 See Heikkinen 2000, 477–478 for a discussion related to paper companies’ sales association: Finnpap.
346 Saarinen 2005, 39
347 Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 144; Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 30
348 Jensen-Eriksen 2008, 126
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However, there is conflicting evidence concerning whether paper or wood production was
the more differentiated one. WOF has been traditionally regarded as a low-tech industry,
which is supported by the product group data.349 Yet in 1948–1984, its number of
innovations outranked that of paper. Its innovations were also less concentrated than in
PAP. Horizontal differentiation was more likely in the case of furniture production, which
after all produces durable consumption goods, rather than in woodworking proper though,
as can be seen from Table 17. detailing marketing intensity.
The highest R&D intensity across industries by far was in ELE and in a rising trend. The
number of innovations in its product group was also very high in the post-war period. Yet
the innovation activities there were evidently ran by large companies.350 Additionally,
electrotechnical goods and instruments tended to be characterized by innovations
increasingly new to world markets, of relatively high complexity, and of an origin related
to science and technology more so than other industries.351 However, ELE did have a high
ratio of marketing expenditure, but this might be related to advertising technologically
advanced products. In the end, I would conclude that there is more evidence in favour of
ELE’s products being related to technological rather than horizontal differentiation.
Goods related to machinery also tended to be characterized by many innovations and,
especially in the late 1980s, high R&D expenditure. Innovations in machinery tended to
be of relatively low complexity and, prior to 1984, not novel in world markets.
Furthermore, their development was usually prompted by price competition or threat of
imitation rather than from scientific and technological advancement as in ELE.352 Product
innovations here were also among the less concentrated among fields of business, which
is consistent with product differentiation.353 Saarinen also mentions that fabricated metal
products became more complex once new materials were introduced beginning in the
1980s.354 The employment share of large establishments in MFM is close to the median,
which at least does not prove that the interpretation of horizontal differentiation is false.
349 Saarinen 2005, 30
350 Both Saarinen’s C4 -ratio and the employment share of large establishments corroborate this
interpretation. However, the C4 -ratio for instruments, which are included in this thesis’ ELE during 1980–
1989, indicates less concentration than in electrotechnical goods. Yet I would argue that the employment
share measure for ELE is more consistent with high concentration in the industry.
351 Ibid., 118, 156, 165
352 Ibid., 118–119, 156, 165
353 Note that fabricated metal products are included in Saarinen’s data among basic metal products and not
in machinery as in generally this thesis.
354 Ibid., 33
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Table 15. The Share of Employees in Large Establishments in Manufacturing in 1959–1989, %
1959 1970 1980 1989
FOO 17.2 28.2 34.2 36.0
TEX 51.0 46.2 45.2 36.3
WOF 41.9 50.6 42.8 37.6
PAP 78.1 81.3 83.3 85.5
CHE 43.2 56.9 57.4 61.4
MET 73.6 84.7 86.1 78.3
MFM 54.0 57.0 52.1 44.6
ELE 58.9 70.2 73.4 67.4
TRE 58.3 47.7 76.1 74.5
Median Manufacturing 52.5 54.7 51.5 46.5
Notes: Large establishments are defined as having more than 200 employees. Note that shoe manufactures are
classified in TEX, not in LEA, in 1959–1970.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland, Statistical Yearbooks of Finland 1959–1989; see the
appendices for monopolistic competition.
Furthermore, the figures indicate that its concentration declined in 1980–1989. The
industry’s marketing intensity was not very high, but not non-existent either.
All of this would imply that MFM was characterized by horizontal differentiation. Yet it
is useful to remember that Dahmén criticized metal exports of their lack of so-called
market-creating innovations in 1949–1962. Eastern Trade led to specialization of sorts,
but only rarely were there Western markets for resulting products. This implies that the
nature of product differentiation in metal industries was related to how the demands of
Eastern Trade were satisfied. I will return to this point in later sections.355
The evidence for product differentiation in other metal industries is mixed. MET did have
a higher than median manufacturing in R&D intensity prior to 1985, whereas this was the
case in TRE only during that year, and both product groups tended to generate more
innovations than e.g. forest industries. However, Table A 15. indicates that most
innovations in Saarinen’s data, seen in Table 14., were not actually basic metal products
but rather fabricated metal products that are classified in MFM in this thesis. Additionally,
the low levels of marketing intensity and a high level of concentration in MET indicate
that there are no grounds to declare that its products would have been horizontally
differentiated despite some evidence to the contrary.356
355 Dahmén 1963, 36–37
356 Saarinen 2005, 118–119, 156, 165. The evidence consists of the low complexity of its innovations, of
not being novel in world markets and being prompted by demand-side reasons. Note though that these
points in favour include both fabricated metal products and basic metal products.
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Table 16. Share of Five Largest Exporters in Manufacturing in 1981–1989, %
1981 1985 1989
Food, beverage and tobacco 60.7 65.3 57.8
Textile, clothing and leather 15.7 18.1 22.9
Wood 28.0 33.1 45.1
Paper and graphic 46.5 45.7 68.9
Chemical 58.6 66.7 56.7
Non-metallic mineral 49.4 59.6 53.5
Basic metal 92.2 93.6 89.5
Other metal industries 35.8 37.9 24.7
Other manufactures 31.4 44.4 49.7
Total manufacturing 21.3 23.5 28.0
Source: Board of Customs, OSF IA Foreign Trade 1981 Vol. 2, 1985 Vol. 2 & 1989 Vol. 2.
Notes: Measures are in gross value, not value-added of exports.
TRE was the most complex field of industry in 1948–66 in terms of innovations. Yet its
innovations in 1967–1984 were clearly less complex than the general average, tended not
to be new in world markets prior to 1985 and were usually prompted by demand-side
reasons which are consistent with horizontal differentiation. TRE also utilized marketing
to great extent in 1985, yet its high employment shares of large establishments imply that
it was not characterized by horizontally differentiated products, although it was less
concentrated before the 1980s. Based on Saarinen’s measure of concentration of
innovation activities one could say that TRE innovated more than what was average, but
the ratio smooths differences across time periods.
These points indicate that transport equipment might have been technologically
differentiated prior to 1967, but was horizontally differentiated afterwards, at least before
the end of the century. That there was product differentiation in TRE is perhaps not
surprising since even its initial exports related to special varieties such as icebreakers and
car ferries which were complemented by passenger cars and oil-rigs in the 1970s.357 Yet
it is slightly surprising that its R&D expenditure was lower than in MET.358
CHE’s product line embodied a high degree of R&D expenditure throughout 1970–1989
and especially in 1989. As already mentioned, the relatively low degree of the measure
in 1985 most likely reflected that a great deal of its R&D expenditure was devoted to
research in rubber and plastic products. In terms of innovations, chemical, oil and
pharmaceutical products did not exactly stand out. Still, the number of innovations there
357 Saarinen 2005, 34; Hjerppe 1982, 421–422
358 Saarinen 2005, 118–119, 156, 165
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Median Manufacturing 5.4 10.1
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated with Statistics Finland’s Wholesale Price Index. The marketing
expenditure requirements reflect the amount of marketing expenditure required to produce one million 2017
euros worth of production. Industrial classification disaggregates WOF into WOO and FUR and TRC to
TRA and COM here. “.” denotes missing values. Tertiary median is not included due to missing values.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Table of 1985, Parjanne 1992; see the
appendices for product differentiation.
was higher than in forest or textile products. On industrial concentration there is
conflicting evidence as Saarinen’s C4 index indicates less concentration and the
employment share of large companies indicates more concentration apart from 1959.359
As for CHE’s marketing intensity in 1985, it was higher than the median but not markedly
so. Chemical innovations tended not to be novel in world markets prior 1985–1998 and
they were predominantly developed because of demand-oriented reasons. In addition, all
chemical inventions in 1945–1966 were of low complexity, though their rate of
complexity increased to an average level in 1967–1984. In conclusion, there is some
evidence that horizontal differentiation might have played a role in the industry’s exports
at least before the late 1980s when they possibly became technologically differentiated.360
Textile products were decidedly not differentiated according to neither R&D intensity nor
the number of innovations. On both counts they were markedly lacking compared to other
industries, even if the industry’s exports were not concentrated as can be observed in
Table 16. However, textile industries had a high rate of marketing expenditure in 1985.
359 Saarinen’s measure is perhaps biased by rubber and plastic production, which were evidently less
concentrated over time, on this point.
360 Saarinen 2005, 118–119, 156, 165
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This makes sense since textiles and apparel would require marketing as consumption
goods, whereas – explaining the lack of human capital intensity observed in the previous
section – skilled personnel were not needed in actual production. It is also worth pointing
out that the few innovations textile industries had, tended to be non-complex, not new to
world markets and demand-oriented – all of which points towards horizontal
differentiation.361 While consumption goods might be generally thought of as
differentiated, foodstuff products were not markedly so in neither measure even if
Hjerppe stated that there was active product development in the industry.362
Finally, there is no strong evidence to suggest that exports of either primary or tertiary
sectors would have been differentiated. Of course, one can argue that services are by their
nature differentiated, but one cannot rule out that Finnish service exports would have been
homogenous concerning either R&D or marketing. While the small increase in TRC
products’ R&D intensity in 1985–1989 probably reflects development in
telecommunications technology as observed in Table 13. it seems that these inroads into
the new technological frontiers were still marginal at the time. It is likely that the high
number of software innovations of Table 14. reflect the 1990s more than the late 1980s.
However, considering appendix Table A 15. it seems that the innovatory activities of BUS
were quite formidable in 1985 and 1989. Its innovations accounted for 20% and 13% of
total innovations in Finland in these years respectively. Whether this was more reflective
of horizontal or technological differentiation is hard to say.
4.4 Institutional Circumstances
The Finnish economy until the new era of globalization, the 1980s,
was able to limit the competition in several ways. The paper and pulp
companies formed strong domestic cartels in order to find joint
export markets, and they were also active in international cartels.
They received support from the government for their investments – –
One important component of exports, those to the Soviet Union – –
were always negotiated by high-level government officials.363
361 Saarinen 2005, 118–119, 156, 165
362 Hjerppe 1982, 424. The only exception in consumption goods’ otherwise low R&D intensity is in BEV
during 1989, which might explain the number of innovations in foodstuff products in 1985–1998.
363 Hjerppe & Jalava 2006, 62
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Historian has the permission and actually also the obligation to set
the assumptions of economics at stake, if it is important for the
question at hand.364
In addition to reviewing the features of C–H–O model, I also stress that some of the
institutional characteristics of post-war Finland should be studied – after all they were
determinants of export structure according to Hjerppe.365 Simply because they might not
be accounted for trade models of economics does not mean that they were not important.
Dismissing these factors would constitute for an undue overvaluation of C–H–O model
over historical facts.
Perhaps the most important institutional quality with regards to structural transformation
of Finnish industry was the decreasing protectionism of domestic manufacturing, which
can be measured by tariff rates. Secondly, I review which industries might have had
export cartels, though much is uncertain about this topic. Conversely in the case of
Eastern Trade several positives and negatives have been suggested. I conclude by briefly
examining whether changes in export structure might have been associated with state-
owned companies.
Tariff rates do not constitute a perfect measure of protectionism as there are a variety of
other methods to curtail international competition. However, they do reflect how customs
barriers were lowered in Finland and the fact that many industries were given leeway in
adjusting to free trade through slower removal of tariffs. One can utilize not only nominal
tariff rates but also effective tariff rates. The former type is defined here as the value of
collected customs duties relative to the value of imports. Effective rates of protection
(EFP) is calculated with input-output tables as many other variables in this thesis. The
algebra is detailed in the appendices. For now, the term should be understood as
corresponding not with a product, as nominal tariff rates, but with the whole value-chain
of that product. The input structure of an industry is once again pertinent. While an
industry’s end product might have had a low tariff rate, its inputs faced a different rate.
Effective rate of protection then is the “percentage addition made possible by the
existence of the tariff to the value-added of the domestic industry”.366 I.e. while setting a
364 Jalava, Eloranta & Ojala 2007, 11. Translated from: “Historiantutkijalla on lupa ja oikeastaan myös
velvollisuus asettaa taloustieteen olettamukset vaakalaudalle, mikäli se on kyseessä olevan tutkimuksen
kannalta tärkeää”.
365 Hjerppe 1989, 169
366 Kauppila 2007, 66
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Table 18. Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in 1934–1989, %
1934 1959 1970 1989
Nom. Eff. Nom. Eff. Nom. Eff. Nom. Eff.
AGR 94.2 105.2 45.2 48.6 10.7 11.5 6.5 9.4
FOR 7.3 6.3 0.0 -2.6 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0
FOO + BEV 174.9 208.1 . . . . . .
FOO . . 118.0 277.6 25.8 76.8 4.2 0.9
BEV . . 141.0 224.7 60.9 110.7 9.0 13.3
TEX 24.9 34.3 24.4 27.8 4.9 4.2 5.0 4.5
WOO 35.1 1.4 5.8 4.4 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.1
FUR . . 0.0 -4.8 0.0 -1.4 1.4 1.8
PAP 8.3 -5.3 9.2 7.4 3.7 2.8 0.3 0.0
CHE 7.8 -0.3 1.5 -7.7 0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.1
MET . . 7.1 11.3 1.2 1.9 0.1 0.0
MET + FAB 19.7 21.9 . . . . . .
MFM . . . . . . 0.6 0.3
FAB . . 6.5 6.9 2.7 3.9 . .
MAC 8.3 6.4 3.4 0.8 1.6 1.1 . .
ELE 9.3 8.8 7.6 8.0 4.8 5.6 2.1 1.6
TRE 4.9 2.4 11.2 9.8 4.5 3.4 1.5 0.7
TRD . -1.1 . 0.0 . -0.1 . 0.0
TRC . -3.3 . -2.0 . -0.5 . -0.1
BUS . -2.8 . 0.0 . -0.2 . 0.0
Notes: Note that Kauppila’s tariff rates for 1934 are classified in a different manner as in 1959–1989 and suffer
from some statistical unreliability. The industrial classifications of 1959–1989 also disaggregate WOF to (WOO
and FUR) and MFM (FAB and MAC) when possible. The industrial classification used here is not identical to one
in Tables A 17 or A 18.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Board of Customs; Kauppila 2007, Table 26; See the
appendices for tariff rates.
tariff on an end-product of an industry will increase its level of protection, a tariff on that
industry’s raw materials, or its any other input for that matter, will increase its production
costs and decrease its value-added reducing its EFP.367
High effective rate of protection implies that the value-added of an industry is highly
protected, which naturally also increases domestic prices and reduces consumer income,
but this does not matter for exports. If the effective rate is lower than the nominal rate,
industry’s imported inputs had a higher tariff than its own products which means that the
tariff policy did not protect the industry as well as it was designed to. Negative effective
rates imply that the industry is in a sense taxed, or negatively protected. Usually however,
effective rates would be higher than nominal ones since customs duties on raw materials
were lower than for intermediate or finished goods.368 Kauppila also thinks that high tariff
rates for industries with low domestic output reflect fiscal purposes instead of
367 Kauppila 2007, 66–67
368 Balassa 1965, 579
92
protectionist ones, which is logical enough though one should not necessarily read too
much into possible political motivations behind these rates.369
While the data for 1934 contains some possible errors, and its classification is not
completely comparable to the one used here, it is still useful to inspect the parallels
between the protectionist 1930s and the protectionist 1950s.370 For instance, FOO was
highly protected in 1934, but even more so in 1959 – a vestige of war-time prerogatives
perhaps. Indeed, this logic perhaps explains the high customs barriers on agriculture,
which was still relatively protected in 1989. TEX was similarly protected in 1934 and in
1959 although its effective rate of protection had decreased to some extent, reflecting that
tariff policy increased its input costs more than in the 1930s.
With forest industries in 1934, the level of protection was greater, but lower EFP suggests
that its value-chain was protected less than optimally. Yet by 1959 their value-added was
actually protected to relatively great extent. Since woodworking and paper industries did
not have a high degree of direct value-added, this must reflect that their input costs were
not increased by tariff rates relative to their own end-product tariffs. As Kauppila
mentions, the nominal tariff rates are hard to justify in forest industries in any other
manner than in fiscal sense, since these products were mostly exported abroad.371
CHE was actually negatively protected in 1959. Kauppila suggests that the industry’s raw
materials had high tariff rates relative to end-products in 1934, but this problem seems to
have accentuated by 1959.372 It is possible that the lack of customs barriers and the
negative protection of CHE slowed its development to an export industry to some extent.
Paavonen did note that fertilizer production was shielded by customs barriers, but this
seems to have been negligible when considering all chemical production.373
While the level of protection in metal industries was generally lower in 1959 than in 1934,
the metal industries were definitively protected. TRE was shielded by customs barriers to
greater degree in 1959 than in 1934 whereas MET and ELE, to lesser extent, were
protected in effective terms in 1959. While MET seem to have been more protected in






1930s, in ELE the effective rate of protection was virtually the same. Machinery
production on the other hand was less protected in 1959 than in 1934.
The results do have some implications for trade structure. First, it is quite clear that
protectionism did decrease over the post-war period, opening all industries up to
international competition to a greater degree. However, the initial exports of FOO were
certainly aided by customs barriers. The visible degree of protection in TEX after 1959
also most likely contributed to its exports, though the lower EFP there seems to indicate
that tariff policy was sub-optimal in protecting its value-chain to a minor degree. The high
customs barriers, a result of consumption goods receiving a slower timetable of tariff
reductions, did not aid these industries in reaching U.S. level of labour productivity at any
rate.374 Early chemical exports were actually impeded to a minor degree by the Finnish
tariff regime. At the very least, its eventual development into an export industry clearly
occurred in the face of international competition.
The relatively high EFP in 1959 concerning MET and TRE suggests that the infant
industry argument might be applicable here to some extent, although it should be noted
that basic metal manufactures’ level decreased substantially by 1970. Considering that
the industry evidently reached the U.S. level of labour productivity in the 1980s,375 tariff
protection was perhaps not the most important factor here. Additionally, basic metal and
fabricated metal products had high customs barriers already in 1934, yet the industry
developed into an export industry relatively late, which implies that the infant industry
argument is not at its strongest here.
Of course, the problem with the infant industries argument is always with the
counterfactual that customs barriers could have equally impeded growth in productivity
besides increasing input costs as well. Dahmén argues that particularly metal industries
utilized their factors of production inefficiently due to customs barriers. In their absence
specialized, large-scale manufacturing would have been more efficient in the use of
labour and capital than separate small-scale production lines servicing domestic markets.
He asserts that whereas protectionism allows for the fragmentation of manufacturing into
these small-scale operations, lack of it would tend to rationalize industry into larger units
374 Pihkala 2001, 203; Maliranta 1996, 86
375 Ibid., 87, 96
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resulting in lower costs and higher productivity. Indeed, Dahmén is implicitly stating here
that scale advantage might have been partly a result of free trade integration.376
The evidence here is not conclusive then. The high export share of at least TRE during
the early post-war period could certainly be attributed to customs barriers, yet perhaps
Dahmén is right in arguing that this led to lower productivity. While ELE was one of the
industries that Finland managed to provide customs barriers in exchange of EEC
curtailing Finnish paper exports,377 considering that ELE’s exports remained relatively
meagre before the 1980s, it is difficult to say whether it was international competition or
barring it up that spurred the industry’s exports in the post-war era.378 While fabricated
metal products were protected to some extent, machinery production was not. Since the
latter was the more important component in MFM, the industry was unaided by
protectionism. In conclusion, the data here does not indicate that some metal exports were
not aided by Finnish protectionism in the 1950s at the very least.
Lastly, we may briefly study effective rates of protection of services. Negative rates on
services reflect that inputs from manufacturing have higher prices because of tariff rates
whereas services are not protected in the same manner as commodities.379 At least TRC
was clearly hampered by tariffs, but it is also generally the case that protectionism during
the early post-war period clearly did not help the tertiary sector to develop either
domestically or internationally. One can speculate that service exports might have
developed more strongly if free trade would have existed. Of course, trade in services was
not free of protectionism either as GATT’s Uruguay Round in 1986–1994 included
discussions over its liberalization.380
As mentioned earlier cartels were a characteristic of both the Finnish and international
economy, the existence and effects of which are difficult to measure. Additionally, it is
not conceptually clear what effect cartels would have on the C–H–O model used in this
thesis. Though it has been suggested that it can be an independent cause of trade, based
on empirical evidence fear of retaliation seems to have had the opposite effect.
376 Dahmén 1963, 61–62
377 Pihkala 2001, 214
378 Larjavaara suggests the former, or lacking infant-industry protection, as the reason for slow growth in
some product groups of ELE. See Larjavaara 1978, 145.
379 Kauppila 2007, 141–142
380 Pihkala 2001, 230, 282–283
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Table 19. Propensity for Cartelisation in 1956–1989
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1985 1989
AGR 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
FOR 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
FOO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
TEX 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
WOF 2 1 3 3 2 3 3
PAP 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
CHE 2 3 3 2 3 2 2
MET 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
MFM 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
ELE 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
TRE 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
TRD 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
TRC 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
BUS 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Notes: The variable for propensity for cartelisation is calculated first by checking if the industry exceeds the 1956
median in capital intensity, natural resource intensity, the employment share of large establishments, or if it was
under the average of the number of innovations in 1956. The values reflect the number of conditions fulfilled with
“4” as the maximum.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; SFINNO; see the appendices for sources regarding product
differentiation, capital, natural resources and monopolistic competition.
Cartelisation across industries is measured here in the form of propensity for cartelisation.
The measure considers several factors that have been named by Jensen-Eriksen as present
in a cartelized industry. In other words, an industry like this “was a capital intensive field,
where the barriers of entry were high, access to raw materials crucial, and the products
relatively homogenous”.381 The measure here is crude and one should not infer too much
about changes over time. The measure rests on the assumption that these factors truly
motivated export cartels to form in industries and that companies were rational agents
who responded to these conditions. In reality, none of this might have occurred. It is also
important to remember that the effect of cartelization is uncertain – they might have
allowed expanded production or impeded growth of novel ides and high-quality
products.382 The high propensity of cartelization might also reflect the existence of an
international export cartel which obstructed the development of a domestic manufacturing
field into an export industry.
It is clear that PAP had a propensity for cartelisation throughout the post-war decades.
The same seems to apply in WOF, AGR and FOR as well to some extent. While this is
partly explained by resource intensity, note that they shared other qualities as well. While
381 Jensen-Eriksen 2017, 4
382 Heikkinen 2000, 479–480; Kuisma 1999, 80
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TEX did not apparently have any of the characteristics that motivated cartelisation there
is some indication that CHE might have had export cartels. One can claim this in stronger
terms regarding MET. Supposing that it was cartelized in the 1950s it is possible that it
was doubly protected by both customs barriers and cartels. Cartelisation seems to have
been unlikely in metal engineering industries and in service exports.
The results can be confirmed by inspecting Grubel-Lloyd indices in Table 1. as well.
Considering the low scores of intraindustry trade in forest industries, it seems quite
probable that they were shielded from imports by fears of retaliation. However, increasing
G-L index scores imply that these perhaps fears lessened over time, though the increases
in WOF could also simply reflect structural transformation of Finnish industry to a higher
level of refinement. MET’s growth prior to 1980 and the high degree of IIT there suggests
that international cartels were either non-existant or not strong enough to impede its
performance. CHE tended to have less-than-median scores of IIT, which perhaps suggests
that these exports was partly dependent on Eastern Trade.
The third institutional factor considered in this thesis is the share of exports devoted to
Eastern Trade as there is ample evidence to suggest that this kind of foreign trade was
qualitatively very distinct from other exports. Profitability of Eastern Trade was higher
than in Western Trade, but it potentially also functioned as a springboard to Western
markets. Thus, Eastern Trade can be interpreted as a kind of protectionism. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that the Soviet share of Finnish exports was shielded
from international competition and the companies Neste Oy and Kemira Oy had a state
monopoly on their respective fields concerning OIL and CHE.383
The share of Eastern Trade was not always stable and sometimes fluctuated dramatically.
For example, the share of foodstuff exports going into communist trade partners doubled
in 1959–1965 but declined noticeably during the next five years. The notion that Eastern
Trade benefited Finnish exports due to long-term contracts, did not evidently translate to
easily anticipated export shares, though at least partly the results here are affected by
increasing trade to Western markets.384 Pihkala writes that the oil crises and the
subsequent depression in Western markets tended to increase metal and consumption
goods exports to the East in the early 1980s.385 Indeed, such a development can be seen
383 Paavonen 2008, 285; Laurila 1995, 100
384 Ibid.
385 Pihkala 2001, 257–258
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Table 20. The Share of Exports to Eastern Group in Commodity Gross Exports in 1956–1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
AGR 2.9 0.3 12.6 5.8 5.0 4.7 14.8 4.7
FOR 16.6 10.9 8.1 0.9 13.6 0.0 8.8 6.0
FOO 16.0 18.6 37.8 25.7 40.4 48.6 45.4 21.6
TEX 5.0 4.4 21.0 12.7 21.7 35.2 32.3 19.9
WOF 16.6 5.8 2.3 2.5 4.5 12.8 3.9 3.5
PAP 17.6 15.3 17.4 16.0 21.8 22.3 17.0 11.8
CHE 71.4 50.8 26.6 44.4 33.4 36.8 30.4 19.7
MET 29.1 18.2 18.5 2.6 10.8 10.9 10.0 6.5
MFM 78.8 82.0 54.6 30.9 28.2 45.7 34.4 20.2
ELE 49.3 82.8 43.2 25.0 25.5 31.2 25.0 22.1
TRE 93.1 87.4 79.2 44.6 41.1 46.7 55.6 43.6
Total 27.3 23.6 21.1 16.9 20.5 29.2 24.2 16.6
Notes: Board of Customs does not have data on service exports. “East” refers to Albania, East Germany, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Mongolia and North Vietnam /
Vietnam.
Source: The author's own estimates; Board of Customs; see the appendices for Eastern Trade.
in other industries as well relative to the year 1970, but only AGR, PAP and FOO had a
higher rate of Eastern Trade 1956–1965 in comparison with 1980–1985. In purely
sectoral terms, most export industries’ reliance on Eastern Trade declined after the 1950s.
The high ratio of Eastern Trade in total gross exports was quite high in the 1950s and
1960s. Note that the ratios here reflect not only exports to the Soviet Union, but also to
other communist economies which were relatively important in the 1950s and the early
1960s although exports to Soviet Union were likewise relatively high in the 1950s.386 In
other words, Finland was quite dependent on Eastern Trade in the 1950s, but less so when
free trade integration began. Soviet Union became an important trade partner once more
by the early 1980s only to recede significantly at the end of the decade.
The idea that metal industries possibly used Eastern Trade as a springboard for Western
markets seems to be consistent with the evidence. MFM and TRE were extremely reliant
on Eastern Trade in the 1950s and still to considerable extent in the later decades as well.
ELE tended to be reliant on trade with communist economies as well to noticeable extent
initially, but once it became an export industry in 1985–1989 only a quarter or so of its
exports were directed there. MET was primarily directed to Western markets after 1965
so one cannot make strong claims about its export performance being driven by Eastern
386 Pihkala 2001, 248–250
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Trade. As Paavonen noted, exports to the West were characterized by basic metal exports
whereas those to the East tended consist of machinery and finer paper qualities.387
Interestingly enough, the notion that reductions in tariff rates during free trade integration
forced textile exports to shift to Eastern Trade before the regime’s collapse can be applied
to FOO as well whose export share was declining in concordance with its rate of
protection. CHE was also relatively focused on Eastern markets, particularly in 1956, but
to lesser extent when it began to truly develop into an export industry. In comparison, the
share of Eastern Trade in textile industries is surprisingly low considering that it is often
noted that they effectively depended on it.
These figures suggest that TEX – shoe and leather exports are not included here – was
less reliant on communist demand in comparison with most metal industries and on a
comparable level to CHE, whose exports did not cease in the 1990s. It is curious that even
PAP was more dependent on Eastern Trade than TEX until the year 1982. On the other
hand, the figures do not dispute that these exports did shift to Eastern Trade in the 1980s,
only that the relative level there was lower than what might be presumed.
It is indeed surprising that paper products were exported to such an extent to communist
countries. While the level of 15–22% is clearly lower than in new exports, this is still
higher than in lower-quality woodworking exports which were almost completely
directed to Western markets – similarly to the first globalization period. Then again the
Soviet Union was an exporter of sawn wood in its own right.388 The high ratio of PAP
might reflect that Finnish exports to KEVSOS countries tended to be composed of
paper.389 Additionally, paper exports to the Soviet Union had a higher level of refinement
than those directed to the West when customs barriers over trading partners’ own paper
production were still upheld, and even during the “free trade” integration.390
It is difficult to draw general inferences here. It is probable that the development of new
export industries, particularly in machinery and transport equipment, was clearly aided
by Eastern Trade. This is perhaps the case in CHE though its reliance declined over time.
387 Paavonen 2008, 257
388 Ahvenainen 1984, 405
389 Pihkala 2001, 220–221. KEVSOS countries consisted of the small Eastern European socialist countries.
390 Paavonen 2008, 290. See Heikkinen 2000, 384–388 for a discussion related to customs barriers against
Finnish paper exports during the EEC negotiations and Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 103–104 concerning British
protectionism against higher quality paper before the 1960s. Some of the paper qualities in Eastern Trade
were rather old-fashioned though. See Heikkinen 2000, 462.
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Table 21. The Share of State-Owned Companies’ Gross Value of Production in Manufacturing in
1959–1985, %
1959 1965 1970 1980 1985
FOO 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
TEX 0.6 0.5 0.4 4.8 4.3
WOF 15.3 11.4 9.0 8.1 8.4
PAP 28.1 27.7 24.2 23.4 21.7
CHE 33.1 39.6 44.1 50.6 52.6
MET 58.6 62.8 73.0 78.0 79.5
MFM 12.8 11.5 10.2 11.8 12.1
ELE 3.3 2.9 1.3 7.2 4.7
TRE 28.9 25.8 24.4 22.9 24.3
Median
Manufacturing
8.3 7.1 6.1 7.6 7.1
Notes: The ratio includes both state-owned joint stock companies and other state-owned establishments. The
Industrial Statistics of 1989 have no data on the nature of ownership.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland, Industrial Statistics.
Still the springboard argument could apply. TEX initially did not rely on Eastern Trade
consistently until the 1980s, which was also caused by the need to balance the high import
value of oil in accordance with the clearing system of Eastern Trade.391
I cannot make strong judgments on whether state activities may have been a determinant
of export structure either directly or indirectly within the scope of this thesis, but the data
of Industrial Statistics can be used to locate the industries where state-owned companies’
share of gross output was prevalent and state activities were perhaps conducive to growth.
What might be surprising is that forest industries, and particularly PAP, were state-owned
to such extent. In 1959 almost a third of gross value of production there originated from
these companies, but the trend in both industries was decreasing. At least state-ownership
of WOF was a result of Finland’s large swathes of forests and “national-economic
considerations”, as Ahvenainen puts it.392 The industries where the state-owned
companies’ importance grew in time were CHE, MET and OIL, not shown here. TRE
also had a clear, but relatively stable, rate of state-ownership, but this was not the case in
other metal engineering industries. MFM did have a higher-than-median rate though.
Since Hoffman suggests that CHE’s initial breakthrough in the 1940s and the 1950s rested
on a few large companies that substituted imports, possible benefits of state-ownership in
CHE cannot be denied.393 The increasing trend of MET was related to Outokumpu, which
391 Paavonen 2008, 291
392 Ahvenainen 1984, 427
393 Hoffman 1988, 150–151
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Wood products 17.6 65.8
Pulp & paper 55.6 57.9
Chemicals 2.5 59.5
Non-metallic mineral products 0.0 71.4
Metal products 10.3 67.3
Machinery and equipment 9.3 67.4
Electrical, electronics 10.2 78.8
Instruments 13.1 73.6
Transport equipment 5.0 60.9
Electricity, gas & water supply 5.1 64.3
Software 12.5 70.4
Total 9.7 66.3
Notes: The data for 1945–66 was excluded by Saarinen due to low level of
innovations. Note that the industrial classification differs from the standard one
used in this thesis.
Source: Saarinen 2005, Table 6.7.
refined non-ferrous metals into Western exports.394 State-ownership became more
pronounced in TEX too during the early 1980s when textile exports accounted for their
largest share of exports in 1956–1989. On the other hand, the relatively high, if receding,
state-ownership ratios in beverage and tobacco manufacturing, not shown here, indicates
that the presence of government did not always translate to export performance.
At any rate, it seems that new exports developed at least partly due to the government’s
willingness to support these industries, which is in contrast with arguments that policy of
state-ownership favoured traditional sectors and impeded development of new exports.395
Another possible channel of state involvement is the public funding of innovations. As
seen in Table 22. there were clear sectoral differences in the relative share of public
funding in 1967–1984. Interestingly enough, textile and forest industries were among the
highest recipients of state support in that time. While the absolute number of innovations
in TEX and PAP was low, Saarinen believes that this either illustrates attempts of
solidifying recognized potential or internationalization of these industries.396 This clearly
failed in TEX, but it is possible that public funding may have been instrumental in raising
the level of refinement in forest industries.
394 Paavonen 2008, 257
395 Jensen–Eriksen 2007, 206
396 Saarinen 2005, 143. The number of innovations in textiles and pulp and paper products were seven and
nine respectively during 1967–1984.
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Metal industries, except for TRE, had some public funding in their innovations during
1967–1984, yet clearly the vast majority of them was developed without public
assistance. This is even more pronounced in the case of innovations of CHE. However,
considering that electrotechnical exports emerged in the late 1980s, it is likely that public
funding was related to it in some manner. In conclusion, I am inclined to assert that public
funding of innovations was not a strong determinant of export structure prior to the 1990s,
other than perhaps in raising the value-added of forest exports and developing
electrotechnical exports. Generally speaking, the rate of public funding of R&D during
1964–1984 was negligible compared to the end of the century, so it can be expected that
its impact on export structure was stronger in 1985–1998.
4.5 Regression Analysis of Determinants Export Structure
During the era of protectionism, 5/6 to 9/10 of Finnish exports
consisted of forest products, the competitiveness of which was based
on a comparative advantage, i.e. forest resources combined with
cheap labour. During the period of economic integration – – new
competitiveness is based on the so-called economies of scale – – 397
As Paavonen’s description illustrates, our initial hypothesis should be that the
determinants of export structure changed. While running a regression for 1956–1989
would allow for a higher number of observations, it is also an established practice in
econometric research to run comparative regressions for different time periods.398 Since
both historical literature and economic historical regression studies agree on this point,
the post-war era was divided into two periods comprising 1956–1970 and 1980–1989.
The point here is to compare how the determinants of either three-factor H–O or C–H–O
models changed between the protectionist and FINEFTA period in comparison with the
1980s. At that time the free trade integration was largely concluded, at least in relative
terms. While the early post-war period admittedly includes a regime change to FINEFTA,
it was not immediate due to gradual tariff reductions in sensitive industries.399
397 Paavonen 2008, 326
398 See Varian 2017 or Wright 1990 for example.
399 Paavonen 2008, 320–323. A preliminary Chow test with labour intensity, machine-related capital
intensity and resource intensity, corresponding with a three-factor H–O model, indicated that the periods
were different at least when it came to labour and natural resources. There were no stark differences
concerning machine intensity in this specification.
102
The regression analyses were run with the software Stata 15.400 Unlike other economic
historical analyses,401 I utilize a log-log regression model where variables are transformed
to natural logarithmic form. This is not necessary theoretically speaking, but it does allow
for an easier interpretation of regression coefficients. In the model a one percent increase
in an explanatory variable is associated with a percent change of magnitude given by β in
the value-added of exports.402 I must stress that while the slope coefficient effectively is
the elasticity of value-added of exports with regards to certain supply-side features, this
approach has nothing to do with studies related to elasticity of exports nor is there
necessarily any sense in interpreting the impact of these features as either elastic, if β is
more than 1.0, or inelastic, if β is less 1.0.
Another major difference with previous economic historical studies and my approach is
that I use a fixed effects model, which holds constant the impact of industry characteristics
which do not change over time. Wright, for example, utilized only cross-sections whereas
Varian ran a pooled OLS, or a panel without fixed effects. Choice of a fixed effects model
was primarily motivated by the need to control cartels at least, although there could be
other time-invariant omitted variables as well. Due to the uncertainty of the correct trade
model for Finland, holding these omitted variables constant is sensible in order not
capture spurious correlation. In all specifications I utilize both heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors as is usual in fixed effects studies.
Time fixed effects, which control time-variant changes that do not differ across industries,
were also added in specifications of Table 26. I assume that they control at least the impact
of free trade integration since it should have removed trade barriers in all industries alike.
This remains uncertain though.403 The same applies to devaluations of the Finnish
markka, since increases in competitiveness should affect value-added of exports in all
industries by the same amount, even if Pihkala states that the devaluation of 1957 was
intended to expand and diversify forest industry whereas the one of 1967 was intended to
strengthen new exports.404
400 I thank Sakari Saaritsa for numerous comments regarding the econometric approach here.
401 Varian 2017, 120; Wright 1990, 659; Crafts & Thomas 1986, 631–632. Varian for example has chosen
a linear-log specification whereas the other two articles do not use log-transformations.
402 Standardized z-scores are also often used as well, but I consider the log-log specification to be more
intuitive than expressing effect sizes in standard deviations.
403 There is evidence that at least United Kingdom and Denmark increased their paper industries’ customs
barriers in EEC negotiations. See Jensen-Eriksen 2007, 357.
404 Pihkala 2001, 207–208. Devaluation would affect gross exports differently, since export industries
utilized imported inputs, whose prices increase if markka depreciates, in varying degrees.
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The correct way of interpreting regression results is not as self-evident as one might
presume. Wright thinks that statistical significance is an appropriate measure for factors’
importance, but  values not so.405 I should note that the  ratios in the regression
tables of this thesis are not exactly the same as in OLS regressions. They refer to “within”
 of the mean-deviated regression where the variation explained is that within
industries.406 Furthermore, there are no adjusted  ratios in fixed effects models.
At any rate, goodness-of-fit is not vital here since the model here is not meant to be
predictive, but I would criticize Wright’s implicit dismissal of slope coefficients. As
Ziliak and McCloskey assert, merely noting statistical significance answers the question
of precision rather than the question “how much?” which is arguably the more interesting
of the two.407 This latter line of inquiry concerning historical significance can be answered
with slope coefficients even if a variable lacks statistical significance.408 In practice, I
usually refer more to confidence intervals than slope coefficients, because they are more
informative in showing possible magnitudes. Statistical non-significance is also reflected
in intervals that are too wide as to make any judgment too uncertain. In order to gauge
the importance of a variable its sign, statistical significance and its slope coefficient – or
rather its 95% confidence intervals – should all be examined.
The control variables used in some specifications consist of share of Eastern Trade,
effective rate of protection and additionally shares of women and trade union members
relative to total workforce. The latter two are specific to regressions where average wage
rate is included, since it is possible that they may bias the results in some manner – wage
differences of women relative to men or trade union members relative to non-members
might either decrease or increase wage rates irrespective of human capital. I should note
that the data quality of the unionization measure is poor – more on that in appendix
chapter 6.2 – but it should capture at least part of the impact of trade unions. Eastern
Trade should be controlled since it did not operate under perfect competition. EFP is
included to ensure that the results are not affected by changes in domestic protectionism.
405 Wright 1990, 658–659
406 See StataCorp 2017, 425 for the reference manual’s explanation.
407 See McCloskey & Ziliak 2008.
408 That is not to say that statistical significance should be dismissed either. If a variable is non-significant,
the estimate is so imprecise that one cannot draw any conclusions about the existence of an effect. I usually
tend not to dismiss effect sizes if confidence intervals are only somewhat in the “wrong direction”. Usually
p-values larger than 0.200 are already too imprecise for meaningful interpretation.
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A measure of propensity for cartelization cannot unfortunately be incorporated into the
regressions since fixed effects models tend not to work well with fairly constant variables.
Besides the variable is calculated based on other factors used here in the first place. State-
ownership of companies was not controlled, since it is not apparent whether these
companies’ existence would distort trade models. Additionally, while state-owned
companies might be connected to the initial growth of an export industry, I am not
convinced that this association is linear and captured adequately by the regressions here.
Since the variable has no observations from primary or tertiary sectors, the sample size
also decreases substantially if it is included.
Note that since logarithmic transformations required for log-log model cannot be applied
to zero values, variables that contain them in great deal such as Eastern Trade and the
number of innovations remain untransformed. This was also the case in other control
variables. In Eastern Trade the high number of zeroes mostly arises from the assumption
that there were no service exports. While this is not absolutely true, I judged this to be an
acceptable assumption as the majority of Eastern Trade remained on a commodity basis
though there were service exports related to tourism and construction projects.409
It is important to note here that the regression tables where effective rate of protection
and Eastern Trade are the dependent variables follow a level-log specification where β
must be divided by hundred: β/100, before interpreting the slope coefficient as a percent
change. Conversely, when value-added of exports is explained, the slope coefficient of
the number of innovations must be calculated according to log-level specification where
β*100 – the slope coefficients there are deceptively small in other words. In explaining
Eastern Trade, the number of innovations follows a level-level model where one more
innovation results in a unit change in Eastern Trade, which is a percent change since the
latter variable is a share of total exports.
I should also add that the high level of capital intensity in the energy and waterworks
industry (EGW) might distort the results somewhat, but whether it can be treated as an
outlier is an open question. The industry did have exports to some degree, so it cannot be
simply dropped from the data as I have done in the case of construction industries (BUI
and OCO) and the ownership of dwellings (DWE). I assume that they were not
409 See Hirvensalo & Sutela 2017, 280–284. Tourism exports are not included in this thesis due to lacking
data in input-output tables and construction industries were dropped due to lack of exports.
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characteristically export industries.410 Additionally, in 1985 financial exports had a
negative value, which was dropped.411 I have included EGW in the regressions, but I will
also comment if dropping it would have led to meaningfully different results and how.
Additionally, it must be noted that a major issue with the factors here is that many of them
are correlated with each other, though not in perfect multicollinearity. For instance, labour
intensity reflects changes not only in the use of unskilled labour but also of greatly
increasing labour productivity, determined by technology, human capital and physical
capital.412 Based on Kokkinen’s research technology is subsumed in physical capital, but
it cannot be studied separately here anyway due to lacking data.413 Changes in labour
productivity should still be compared to other variables, as is done in Table 23.
Labour productivity was studied here instead of labour intensity, since it is conceptually
more appropriate and changes in labour intensity are almost entirely explained by those
in labour productivity. Machine intensity, or total capital requirements pertaining only to
machinery and transport equipment, was also used instead of capital intensity due to its
stronger conceptual link to productivity and technology. Admittedly, average wage rate
could also reflect that export industries were able to compensate labour more so than in
domestic manufacturing. Since unionization should be controlled here, I would expect
that higher wages should be associated with skilled labour.
It is quite surprising that machine intensity was negatively associated with labour
productivity. A one percent increase in machine intensity decreases labour productivity
by approximately half a percent in most specifications. This might be a result of
ineffectiveness of capital endowments identified by Pohjola.414 Resource intensity was
likewise negatively correlated with labour productivity in most specifications, which is
perhaps less surprising as higher level of refinement reflects less use of raw materials.
R&D intensity, on the other hand, was statistically significantly linked with labour
productivity though its effect size was lower than in other variables, such as average wage
rate in specifications (2) – (4) which had a high and strong association with labour
productivity. This suggests that increases in skilled labour may have been a more
410 This should be evident based on lack of exports in these industries as seen in Table 5.
411 Negative values are possible in financial exports if insurance claims paid by Finnish companies to
foreign customers exceed the value of insurance claims paid to Finnish companies or denizens. This was
the case in the late 1980s. See Pihkala 2001, 260.
412 Jalava 2007, 27
413 Kokkinen 2012, 190–191
414 See Pohjola 1996.
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important determinant for export structure than R&D expenditure, though the latter was
also associated with labour productivity. Scale advantage was likewise positively related
to labour productivity, as can be expected, but only to a relatively low degree.415 The
number of innovations is also statistically indicative – i.e. its p-value is less than 0.010 –
in specification (4) where one more innovations increases labour productivity by 1.4%.
Table 23. Labour Productivity and its Determinants in 1956–1989 and 1970–1989
1 2 3 4
Machine Intensity -0.490** -0.743** -0.431*** -0.511***
(0.192) (0.303) (0.129) (0.115)
Resource Intensity -0.470*** -0.148 -0.014 0.044
(0.069) (0.159) (0.083) (0.071)
R&D Intensity 0.265***
(0.043)
Average Wage Rate 0.607** 0.970*** 0.955***
(0.288) (0.069) (0.311)
Scale Advantage 0.172* 0.142
(0.084) (0.085)
Number of Innovations 0.010 0.014*
(0.008) (0.007)
Intercept 8.090*** 11.582*** 6.689*** 7.374***
(2.6) (4.103) (1.744) (1.725)
Unionization No Yes Yes Yes
Women No Yes Yes Yes
Eastern Trade No No Yes Yes
EFP No No Yes Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects No No No Yes
R2 .373 .612 .837 .871
Observations 135 182 132 132
Clusters (Industries) 27 27 24 24
1970–1989 1956–1989 1956–1989 1956–1989
* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Notes: Dependent variable is value-added per working hours in each industry. All variables are measured in
natural logarithmic form except for the number of innovations and control variables. See the appendices for
data sources.
415 Maliranta has noted that large establishment size is correlated with labour productivity. See Maliranta
1996, 129.
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Kokkinen has argued that physical and human capital had a symbiotic relationship in the
20th century. According to him, physical capital and technology gave impetus to growth
in human capital in the first place, but human capital also intensified growth in physical
capital as it made it possible to exploit new technology embodied in capital. Hjerppe too
has argued that utilizing machinery requires a certain level of skilled labour.416 However,
human capital became more important in explaining physical capital than vice versa after
1944. While Kokkinen’s approach differs from the one here to the extent that contrary
results cannot support or discredit it, the findings in Table 23. imply that human capital
was the motor of labour productivity in post-war period, which is on line with Kokkinen’s
description of the situation after 1944. Yet the negative association of physical capital,
with human capital held constant, is still striking. These findings are robust to enlisting a
full set of controls, including both time and industry fixed effects.417
Empirically speaking this means that the measures for human capital and labour intensity
confound each other and should not be included in the regression specifications jointly.
Therefore, only of them is included at a time. As mentioned before, I have separated the
time period here to 1956–1970 and 1980–1989.  Not only were these periods subject to
different trade policy regimes but they may have been different in other ways too. The
use of EFP does control possible impacts of domestic protectionism, but the impact of
new trade opportunities on unbound European markets cannot be completely accounted
for. I assume that time fixed effects capture at least part of this development alongside
other post-war trends that swept over all industries in the same degree but for now, I will
only focus on industry fixed effects in Tables 24. and 25. Time fixed effects regression
specifications are inspected in Table 26.
Based on the literature reviewed in this thesis, it seems more probable that the three-factor
H–O model is more explanatory for the earlier post-war period of 1956–1970 than for
1980–1989. Hence it is the starting point of our econometric inquiry in specification (1)
of Table 24. The regression model indicates that during the early post-war period both
labour and resource intensity declined markedly, though labour intensity to a greater
degree. A one percent increase in labour intensity led to a decline of over 2% of value-
added of exports whereas a similar increase in resource intensity resulted in a decline of
416 Hjerppe 1982, 411
417 Kokkinen 2012, 182, 190–191. Kokkinen argues that this shift was likely caused by war-time destruction
of physical capital and increases in schooling.
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Table 24. Determinants of Value-added of Exports in 1956–1970
1 2 3 4 5 6
Labour Intensity -2.383*** -2.789*** -2.517*** -2.327***
(0.652) (0.828) (0.512) (0.510)
Capital Intensity 1.065 2.181* 0.247
(0.783) (1.174) (0.862)
Machine Intensity 2.686*** 2.358** 1.585
(0.814) (0.852) (1.057)
Resource Intensity -0.942** -1.241*** -1.407*** -1.728*** -1.080** -1.080***
(0.396) (0.392) (0.378) (0.352) (0.358) (0.274)
Scale Advantage 0.360 0.286 0.231 0.431 0.341
(0.402) (0.326) (0.387) (0.358) (0.386)
Innovations 0.059 0.049 0.035 0.048 0.003
(0.079) (0.067) (0.073) (0.085) (0.061)
Average Wage Rate 3.397*** 3.481***
(0.898) (1.003)
Intercept 17.047** 6.104 -1.095 1.658 -4.560 -24.313*
(6.217) (11.993) (8.184) (9.519) (12.464) (13.498)
Unionization No No No No Yes Yes
Women No No No No Yes Yes
Eastern Trade No No No Yes No Yes
EFP No No No Yes No Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects No No No No No No
R2 .473 .655 .706 .695 .665 .719
Observations 101 81 81 62 81 62
Clusters
(Industries)
27 23 23 22 23 22
* = p < .100, ** = p < .050, *** = p < .010
Notes: Dependent variable is domestic value-added of exports in millions of 2017 euros in natural logarithmic
form. All variables are in natural logarithmic except for the number of innovations and control variables. Note
that EFP only includes the years 1959–1970 which decreases the sample size in relevant specification. See
appendices for further information and data sources.
-0.9%. However, it is generally more interesting to ask what determined something rather
than what did not. Capital intensity did have a positive and strong association with exports
in specification (1), but its effect is also imprecise with 95% confidence intervals ranging
from -0.5% to 2.7%.
However, applying the C–H–O model by complementing the specification with scale
advantage and the number of innovations, a proxy for product differentiation, in column
(2) amplifies the regression coefficients of all three intensities to the extent that capital
intensity becomes statistically indicative. In purely empirical terms, this implies that some
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of the variables in (1) encapsulated part of the effect of number of innovations and scale
advantage. While capital intensity’s effect nearly doubles in (2) switching to machine
intensity in column (3) results in statistically significance with 95% confidence intervals
of 1.0% and 4.4%. In other words, the model cannot disprove that a 1% increase in
machine intensity would not have been associated with over a 4% increase of exports.
This indicates that export structure was determined to significant extent by mechanization
in the early post-war period. This supports Hjerppes’ statements that Finnish exports were
capital intensive with regards to natural resources.418 Of course, this not rule out that this
mechanization was on an unproductive scale. In fact Dahmén noted in 1963, decades
before Pohjola, that the high investment ratio had downsides for the Finnish economy.419
While machine intensity is robust to controlling the share of Eastern Trade and EFP in
specification (4) both capital intensity in specification (5) and machine intensity in
specification (6) are not robust to including average wage rate in favour of labour
intensity. Based on Table 23. and the fact that labour intensity captures a great deal of
labour productivity’s impact, imprecise correlations perhaps reflect that the negative
association of machine intensity and labour productivity is now encapsulated in the two
measures for capital. Yet in specification (6) machine intensity, despite being statistically
non-significant, does have 95% confidence intervals of -0.6% and 3.8%. In other words,
the model cannot disprove that a one percent increase in machine intensity would not
have led to an increase of exports by over 3%. Additionally, if either EFP or the industry
EGW were to be removed from the specification, machine intensity would be a
statistically indicative variable.420
Based on specification (5) average wage rate is a stronger explanatory variable for value-
added of exports across industries in 1956–1970 than machine intensity. This finding is
robust to including the shares of female employees and union members. While the
variable’s effect size diminishes slightly by controlling for Eastern Trade and EFP it
remains a large, positive and statistically significant variable for explaining export
performance. While this could reflect that export industries were simply productive
418 Hjerppe 1989, 162; Hjerppe 1975, 159–161
419 Dahmén 1963, 31–32
420 With 95% confidence intervals of -0.2% and 3.5% and a p-value of 0.074 if EFP is removed and
confidence intervals of -0.4 % to 4.2% and a p-value of 0.096 in the case of dropping EGW.
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enough to pay higher wages, controlling for the measures mentioned does suggest that
the use of skilled personnel was a determinant of exports in 1956–1970.421
Although the point here is not to test trade models, it should be noted that the Heckscher-
Ohlin variables are more explanatory than scale advantage or number of innovations.
Neither variable was statistically significant though it cannot be disproven that number
of innovations would have had an effect as large as 18.7% in (4). On the other hand an
effect of -11.6% cannot be disproven either. Since Dahmén criticized Finland for its
scarcity of market-creating products it is probably more believable that innovations or
product differentiation were not determinants of exports during this time.422
Scale advantage has a smaller effect size, which increases when disregarding labour
intensity and decreases when adding machine intensity. As seen in Table 23. this likely
reflects its positive association with labour productivity in some manner. However, unlike
in the case of machine intensity this probably reflects that omitting labour productivity
had led into a positive bias. Of course, it could be argued that scale advantage should have
a higher effect size since it is causing labour productivity, but this effect is drifting into
labour intensity. However, neither scale advantage nor number of innovations seem to be
useful measures here, which most likely reflects that the H–O model is an adequate one
for export structure at least preceding the EEC agreement in 1973.
This was no longer the case in the 1980s as can be observed in Table 25. All of the three-
factor H–O variables in column (1) have small effect sizes and only one of them, capital
intensity, remains statistically significant and only at an indicative level at that. Labour
intensity’s loss of statistical significance perhaps reflects slower growth in labour
productivity in the 1980s whereas the reduction in resource intensity is likely explained
by the supposition that most of export diversification, when forest exports’ relative
importance decreased, occurred prior to the 1980s.423
Even capital intensity loses its significance, once scale advantage and intensity in R&D
expenditure according to product groups are included in specification (2). Note that the
Tables 24. and 25. are not identical due to using R&D intensity of product groups as a
proxy for product differentiation instead of number of innovations. This change was
421 Dropping EGW in specification (6) will also increase average wage rate’s 95% confidence intervals to
1.8% and 5.8% with a p-value of 0.001.
422 Dahmén 1963, 38
423 Resource intensity becomes statistically significant and negative variable, at least at an indicative level,
in specifications (1) – (3) if EGW is removed though. Its effect size only ranges from -0.3 to -0.6% though.
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motivated by the likelihood that the former variable is a better proxy for product
differentiation and it is weighted according to industry size.
Specification (2) stands for C–H–O model where even labour intensity now has a negative
sign. Reduction in negative slope coefficient of capital is mostly due to adding scale
advantage to the model, implying that the variable is capturing part of the negative
association of capital and exports. Similarly, in column (2) of Table 24. capital intensity’s
positive association increases when scale advantage is added. At any rate, the poor
standing of H–O variables in the 1980s is not improved by replacing capital intensity with
Table 25. Determinants of Value-added of Exports in 1980–1989
1 2 3 4 5 6
Labour Intensity 0.170 -0.188 -0.216 -0.349
(0.433) (0.305) (0.280) (0.276)
Capital Intensity -0.811* -0.168 -0.324
(0.444) (0.345) (0.408)
Machine Intensity -0.089 -0.095 -0.289
(0.294) (0.304) (0.418)
Resource Intensity -0.380 -0.175 -0.176 -0.078 -0.096 -0.124
(0.422) (0.307) (0.311) (0.296) (0.272) (0.309)
Scale Advantage 0.330 0.335 0.352 0.419 0.417
(0.206) (0.206) (0.211) (0.289) (0.296)
R&D Prod. Diff. -0.072 -0.082 -0.068 -0.105 -0.111
(0.11) (0.106) (0.107) (0.125) (0.127)
Average Wage Rate 0.613 0.632
(0.591) (0.605)
Intercept 15.844*** 10.647*** 9.787*** 10.840*** 8.662 7.794
(4.743) (3.623) (3.203) (3.231) (5.811) (5.196)
Unionization No No No No Yes Yes
Women No No No No Yes Yes
Eastern Trade No No No Yes No Yes
EFP No No No Yes No Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects No No No No No No
R2 .105 .272 .271 .294 .338 .340
Observations 107 92 92 92 70 70
Clusters
(Industries)
27 24 24 24 24 24
* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Notes: Dependent variable is domestic value-added of exports in millions of 2017 euros in log form. All variables
are measured in natural logarithmic form except for control variables. See appendices for further information and
data sources.
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machine intensity in column (3) or by controlling for Eastern Trade and EFP in (4).
The only variable in specifications (1) – (4) that has a consistently positive sign is scale
advantage even if its historical and statistical significance are not high. It is somewhat
surprising that R&D intensity according to product groups has a negative sign and a small
effect size considering that product differentiation should have emerged as a determinant
of export structure during the 1980s.
Replacing labour intensity with average wage rate in specification (5) results in scale
advantage’s effect size increasing somewhat with 95% confidence intervals of -0.2% and
1.0%. While naively comparing statistical significances across regressions is not
prudent,424 I presume that part of scale advantage’s effect on labour productivity is
reduced if labour intensity is included, meaning that its impact on export structure through
labour productivity is also diminished. Scale advantage may have become an important
determinant of exports by this point as Aunesluoma and Paavonen assert. The other
marked change is that average wage rate is the only H–O variable that is positively
associated with exports, with 95% confidence intervals of -0.6% and 1.8% in column (5).
This is undeniably muter than its impact in 1956–1970, but it is equally important to note
that other factor intensities seem to be completely unrelated to exports.425
However, the regressions in Tables 24. and 25. omit those variables which do not vary
across industries but do so over time. Time fixed effects control for these factors, which
I assume include at least free trade integration and devaluation cycle. Since there could
be other such omitted variables, one should not engage in too fanciful theories on why
and where the differences in Table 26. arise from. The specifications here simply hold the
general trends of the early and late post-war period fixed. The following results are robust
to dropping the industry TRC from the data, which ensures that general reductions in
transport costs are captured by time fixed effects.426
Holding the general trends in 1959–1970 fixed, the negative association of resource
intensity emerges as the strongest one in the early post-war period, and as one that is also
424 Omitting certain variables leads to biased slope coefficients, but since the model has more information
in estimating them, the coefficients will tend to have smaller variance and higher level of statistical
significance. See Feinstein & Thomas 2002, 304.
425 Removing EGW would yield statistically indicative effect sizes of average wage in (6) with 95%
confidence intervals of -0.1% and 1.8% and a p-value of 0.065. However, scale advantage’s effect size
diminishes to 95% confidence intervals of -0.2% and 0.5%.
426 It should be noted that machine intensity in (6) is nudged into statistical non-significance. However, its
effect size is hardly any different.
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robust to a wide range of controls. This cannot be simply explained by forest industries
reducing their forestry inputs. As can be seen in 11. PAP’s use of primary sector inputs
was relatively on the same level in 1959 as in 1970 and WOF’s decline occurred in 1965–
1970. It seems unlikely that its 95% confidence intervals of -2.0% to -0.8% in column (1)
would be a result of only structural changes in woodworking and furniture exports. An
effect size of that calibre must reflect the emergence of new export industries, less reliant
on domestic natural resources.
Table 26. Determinants of Value-added of Exports in 1959–1970 and 1980–1989, with Time
Fixed Effects
1 2 3 4 5 6
Labour Intensity -0.813 -0.844 -0.524
(0.975) (1.051) (0.547)
Machine Intensity 1.217* 1.715* 1.615* 0.140 -0.293 -0.690*
(0.697) (0.824) (0.860) (0.681) (0.432) (0.395)
Resource Intensity -1.400*** -1.550*** -1.165*** -0.109 -0.106 -0.001
(0.275) (0.289) (0.353) (0.286) (0.321) (0.284)
Scale Advantage -0.136 -0.197 0.370 0.389 0.409
(0.397) (0.370) (0.268) (0.283) (0.316)
Innovations 0.015 -0.006 0.042*
(0.056) (0.045) (0.023)
R&D Prod. Diff. -0.075 0.134
(0.088) (0.123)
Average Wage Rate 1.444 0.979 2.093
(0.912) (2.100) (2.583)
Intercept -1.171 -7.710 -20.325** 9.671* 7.466 8.592
(10.516) (12.479) (9.730) (4.819) (7.329) (6.624)
Unionization No No Yes No Yes Yes
Women No No Yes No Yes Yes
Eastern Trade Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EFP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .651 .756 .771 .322 .370 .402
Observations 79 62 62 92 70 70
Clusters (Industries) 27 22 22 24 24 24
Years 1959–70 1959–70 1959–70 1980–89 1980–89 1980–89
* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Notes: Dependent variable is domestic value-added of exports in millions of 2017 euros in log form. Explanatory
variables are measured in natural logarithmic form except for control variables and number of innovations. The
years 1956 and 1982 are dropped from the regressions since EFP and Women variable do not cover these years
respectively. See appendices for data sources.
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This finding is in contrast to Parkkinen’s conclusion that Finnish export structure in 1964–
1975 was characterized by unskilled labour and forest resources. Naturally, one cannot
simply say that Parkkinen was wrong since his study compares exports to imports and it
differs from this thesis in its choice of period and of measures. It is not contradictory to
say that renewable natural resources were not as imported to Finland as they were
exported, but Parkkinen also argues that the devaluation of 1967 tended to increase the
exports of these industries. True or not, that statement contradicts the evidence here.427
There is also some evidence to suggest that mechanization was a determinant of export
structure in the early post-war era. For example, when controlling for scale advantage
among other things in specification (2), machine intensity’s 95% confidence intervals are
0.0% and 3.4%. While the model cannot prove that there would have been approximately
zero correlation between exports and mechanization, it cannot disprove a very high
positive impact either.
The major difference between Table 24. and specifications (1) – (3) in Table 26. is that
labour intensity and average wage rate have lost their historical and statistical
significance, though their signs remain the same. This implies, in my opinion, that what
we observed previously mostly reflected general increase in Finnish labour productivity
that was not specific to certain industries. That being said, in column (1) for example the
regression model cannot disprove that a 1.0% decrease in labour intensity would not have
led to an increase 2.8% in exports, which is very high. Yet a 1.2% decrease cannot be
disproven either, which suggests that some industries perhaps specialized according to
labour intensity and some did not. While Parkkinen suggested that Finnish exports were
driven by unskilled labour around this period, we cannot prove this statement here.
The specification (3) is also imprecise with regards to average wage rate. Yet its 95%
confidence intervals range between -0.5% and 3.3% meaning that the model cannot
disprove a large, positive impact of skill intensity on export structure. Hjerppe speculated
that know-how related to forest manufactures could be another comparative advantage of
the early post-war period, and the results here do not disprove that view.428
Column (4) reinforces the notion that the underlying model of Finnish trade structure had
shifted away from the H–O model by 1980–1989 as labour, capital and resource
427 Parkkinen 1977, 95–98, 152
428 Hjerppe 1975, 159–161
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intensities have smaller regression coefficients that are statistically non-significant.
Comparative advantage was very different between 1956–1970 and 1980–1989. Indeed,
Kajaste noted that exports of capital intensive industries with low R&D declined in the
1980s. This is also in line with Pihkala’s statement that capital intensity no longer
determined the relationship between companies and world markets in the 1980s, yet his
claim of know-how’s importance is more questionable.429
Specification (5) reveals that average wage rate had become a very imprecise indicator
for export structure with 95% confidence intervals of -3.4% and 5.3%. While one cannot
claim that human capital would have not had a large positive association with exports,
one cannot disprove the opposite either. This implies that skill intensity may have become
increasingly divergent in the 1980s – some export industries utilized it greatly whereas
others decidedly did not. Note that the specification already controls Eastern Trade and
customs barriers so they cannot be the culprits here.
Based on the regression model, one finds no strong evidence that skill intensity had
developed into a determinant of Finnish export structure in the 1980s. The same can be
stated regarding R&D intensity as well.430 On the other hand, a large, positive impact of
skill intensity cannot be disproven either. Since such an effect can be refuted in the case
of R&D intensity, human capital related to know-how rather than to high-tech research
may have been more important. Pihkala wrote that inputs into R&D only began in the
1980s and the share of high-tech products in commodity exports only increased over 10%
in the 1990s, suggesting that R&D is more characteristic of the 1990s and 2000s.431
However, since the office worker ratio is an imprecise factor as well, though its validity
as a proxy for human capital in modern times can be questioned, this might be a moot
point.432 Kajaste argued that skill intensity was not a feature of export structure in the
1980s – although its importance increased towards the late 1980s – and the results here
429 Pihkala 2001, 303; Kajaste 1991, 484–488
430 Its 95% confidence intervals ranged from -0.5% to 0.1% with a p-value of 0.141 if variables concerning
average wage rate, the share of women and unionization are removed in column (5).
431 Pihkala 2001, 310–311
432 See Yli-Pietilä et al. 1990, 4, 150–151. Of course, there is office worker data only concerning
manufacturing industries, so a more comprehensive dataset might yield other results. 95% confidence
intervals in the case of office worker ratio are -1.8% and 3.0% with a p-value of 0.634 if variables of average
wage rate, share of women and unionization are removed in column (5).
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cannot refute his argument. Still, Pihkala’s and Kaukiainen’s remarks that know-how was
a Finnish comparative advantage in these times cannot be disproven either.433
On the other hand, Kajaste also stated that export structure was more driven in that period
by other determinants such as scale advantage or product differentiation. As observed in
Table 26. there is evidence that scale advantage may have evolved into an important
rationale for export structure even when time fixed effects are included. First, its sign was
negative in the columns (2) – (3) concerning the early post-war period, but flips to positive
in specifications concerning the 1980s. Secondly, in column (5) there the regression
model cannot disprove an effect of scale advantage being approximately -0.2% or as large
as 1.0%. Quite a large impact cannot be disproven, though the evidence is not conclusive
enough to absolutely prove Aunesluoma’s and Paavonen’s claims.
In specification (6) I utilize the innovation data of SFINNO and H-INNO as an alternative
proxy for horizontal differentiation. It is noteworthy that the variable is statistically
significant, albeit on an indicative level. Since the variable’s association with exports is
modelled in a log-level specification its 95% confidence intervals correspond with a
percent change of -0.5% and 8.9% in exports if one more innovation is produced in the
industry. The possible effect of horizontal differentiation might have been extremely large
then. However, it is feasible that these innovatory activities may have been more
reflective of technological differentiation. Although capital intensity becomes a
statistically indicative factor in the same column, the variable is not very robust, so I
hesitate to draw any conclusions here.
I have not included the results in the case that the EGW industry is dropped from the
regressions of Table 26. but it should be noted that the results change significantly in
some cases. In specifications (2) – (3) machine intensity’s p-value declines below 0.050.
In column (3) average wage rate becomes statistically indicative with 95% confidence
intervals of -0.2% to 3.6%. In column (4) machine intensity has a coefficient of -0.6%
and in (5) average wage rate has a one of -0.1 but neither is statistically significant. Lastly,
the number of innovations is not robust to dropping EGW.
Due to the possibility that R&D differentiation and scale advantage might have a non-
linear relationship with exports, I have included quadratic transformations for them in
Table 27. High scale advantage might reflect product standardization instead of
433 Kaukiainen 2006, 151; Pihkala 2001, 306–307; Kajaste 1991, 484–488
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economies of scale pertinent for NTT whereas high R&D intensity stands for
technological differentiation instead of attribute-related horizontal differentiation.
Concerning product differentiation this approach follows that of David Greenaway’s and
Chris Milner’s whereas product standardization is based on Parjanne’s arguments.434
There is little evidence for product standardization being a determinant of exports as its
regression coefficient is consistently approximately zero. The fact that a lower level of
scale advantage is not statistically significant in column (4) does not support the notion
of the variable’s importance, but it is possible that this simply results from a
misspecification of scale advantage’s functional form. It is also likely that high scale
advantage, if capturing product standardization, will be negatively related with horizontal
product differentiation, but running a regression without these variables does not result
in different effect sizes or statistical significances concerning scale advantage variables.
The case of R&D intensity according to product groups is more revelatory. Both high and
low levels of R&D product intensity are correlated with exports, but in very different
manner. The squared variable, which stands for technological differentiation, is positive
but its effect size is small. Lower levels of product intensity, which should correspond
with horizontal product differentiation, are conversely negatively associated with exports.
In specification (1) an increase of horizontal product differentiation by 1% tended to
decrease exports by roughly the same degree, or with 95% confidence intervals of -1.7%
and -0.1%. When considering average wage rate in (4) the negative association amplifies
with 95% confidence intervals of -2.8% and -0.3%, arising probably from associations
with labour productivity in some manner as well.
The findings here are clearly opposite to the hypothesis that NTT and horizontal product
differentiation evolved into important rationales for export structure during the post-war
period. It also explains why R&D product intensity tends to be statistically non-
significant in previous tables: it includes two different effects. This is robust to including
time effects in columns (2) and (4). While one can explain the statistical significance of
technological differentiation, although its impact was small, with high-tech exports of the
late 1980s such as electrotechnical goods, the finding that exports tended to be
homogenous or standardized and not differentiated in the 1980s requires further research.
434 Parjanne 1992 95; Greenaway & Milner 1984, 325. Parjanne, however, did not transform her measure
for increasing returns to scale into a quadratic form.
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Of course, one could also speculate that alternative measures for product differentiation
such as marketing intensity might yield other results.435
Table 27. Determinants of Value-added of Exports in 1980–1989, Product R&D Intensity and
Scale Advantage in Quadratic Form
1 2 3 4
Labour Intensity -0.153 -0.360
(0.240) (0.597)
Capital Intensity -0.290 -0.201 -0.417 -0.577
(0.315) (0.817) (0.377) (0.400)
Resource Intensity -0.152 -0.035 -0.028 -0.124
(0.287) (0.241) (0.246) (0.247)
Scale Advantage 0.241 0.258 0.315 0.277
(0.187) (0.251) (0.231) (0.215)
Scale Advantage2 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.035
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.049)
R&D Prod. Diff. -0.927** -0.934** -1.490** -1.546**
(0.376) (0.354) (0.605) (0.608)
R&D Prod. Diff.2 0.052** 0.052** 0.083** 0.086**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.032)
Average Wage Rate 0.851* 2.100
(0.429) (2.554)
Intercept 15.313*** 15.869** 13.207** 12.579*
(3.378) (6.311) (8.570) (7.323)
Unionization No No Yes Yes
Women No No Yes Yes
Eastern Trade No Yes No Yes
EFP No Yes No Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects No Yes No Yes
R2 .336 .381 .447 .471
Observations 92 92 70 70
Clusters (Industries) 24 24 24 24
* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Notes: Dependent variable is domestic value-added of exports in millions of 2017 euros in log form. All variables
are measured in natural logarithmic form except for the number of innovations and control variables. Also, note
that the squared variables are in logarithmic form before the quadratic transformation. See appendices for further
information and data sources.
435 Capital intensity’s negative effect size becomes larger in specifications (2) – (4) when EGW is removed
to the extent that the variable becomes statistically significant or indicative. Product differentiation
variables become even more statistically significant in all specifications.
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In light of opinions that some industries were more protected than others, I will also
discuss the association that these factors had with effective rate of protection.
Additionally, the share of Eastern Trade might have had determinants of its own. While
neither specifically relate to export structure, they are important points in understanding
the differences between domestic manufacturing and internationally oriented industries.
Eastern Trade has also very interesting implications considering product differentiation.
There is evidence that EFP was positively associated with labour intensity in 1959–1970
when protectionism began to recede. Industries with customs barriers tended to have a
low rate of labour productivity and/or utilize labour to noticeable extent and in manner
that is statistically significant in column (2) of Table 28. Still the possible impacts might
have been small – a 10% increase in labour intensity was associated with a 0.4 to 4.5 unit
increase in EFP. There is also some indication that these industries were not capital or
machine intensive as can be seen from the variables’ negative signs. The same can be
stated regarding resource intensity, but its effect size is negligible. The results partly
reflect that the tertiary sector had negative EFP and a high rate of capital intensity and a
low rate of natural resource intensity.
Table 28. Determinants of Effective Rate of Protection in 1959–1970 and 1980–1989
1 2 3 4
Labour Intensity 26.251* 24.590** 3.934 3.607
(13.551) (10.073) (3.208) (3.001)
Capital Intensity -21.000 -2.901
(19.347) (2.814)
Machine Intensity -39.122 -2.084
(26.348) (2.464)
Resource Intensity -4.326 -0.211 -2.156 -2.194
(5.478) (5.462) (2.541) (2.628)
Intercept 30.859 256.100 6.267 -4.211
(154.486) (253.838) (20.835) (20.211)
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects No No No No
R2 .080 .126 .020 .018
Observations 79 79 108 108
Clusters (Industries) 27 27 27 27
1959–70 1959–70 1980–89 1980–89
* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Notes: Dependent variable is Effective Rate of Protection. Explanatory variables are measured in natural
logarithmic form. See appendices for data sources.
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By 1980–89 customs barriers had been lowered to the extent that the regression models
in columns (3) – (4) are unable to differentiate any significant factors. Labour intensity
still has a positive sign and one cannot refute the statement that customs barriers shielded
labour intensive industries, but no general statements can be made one way or another.
The evidence instead implies that EFP was no longer correlated with any factor intensity
in the 1980s.
Table 29. Determinants of Share of Eastern Trade in 1956–1970 and 1980–1989
1 2 3 4 5 6
Labour Intens. 8.512 3.050 18.647***
(7.570) (6.235) (2.915)
Capital Intens. -5.376 0.939 22.390*** 25.276***
(12.245) (9.863) (6.004) (6.306)
Machine Intens. 13.822 0.825
(9.069) (5.691)
Resource Intens. 1.834 3.002 3.535 -14.060*** -7.429 -8.709
(5.838) (6.187) (6.984) (4.439) (5.719) (5.727)
Scale Advant. -5.565 -6.479 -5.896 -2.896 -0.565 0.526
(6.725) (6.898) (5.945) (1.906) (1.978) (1.984)
Innovations 1.406** 1.280** 1.478*
(0.548) (0.603) (0.736)
R&D Prod. Dif. -2.119 -0.768 12.106*
(1.400) (1.279) (5.891)
R&D Prod. Dif.2 -0.774**
(0.353)
Avg. Wage Rate -11.000 -21.888*** -23.286***
(11.825) (7.416) (7.310)
Intercept -5.434 -205.749* 0.077 -144.126** -208.731*** -294.225***
(139.465) (118.066) (155.204) (64.970) (72.794) (89.998)
Unionization No No Yes No Yes Yes
Women No No Yes No No No
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects No No No No No No
R2 .139 .157 .150 .317 .318 .337
Observations 81 81 81 92 92 92
Clusters
(Industries)
23 23 23 24 24 24
1956–70 1956–70 1956–70 1980–89 1980–89 1980–89
* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Notes: Dependent variable is the share of Eastern Trade in an industry’s total exports, both in gross value.
Variables are measured in log form except for number of innovations. If “women” are included the year 1982
would be excluded. In that case average wage rate becomes statistically non-significant. However, it seems that
this is caused by removing 1982 from the data. See the appendices for further information and data sources.
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In Table 29. one can observe that Eastern Trade in the early post-war period was
seemingly characterized by labour intensive industries as seen in columns (1) – (2), based
on its positive sign. In specification (3), average wage rate’s 95% confidence intervals
range from -35.5 to 13.5, or -0.4% to 0.1%, which indicates that Eastern Trade utilized
unskilled labour, but the association is not statistically significant either. However, it
actually seems that Eastern Trade was more of a feature of export industries with a high
degree of mechanization in 1956–1970, though this is not statistically significant. It is
worth pointing out that resource intensity was not a determinant one way or another at
the time – if exports of other than forest products would have been predominantly directed
to Eastern Trade, one would expect to find statistical significance or a large effect size.
The only variable that is statistically significant here is the number of innovations as the
model predicts that an industry’s share of Eastern Trade will increase approximately by
1.3% when an innovation is produced there in column (2). The variable’s 95% confidence
intervals in there are 0.0% and 2.5%. This likely reflects the high number of innovations
in metal industries. The finding here can be also stated in inverse: industries exporting
primarily to the West were not characteristically innovative in 1956–1970.
In the 1980s, prior to the end of Eastern Trade, the situation was quite different. Labour
intensity is now a highly statistically significant variable in predicting exports’
dependence on Eastern Trade in specification (4) and the same can be said of average
wage rate in column (5). Capital intensity is also a statistically significant and positive
measure for Eastern Trade in (5), but since neither it nor machine intensity is robust to
including labour intensity I would not draw strong conclusions here. Although Eastern
Trade is arguably interesting in its general trend across all industries, and hence time fixed
effects need not be controlled, I should note that labour intensity is robust to including
time effects in specification (4). The negative relationships with scale advantage and
R&D product intensity become statistically significant in that case. However, in column
(5) average wage rate loses its significance with the same addition.436
The results here are different from Hellvin and Torstensen’s characterizations of Finnish
exports to Eastern Europe for 1985 where they concluded that Finland was a net exporter
of human capital and a net importer of physical capital. Specification (5) indicates the
complete opposite, but then again their perspective revolves around comparing exports to
436 This is likely due to unionization being a surprisingly statistically significant explanatory factor with
Eastern Trade after controlling time fixed effects.
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imports whereas I am analysing features of Finnish industries. The results are not
necessarily contradictory. It is possible that Finnish exports to Eastern Europe were more
human capital intensive than imports from Eastern Europe – resulting in net exports of
human capital – but that simultaneously the most skill intensive industries in Finland
exported to the West rather than to the East – resulting in a negative sign of skill intensity
Horizontal differentiation seems initially unrelated to Eastern Trade in columns (4) – (5)
and the same result would be observed if number of innovations would be used in its
stead. Yet based on column (6), Eastern Trade tended to be horizontally differentiated in
terms of R&D during the 1980s. By the same reasoning, the standardized homogenous
exports were a feature of Western Trade. However, the 95% confidence intervals there
correspond with changes of -0.0 to 0.2% so the association is relatively limited. While
technological differentiation had a more marginal impact here, it seems to have been also
more characteristic of Western Trade. While these findings are not robust to including
time effects or labour intensity small associations cannot be overruled. I will return to this
topic in the next section.437
In conclusion, industries exporting to communist countries were possibly mechanized and
associated with innovatory activities in the early post-war period, but in the 1980s they
were also characterized by increasing labour intensity as has been noted in previous
research.438 This suggests that Eastern Trade functioned as a form of protectionism
applied to unproductive labour intensive industries after free trade integration had
reduced their customs barriers. There is also some evidence that suggests that products of
Eastern Trade were horizontally differentiated according to R&D.
It ought to be mentioned here that neither Eastern Trade, EFP nor the share of state-owned
companies were statistically significant, robust variables in explaining export structure.
Additionally, the share of infrastructure or of banking and financial inputs in value-added
of exports were statistically non-significant variables. However, infrastructure has a
relatively large effect size with confidence intervals of -0.8% to 2.1% in specification (5)
of Table 26.
437 It  should  be  noted  that  this  finding  rests  on  the  assumption  that  there  were  no  service  exports  to
communist economies insofar as they were not included in commodity exports. Additionally, if Eastern
Trade would be transformed into natural logarithmic form, log-log model’s horizontal product
differentiation’ slope coefficient would correspond with an increase of 0.8%. While this result might be
biased due to data imputations related to zeroes, it is possible that the level-log model’s effect size of 0.2%
is underestimated.
438 See Paavonen 2008, 288 or Alho et al. 1986, 90.
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5. Discussion and Conclusory Remarks
This chapter discusses the overall conclusions based on utilizing trade models and
examining previous research through quantitative methods in locating the determinants
of export structure. While the majority of the discussion here is devoted to addressing the
econometric results of this thesis, inspecting industries’ individual characteristics can be
insightful as well. For this purpose, I have compiled information in quantitative tables of
the previous section in Table 30. The results are also compared with previous research
and venues for future research are suggested.
5.1 Development of Determinants and a Nordic Comparison
From a researcher’s point of view it would have undoubtedly been a
pleasure to locate an “Open Sesame” type business idea or strategy –
– 439
In the earlier sections I criticised previous economic historical research as lacking in
analysis of their diagnosis of the important determinants of Finnish export structure. Yet
the results here are somewhat complex in light of previous research. The results of fixed
effects regression analyses confirm some of its characterizations, find no evidence for
others and temper the rest. That is to say, some arguments can be supported but only in a
qualified way. The need to separate early and late post-war periods should be self-evident
by now as there is evidence that different models apply to 1956–1970 and 1980–1989.
Before considering what the determinants of export structure as a whole were, it might be
useful to review the determinants of individual export industries. Table 30. is only a
general approximation of their noteworthy features. Deciding what constitutes
noteworthiness is admittedly somewhat arbitrary on my part and is based on whether an
industry “stood out” in the case of each determinant. Therefore, econometric analyses are
preferable to measuring each determinant’s impact as they pick more marginal and less
observable differences across industries. On the other hand, institutional features of trade
might be important only by the virtue that they existed and not by their trends. If that is
the case, econometrics used here will not identify their significance. This summary table,
based on quantitative tables of the previous section, is a workaround to this issue.
439 Larjavaara 1978, 194. Translated from: “Tutkijan kannalta olisi epäilemättä ollut ilo löytää “sesam
aukene”-tyyppinen toiminta-ajatus tai strategia – – ”.
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Table 30. Determinants of Export Structure in Export Industries in 1956–1989




















































































Notes: “(E)” refers to the determinant being important during the early post-war period of 1956–1970 and “(L)”
during the late post-war period of 1980–1980. Note that R&D data only covers the year 1970 from the early post-
war period.
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First, it is evident that the traditional export sectors of forest, and also foodstuff, goods
tended to be determined by factor intensities of the H–O model. This is somewhat
reminiscent of Aunesluoma’s point that raw materials and comparative advantage were
important in the 19th century – the traditional export industries still operated in an old-
world fashion during 1956–1970 at least.440 Although they are difficult to measure, scale
advantage and product differentiation were more apparent in the case of new exports.
This was particularly the case in the 1980s when new exports had become more dominant.
While this does reinforce Paavonen’s argument that most new export industries utilized
scale advantage, the distinction is not clear-cut even in the 1980s.441 For instance, MFM,
ELE, CHE and TEX were all associated with some Heckscher–Ohlinian factors at some
point. Secondly, PAP had a high rate of scale advantage as early as in 1956–1970 while
metal engineering industries did not in the entire post-war period.
It is curious to note that the basic metal industry, which was a relatively noteworthy export
industry even in the 1950s shared many characteristics with the paper industry. Both were
resource-dependent industries that utilized capital to great deal which might reflect the
notion of some observers that capital and natural resources are complementary.442.  Both
industries had increased their skill intensity coming to the 1990s, which is likely related
to how the length of experience obtained in the same company was greater in Finnish
PAP and MET compared to the U.S. in 1987.443 Both industries were also characterized
by state-owned companies and possibly cartels. The only difference between the two was
that MET became even less dependent on domestic resources than PAP after 1970. It is
also worth mentioning that according to Maliranta’s calculations these two were the most
internationally competitive industries in Finland in 1987.444
That both industries featured scale advantage and skill intensity may be explained by
production strategies. Combining the production of parts can lead to branded articles
where economies of scale are reached by using know-how in “combining ‘hardware’ and
‘software’”, as Larjavaara puts it.445 He also notes that this seemed to be characteristic of
440 Aunesluoma 2011, 154
441 Paavonen 2008, 263
442 See Wright 1990 for example.
443 Maliranta 1996, 135–137
444 Ibid., 79–80. PAP’s labour productivity was 6% higher than in the U.S whereas MET was lagging only
8% behind. In comparison, CHE/OIL, ELE and TEX had labour productivity levels of only roughly 65%
of the U.S. level.
445 Larjavaara 1978, 130
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German metal industry of the period and based on Table 30. this may have been the case
in Finnish not only in MET and PAP, but in CHE as well. Maliranta also refers to MET
and PAP as being characterized by industry-specific know-how which is connected to
forming industrial clusters, per Michael Porter’s famous line of thinking.446
Aija Leiponen has also described MET as following the strategy of the so-called newly
industrializing countries: a state-directed import-substituting production that uses imports
of novel technology. Although she mentions that technical change was an aspect of the
industry and there were attempts to improve relevant education and research, R&D
intensity was never an especially prevalent characteristic of MET. This at least highlights
another similarity of MET, PAP and CHE – a high rate of state-ownership. While the
emergence of forest exports was probably unrelated to public assistance, the same
statement cannot be made so certainly regarding chemical and basic metal exports.447
While woodworking exports were labour intensive in contrast with paper exports, it had
a higher rate of capital intensity than metal industries throughout the post-war period. Nor
was it relatively labour intensive in the 1980s. This reflects that the industry was capable
of structural transformation, though admittedly its labour force seems to have been
unskilled based on the industry’s low wage rates. Yet one cannot observe a structural
change of this kind in foodstuff exports, for example, where the only major difference
between the early and the late post-war periods was that the industry switched its reliance
from customs barriers to Eastern Trade.
Metal industries have often been linked with Eastern Trade in previous research. This
seems to be an accurate statement as it appears to be most shared feature among the metal
engineering industries.448 This is not surprising considering that metal engineering
industries were linked with war reparations to the Soviet Union. Conversely basic metal
industry was not dependent on Eastern Trade, and in fact its exports were also unrelated
to war reparations, which consisted of machinery, ships and cables. The last product
explains the high share of Eastern Trade in electrotechnical exports.449
While the war reparations can be considered as a positive demand shock for these
industries, the development was not necessarily positive in all respects. For instance, the
446 Maliranta 1996, 95; Larjavaara 1978, 130
447 Leiponen 1994, 22–24
448 Coincidentally the Eastern Trade of Yugoslavia or Austria was also characterized by metal exports. See
Hirvensalo & Sutela 2017, 196, 199.
449 Ibid., 146. War reparations also included wood-processing products though.
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need to pay for the reparations was so pressing that some small shipyards were established
inland.450 They were consequently uncompetitive and had difficulties in exporting to
anywhere else than to the Soviet Union. Exports of transport equipment were decidedly
affected by geopolitics. Finnish shipyards might not have been competitive in Western
markets during the 1950s, but the Soviet Union did not have many alternative sources
either as most of the competitive Western shipyards were in NATO countries which
curtailed such exports to the East for obvious reasons.451
As mentioned earlier, horizontal differentiation in TRE might be a natural consequence
of its exports including icebreakers, car ferries, oil-rigs and passenger cars. Saarinen also
describes that the industry did not manage to compete well in global markets and its
companies “specialized in a few products and often only served selected customers”.452
These commodities included elevators, luxury cruisers, LNG tankers and an assortment
of harbour equipment. Dahmén also noted in the case of early post-war period that due to
demands of Eastern Trade there was some product specialization in metal industries but
they were not usually of the kind that could be marketed to Western markets as well.453
In the late post-war period this had changed since both Western and Eastern metal exports
were specialized, but only in a few products.454
The lack of competitiveness in Western markets apparently characterized all metal
engineering industries.455 Indeed, Eastern Trade was the only noteworthy determinant of
MFM in 1956–1965. Both it and TRE continued to depend on Eastern Trade throughout
1956–1989, but electrotechnical exports’ emergence in 1985–1989 seems more related to
R&D, and its public finding possibly, or product differentiation of technological nature.
R&D intensity did become a feature of MFM during the 1980s as well. There is no data
on R&D intensity before the year 1970, but it was likely not an export determinant in the
early post-war period, because R&D expenditure of metal engineering industries in
Finland was lower than in other Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, in 1973–1975.456
The chemical industry was reliant on human capital, either viewed through skill or R&D
intensity, but it also tended to have a wide variety of determinants. Scale advantage and
450 Hirvensalo & Sutela 2017, 152
451 Ibid., 147
452 Saarinen 2005, 34
453 Dahmén 1963, 36–37
454 Saarinen 2005, 34; Dahmén 1984, 21; Hjerppe 1982, 421–422
455 Hirvensalo & Sutela 2017, 147
456 Larjavaara 1978, 152–153
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product differentiation may have been expected on the basis of previous research on
intraindustry trade, but it is surprising that Eastern Trade and state-ownership were
associated with chemical industry to such extent. One cannot rule out that its development
would not have occurred in the absence of these characteristics. As noted by previous
research, the labour intensive textile industries became more dependent on Eastern Trade
in the 1980s. Yet the extent of this dependence was generally either on the level of or
lower than for chemical exports. This suggests that the plummeting of textile exports was
perhaps more related to high labour costs and lack of competitiveness than the dissolution
of the Soviet Union.
While data concerning the variables of New Trade Theory and institutional features,
particularly scale advantage, is admittedly lacking when it comes to primary or tertiary
sectors, Heckscher–Ohlinian factor intensities seem to be especially explanatory
concerning service exports. Capital intensity was a factor in all three major service export
industries whereas TRD was also characterized by labour and BUS by skill intensity.
However, BUS was also characterized by a high rate of innovations during its growth in
the 1980s, though its R&D intensity was not great. Due to this reason I have included
horizontal differentiation as a characteristic of the industry, but it is also possible that
innovatory activities are more reflective of the skilled personnel in BUS. Skill intensity
was also a feature of financial services which grew to some degree in the 1980s. This
indicates that know-how was tied into Finland’s transformation to a service economy,
even if that impact was only limited in the 1980s from an export-perspective. It is also
evident that the tertiary sector’s development was curtailed by customs barriers due to
increasing their input costs.
Conversely, agricultural exports were decidedly protected by customs barriers even in
1989. Propensity to cartelization was also a feature of both agriculture and forestry, as
was the strong dependence on resources, as can be expected. However, forestry tended to
shift away from labour intensity towards capital intensity after the 1950s, and towards
scale advantage in the 1980s, though the data is lacking here. There is also some evidence
to suggest that product quality or vertical differentiation in the line of Falvey’s model
might be applicable there. Yet scale advantage and product quality cannot be considered
to have been very important, since forestry exports were only important during the 1950s.
That being said forestry’s structural transformation most likely affected the labour and
capital intensities of woodworking and paper exports.
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Chart 4. The Share of Domestic Value-added of Exports originating from Forestry Products, %
Notes: Includes the value-added of forestry inputs in both forestry itself and in other industries through backward
linkages.
Source: The author’s own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input–Output Tables 1956–1989; Kauppila 2007.
The manner of discussing the entire post-war export structure from the late 1940s to the
1990s as a straightforward narrative – i.e. described with a single trade model – can lead
to somewhat imprecise statements, even if they are true in broad terms. Kaukiainen for
example stated that natural resources became less relevant over time. This is true, but
most of the decline there seems to have taken place prior to the 1980s.
That is not to say that forest resources were meaningless for export structure at least in
1956. Eloranta and Ojala have suggested, based on Finland’s small share of global paper
exports, that Finnish forest exports were not very important internationally.457 In truth,
Finnish forest exports accounted for high shares of global commodity exports of their
respective product groups at certain points in time.458 Although the international
importance of Finnish forest industries is not equivalent for their standing among other
export industries in Finland, in 1956 almost a third of Finnish value-added of exports
originated directly or indirectly from forestry as seen in Chart 4.
Yet the tremendous and clear decline in the value-added of exports accrued by forestry
products after 1956 proves that resource intensity ceased to be a determinant of exports.
This is in stark contrast with Markku Kuisma’s rather impressionistic statement on how
Finland and forests are “bound by fate”:459
457 Eloranta & Ojala 2018, 163
458 In terms of physical volume Finnish sawn softwood exports accounted for 13% and exports of wood
pulp for 17% of the commodities’ global exports in 1953–1954. See Yates 1959, 119–120. While Finland’s
share of global wood pulp exports declined in 1961–1991, Finland’s paper and cardboard exports comprised
approximately 15% of global exports in that commodity group during the same era. See Pihkala 2001, 257.




























Finland lives on forest, is in forest and is forest.460
The term “forest fundamentalism” is apt in this context. Even in more mild-mannered
recent research by Pertti Haapala and Christopher Lloyd one can find declarations stating
that “the rapid industrialization of the 20th century was largely based on a single raw
material”.461 Ahti Karjalainen’s quote from 1953 in the introduction of this thesis was
certainly an accurate description of the times he lived in, but that even the historical
research of 2018 seems to have a misguided interpretation of the importance of forest
resources is bewildering.462 The data suggests that the reliance on forests declined
demonstrably in both forest industries and new exports. Indeed, how could it have been
any other way as Finland transitioned into a modern economy? The livelihood of modern
Finland is found not in forests but in other factors.
Kaukiainen stated that capital and know-how became important determinants of trade,
which is also supported by Hjerppe’s description in 1982 of structural transformation of
Finnish manufacturing – implying that she is specifically describing the development
prior the 1980s. Hjerppe asserts that lower trade barriers tended to encourage capital
intensification and mechanization of production alongside improvements in know-how.
Skilled workers were more in demand owing to diversified production processes that
required more technological skills.463
Based on the econometric approach of this thesis, both factors may have been important
in the early post-war period, though there is solid evidence only for capital intensity.
Capital, and specifically the kind related to mechanization, as Hjerppe correctly
characterizes, was an important determinant of export structure in 1956–1970. Indeed,
Pohjola notes that the capital intensification of the Finnish economy was already
underway in the 1950s. Although Pohjola makes a persuasive case for the inefficient of
Finnish capital fundamentalism, it is perhaps not surprising that high levels of
mechanization were correlated with export structure. Yet one might speculate, that by the
1980s, the inefficiently high level of capital with its lower marginal productivity was no
longer sufficient enough to compete in global markets resulting in lack of statistical
significance for capital intensity and negative signs. The only specification where time
460 Kuisma 2008, 16. Translated from: “Suomi elää metsästä, on metsässä ja on metsä”.
461 Haapala & Lloyd 2018, 26
462 Karjalainen 1953, 24
463 Kaukiainen 2006, 150–151; Hjerppe 1982, 410–411
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effects are included and capital intensity is on a statistically indicative level is column (6)
of Table 26. but its sign is negative there as well.464
The results concerning human capital are less certain that what might have been hoped
for. Based on Hjerppe’s remark that manufacturing required skilled personnel in
increasing numbers leading to the 1980s, the early post-war period should have been
characterized by skill intensity. Indeed, a regression with both time and industry fixed
effects cannot rule out an impact as large as 3.3% on exports when average wage rate
increases by 1% concerning 1956–1970. Although the same specification cannot disprove
a negative relationship, this does seem to indicate that human capital might have been a
cause of export structure in 1956–1970.
Since skill intensity interacted with machine intensity in some manner, the impact might
be distorted somehow. The exact manner of how the variables interacted with each other
is not studied here, other than by remarking that average wage rate and R&D intensity
were positively associated with labour productivity whereas machine intensity was not.
This indicates that capital intensification may have indeed been on an inefficient scale. It
should be noted that R&D intensity’s possible effect on export structure is mostly
transmitted through labour productivity. While chemical and metal exports tended to have
high levels of R&D activities, econometric analysis could not identify a positive
relationship with R&D and export structure in the 1980s.
This is consistent with Hjerppe and Jalava’s statement that Finland was lagging behind
the Western European level of R&D in the late 1980s.465 Pohjola also mentions that
manufacturing’s R&D expenditure relative to its value-added was only roughly half of
Swedish level in 1989.466 On the other hand, Maliranta claims that Finnish R&D intensity
was high in 1990 in an international comparison, but this seems to have been unrelated to
export structure.467 It could be speculated that skilled personnel and know-how,
specifically mentioned by previous research, were more important than R&D expenditure
for export structure. On the other hand, skill intensity’s effect size is wildly imprecise for
the 1980s when time fixed effects are included. Neither strong positive or negative
associations cannot be ruled out for the late post-war period then.
464 Pohjola 1996, 111–113
465 Hjerppe & Jalava 2006, 59
466 Pohjola 1996, 53
467 Maliranta 1996, 153
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This impreciseness might be partly related to the fact that Finnish manufacturing
employees tended to have less job-experience on average in comparison with the U.S.A
and Japan during the late 1980s. While PAP and MET had personnel with a considerable
length of experience in the same company that was also the case in textile and foodstuff
industries. The potential in skill intensity was perhaps neglected in some industries while
utilized in others leading to the large impreciseness witnessed before. The full explanation
of why skill intensity’s effect size changed as it did cannot be fully answered here.468
The reason why R&D intensity was evidently unrelated to exports is more easily
explained. Dahmén himself stated that new knowledge in Finland tended to be more
related to “engineers and other practical, inter alia organisatory, working in production”
rather than inventions and science.469 Finnish technological policy favoured engineer-
dependent process-innovations at the expense of marketing, management and R&D.
Economic nationalism unfavoured foreign-owned companies which impeded spread of
technology. Since public funding of innovations also seems unrelated to exports as seen
in Table 22. it is perhaps no wonder that R&D intensity was not a determinant of Finnish
export structure in 1956–1989. Of course, the establishment of Tekes in 1983 and other
R&D related policies of the 1980s may have borne fruit afterwards.470
Labour intensity was also not a determinant of export structure once time fixed effects
were included concerning 1956–1970. This is perhaps a good reminder that there is a
difference between saying where Finland’s place in the international division of labour
was and what determined Finnish export structure. Kaukiainen argues that Finland ceased
to be a country of low-cost labour and this seems to be the case in regressions when
industry-invariant but time-variant features are not controlled for.471 There we see a clear
indication that Finnish export industries had high rates of labour productivity and average
wage rates in 1956–1970. Yet controlling for general trends over time also implies that
this development happened in all industries equally, even if skill intensity may have had
some effect at that point. In fact, it has been suggested that the move away from unskilled,
cheap labour was an all-European phenomenon even if other countries tended to have a
significantly higher rate of labour productivity than Finland.
468 Maliranta 1996, 135–137
469 Dahmén 1984, 19. Translated from: “insinöörien ja muu käytännön mm. organisatorinen, työskentely
tuotantotoiminnassa”.
470 Aunesluoma 2011, 292–293; Pohjola 1996, 54–57
471 Kaukiainen 2006, 151
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Table 31. Aggregate Labour Productivity of Certain European Countries (100 = U.S.A.), %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1985 1989
Finland 44.6 45.5 49.3 58.4 73.0 74.9 81.5
Sweden 75.4 75.1 84.3 95.4 101.8 95.7 95.1
Germany 55.5 60.0 69.1 80.2 99.0 100.4 105.6
United Kingdom 61.3 62.2 64.2 71.2 78.5 83.3 84.3
France 56.0 58.1 67.7 82.1 101.4 109.1 112.7
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, March 2018
After this general trend is accounted for, the estimates for labour intensity are imprecise.
For example, in specification (4) of Table 26. the 95% confidence intervals of labour
intensity are -1.7% and 0.6%. Not much can be said of the possible impact of the variable.
Perhaps the association would be more precise had Eastern Trade not supported labour
intensive industries, although the variable should be controlled in the regressions.472
Since skill intensity’s effect size is lower in 1980–1989 than in 1956–1970, the
dependency on low-cost labour seems to have been stronger in the 1980s. This suggests
that the protection provided by Eastern Trade noted by Laurila was perhaps an unintended
consequence of free trade integration. Uncompetitive labour-intensive industries and
effective rate of protection had a positive and statistically significant association in 1956–
1970. The fall of customs barriers, gradual or not, perhaps motivated these industries to
depend on trade with communist countries, which was easier to satisfy than trade with
Western markets for a variety of reasons. This seems to have been especially the case in
textile and foodstuff industries and probably distorted the structural transformation of
Finnish economy. Uncompetitive industries might have died out faster as in other Nordic
countries had Eastern Trade not existed – but more on that later.473
Although it was not apparent which theory or study Aunesluoma and Paavonen were
referring to when they stressed the importance of scale advantage, their view is somewhat
validated by the finding that scale advantage had a positive association with exports,
though not on a statistically significant level, in 1980–1989. Of course, its regression
coefficient was smaller than what H–O model’s factor intensities tended to be, so scale
advantage’s impact on export structure was not tremendous. Yet only it and number of
innovations had a positive association with value-added of exports in 1980–1989
suggesting that there had been a structural change in determinants of the Finnish trade
pattern. However, including time fixed effects tempers the notion of scale advantage’s
472 Laurila 1995, 101
473 Ibid., 99–102
134
superiority. While that econometric specification suggests that scale advantage’s impact
could be 1.0% per a 1% increase, it cannot rule out a -0.2% decrease either. At the very
least, scale advantage did not have a substantial negative effect on export structure
whereas in 1959–1970 its sign had still been negative.
Considering that previous literature has identified several reasons why product
differentiation, the second New Trade Theory variable, could have been important, it was
curious that the variable seemed largely unrelated to export structure. Although number
of innovations had positive association with exports in the 1980s, it was not robust and
might have been related to technological differentiation that is not related to NTT. Due
to the possibility that the structural form of the regressions was misspecified, both low
and high levels of R&D intensity according product groups were inspected. The result
was that low levels of R&D, reflecting horizontal product differentiation, were negatively
associated with exports implying that Finnish export products were actually homogenous.
What can explain this surprising finding? It could be that inclusion of marketing intensity
would result in a positive sign of horizontal differentiation with exports. On the other
hand, one might speculate that the C–H–O model is in fact not the correct approximation
of the late post-war export structure, and that a model that includes increasing returns to
scale – without product differentiation – might be more accurate.474 Then again, it has
been thought that large countries tend to be at comparative advantage in industries with
increasing returns to scale. This does not exactly provide evidence for scale advantage
being an independent determinant of trade in a small open economy like Finland.
However, it has been also suggested that the argument is not relevant once free trade
creates shared global markets, a development which European trade integration was part
of. Additionally, there is still a rationale for trade between countries of the same size,
which is consistent with how Finnish IIT was a feature of trade with Nordic countries.475
There are also reasons for intraindustry trade in homogenous products including border
trade, re-export trade, cyclical trade – think of how agricultural trade depends on seasons
– and strategic trade pertaining to Brander’s model where a binational duopoly exports to
each one’s market.476 I am not sure how much stock one should put to these rationales.
474 For a discussion of models of increasing returns to scale, see Helpman 1984. It is important to note here
that the nature of economies of scale can differ by being national or international and external or internal.
475 Pihkala 2001, 297; Deardorff 1984, 510–511; Helpman 1984, 344
476 Deardorff 1984, 506–507
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Border trade would at least make sense in the case of intraindustry trade with Sweden
whereas Brander’s model may be explanatory in industries with export cartels.
Yet it has been suggested that country size makes all the difference here. Jacques Drèze
argued “that a larger total market will be needed to permit producers in particular product
lines to exhaust the benefits of economies of scale”.477 This leads into a market
segmentation where large countries specialize in differentiated products and small
countries in homogenized products.478 Perhaps this was Finland’s position in the new
international marketplace of the 1980s: a country producing only standardized, general
goods. Larjavaara was quite sceptical in 1978 whether this theory, more suitable to small
labour intensive countries, could be applied to Finnish metal exports. According to him
they were differentiated products, but Larjavaara admitted that the notion might still apply
in other exports, most of which were composed of bulk commodities.479
A further examination indicated that homogenous goods were specifically a feature of
Western Trade. Since exports to communist economies were characterized by low
marketing costs and high profitability,480 one might presume that they were relatively
homogenous as well, but this seems to have not been case. Horizontal differentiation by
R&D – i.e. products characterized by R&D but not on an extremely high level – seems to
have been a feature of Eastern Trade even if the estimated effect size was not large.
Therefore, Drèze’s argument might still hold since metal exports, the focus of
Larjavaara’s study, were exported into the East. Indeed, it has been noted that metal and
paper qualities of Eastern Trade were more refined than those exported into the West.
This should partly explain the geographical difference in horizontal differentiation.481
The relationship between innovations, R&D intensity of product groups and Eastern
Trade warrants some discussion, although it is obscured by the inability to distinguish
between technological, vertical and horizontal differentiation. In 1956–1970 innovations
had a positive association with Eastern Trade, but not one that can be proven regarding
all exports. In the 1980s the opposite was the case. It seems that during this time Western
Trade was characterized by technological differentiation, though only mildly, and
homogenous products whereas horizontal differentiation was a feature in Eastern Trade.
477 Deardorff 1984, 511
478 Ibid., 511
479 Larjavaara 1978, 121–122
480 Laurila 1995, 100–101
481 Paavonen 2008, 257
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Reconciling these observations is not straightforward. They may even simply rise from
using different data sources. If that possibility is assumed away, one might speculate that
changes in both the diversification and the technological level of Finnish exports might
be the key here. In 1956–1970 Eastern Trade provided a market for metal engineering
industries which were also the most innovatory industries at the time based on H-INNO
data. Eastern Trade may have been important in raising the technological level of these
exports. In the 1980s the number of export industries had grown, and innovating was no
longer as concentrated in metal engineering industries. Hence the lack of statistical
significance between innovations and Eastern Trade. If most of the innovations were
related to production processes or technological differentiation it is no surprise that
Western Trade was not characterized by horizontally differentiated products.
In the case of horizontal differentiation of Eastern Trade one should also consult the
Andersson and Tolonen who argued that Finland managed to exploit its “geo-economic”
position between Soviet Union and Sweden in 1960–1980. The authors argue that Eastern
Trade was relatively technologically intensive – which is in line with horizontal or vertical
differentiation by R&D – and could grow in conjunction with imports due to its clearing
system, enabling Finland to close its technological gap with Western Europe. With
regards to Swedish trade, the authors state that Swedish production shifted to lower-wage
Finland as predicted by product cycle theory. Both statements are in line with the limited
evidence here on Eastern Trade being horizontally differentiated according to R&D and
Western Trade being homogenous.482
Testing for the validity of these claims remains an area for future research. Then again it
is not obvious that a phenomenon related to Eastern Trade should even be attempted to
explain with models that assume free markets. Indeed, NTT assumes that horizontal
differentiation reflects appreciation for variety whereas Eastern Trade was handled on a
governmental level without market mechanisms.
The point of this thesis was certainly not to test the validity of any particular theory – the
Heckscher-Ohlin model in particular has already been subjected to a much scrutiny in the
literature – as doing so would necessitate several tests such as sign test, slope test, t-test
and variance ratio test.483 While one should not put too much stock into high rates of ,
482 Andersson & Tolonen 1982, 35. I am assuming here that homogenous products are correlated with
utilizing unskilled labour.
483 See Estevadeordal & Taylor 2002 for such an example of testing H–O model.
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I cannot resist the urge to point out that the three-factor H–O model performs markedly
better in explaining the variation within industries in 1956–1970 than in 1980–1989.484
This supports Pihkala’s statement that neoclassical trade theory, or the H–O model,
performed better in the time preceding free trade integration although he dates this period
to 1920–1960.485 Since integration proceeded only gradually, the model might be
applicable during 1960–1970 as well based on these tentative results.
What was the underlying trade model after 1970 then? Since the C–H–O model is less
explanatory in 1980–1989 than H–O model in 1956–1970, another model might be more
appropriate for the 1980s. These could include the models which originated in the post-
war era but have since fallen out of fashion, such as increasing returns to scale,
technological gap, product cycle and other demand-oriented models. Paavonen interprets
textile exports’ development through product cycle theory and Andersson and Tolonen’s
research does certainly point to it being a possible area of further inquiry.486 That the
innovations of MFM, TRE, CHE and TEX tended not to be novel in world markets, while
not a definite proof of the theory’s validity due to Eastern Trade’s influence, is a
mechanism of the model, in the phraseology of Rodrik’s diagnostic framework. Perhaps
new exports may be explainable with product cycle theory or a similar model then.
Additionally, recalling Pat Hudson’s admonishment of supply-side dominance should
encourage us to put more effort into studying demand-side models after all. Or perhaps
export diversification alongside Eastern Trade ensured that there was more than one trade
model simultaneously at work. As Leamer and Levinsohn noted some models might be
specific to some industries and not to others.487 Checking the validity of a correct model
for Finnish exports of the late post-war period is another potential area of future research.
The evidence here suggests that the characteristics of Eastern Trade would have to be
accounted for in that inquiry as well.
Developments in Finland were not necessarily unique though. After Norway’s Efta
Agreement in 1960, some of its home market industries, particularly consumption goods
industries, could not sustain themselves while others adapted to international competition.
484 As mentioned earlier the concept of  differs from the ratio used in OLS regressions since fixed effects
models are used instead.  that is referred to here is the so-called within .
485 Pihkala 2007, 46–47
486 Paavonen 2008, 279–281
487 Leamer & Levinsohn 1995, 1342
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The latter group included the basic metal, metal engineering and chemical industries –
new export industries of Finland as well.488 And as Fritz Hodne puts it:489
– – industry survived in the open economy by utilizing natural
resources, like cheap energy, fish and forests, or competitive skills in
engineering and other modern high technologies – – there has been
an inrush from abroad of consumer goods, for instance shoes,
apparel, furniture, cosmetics that gradually ousted the Norwegian
producers by price, quality or design – – the old distinction between
the home market and export markets has been blurred.490
This is almost identical to a description of how structural transformation of Finnish
economy proceeded, the last sentence in particular. In Denmark as well, textile industries
continued to wither due to international competition by 1980.491 The Nordic experience
implies that had Eastern Trade not been a characteristic of Finnish foreign trade, textile
and apparel industries would have likely succumbed to low-cost competition earlier than
in the late 1980s, perhaps even in the 1970s or 1960s.
Of course, since textile exports’ dependence on communist countries was not evidently
higher than 35%, this point has perhaps been overestimated. Chemical exports’ Eastern
Trade share was roughly on the same level, suggesting that textile exports declined in the
long-run because they were unproductive and labour intensive. Indeed, both Pihkala and
Paavonen maintained that the industry lost its competitive edge and production was
moved countries with lower labour costs due to solidary wage policy and cheap
imports.492 Eastern Trade may have slowed down this development, but it is questionable
to believe that these low-wage industries would have been compatible with Finnish
income growth in the long run, even if Soviet Union had continued its existence.
Returning to the Nordic context, one can observe similarities in Denmark as well.
Chemical and metal manufacturing became important industries during free trade
integration after fears of international competition driving domestic manufacturers, less
productive than in European industrial nations, to the ground. The difference with Finland
is that oil crises of the 1970s damaged Denmark more – Eastern Trade did have its
benefits after all – and that foodstuff exports increased thanks to domestic agriculture.
488 Bear in mind that this relates to the years prior to the 1970s, so mention of chemical industries here is
unrelated to large-scale, oil and petrol manufacturing.
489 Hodne 1983, 202–203
490 Ibid., 203
491 Johansen 1987, 181–183
492 Paavonen 2008, 281; Pihkala 2001, 258
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Table 32. Shares of Commodity Groups of Commodity Gross Exports in Sweden and Finland in
the Early Post-War Period, %
Sweden Finland Sweden Finland
1951/1955 1956 1971/1975 1970
Woodworking 13.7 23.5 6.7 14.9
Pulp and Paper 31.0 46.5 17.0 37.8
Metal Ore Mining 9.2 1.2 4.8 0.6
Basic Metal and Metal Products 12.0 1.5 13.7 7.9
Machine and Transport Equipment 20.8 10.9 40.5 13.8
Others 13.3 16.4 17.3 25.0
Notes: The classification of commodity groups likely differs by some unknown amount. Metal ore mining in
Finland 1956 includes exports of other mining as well.
Source: Statistics Finland; Input–Output Tables 1956–1970; Schön 2000, Table 5.11.
The Danish success perhaps explains the relative decline of Finnish foodstuff exports
although there was also a marked increase in the relative standing of Finnish agricultural
exports during the 1980s. Hans Christian Johansen also mentions that shipbuilding went
into crisis during the 1970s, whereas Finnish transport equipment industry most likely
was not as struck as severely by those times thanks to Eastern Trade.493
Coincidentally, Finnish service exports were also not as important as in other Nordic
countries during 1970–1987. While this was probably partly due to the shipping industries
of Denmark and Norway, the fact that the Swedish service exports’ GDP share was
somewhat larger than in Finland in 1987 suggests that Finnish service industries did not
internationalize to the fullest extent possible.494
The Swedish economy of the early post-war period developed into a high-wage one, at
least in comparison to its closest competitors. Its export structure around 1950–1970 was
affected by both capital and skill intensity according to Lennart Schön. While
mechanization was a feature of Finnish export structure during those times as well and
there is some indication that skill intensity may have been important, the case for human
capital seems less certain in Finland than in Sweden.495
Finland was at any rate only catching up to Swedish export diversification as exemplified
by Table 32. where commodity group shares of Swedish and Finnish exports are
compared. While there is some discrepancy in years studied and probably in the
composition of the commodity groups as well, the results here indicate that Swedish forest
exports clearly declined in favour of metal exports earlier than in Finland. Exports of
493 Johansen 1987, 177–184
494 Miikkulainen 1989, 13–14
495 Schön 2000, 381–384
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machine and transport equipment were especially meagre in Finland when compared to
Sweden in the early post-war period.
While Swedish textile industries declined in the 1970s, electrotechnical and medicinal
manufacturing expanded during the 1980s in Sweden. The latter industry is customarily
classified as a part of chemical industry. Skill intensity was another feature of this period.
While Schön does not directly discuss exports in either case, rather manufacturing in
general, this nonetheless indicates that Finnish and Swedish economies and exports
developed similarly in some cases and less so in others. One finds evidence for skill
intensity in Sweden in the 1980s, but not as much in Finland – and perhaps even more
importantly – while I have asserted that export diversification was a feature of Finnish
development this too seems muted compared to the Swedish case.496
When inspecting the series of IMF’s export diversification index in Chart 5. one can
observe that Finnish exports were not only more concentrated than in other Nordic
countries in the 1960s but also that Finland did not manage to converge completely with
Denmark or Sweden even by 2010. The relative lack of diversity in export structure did
not go unnoticed in the early 1960s. Dahmén noted that Finland had not managed to
produce competitive products relative to the U.S.A. as Sweden and Switzerland had. The
reason for this was the “sluggishness of factors of production and Finland’s slowness to
discard industries and practices that lacked a future”.497 While free trade integration
certainly alleviated the second problem, the institutional settings that led to problems in
factor substitution can be studied in more detail in Dahmén’s own research.498
Finland still shared some characteristics with other Nordic countries. For example,
Fagerberg recognized that chemical production had evolved into a field of competitive
advantage in all Nordic countries. Its development could be studied from a cross-country
perspective then. Textile exports, on the other hand, were perhaps affected by both
general international trends and specifically Finnish features. Yet the greatest difference
here relates to the battle of primacy between forest and metal exports.499
496 Schön 2000, 476–478
497 Dahmén 1963, 43
498 Ibid., 42–51. These institutional issues include e.g. solidary wage policy and import regulation.
499 Miikkulainen 1989, 13–14; Fagerberg 1987, 94
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Chart 5. Export Diversification in Nordic Countries in 1962–2010
Notes: The diversification index does not only account for diversity of products, but also that of trading partners. The
scale is inverted: an index score of 0 reflects totally diversified exports and higher scores reflect increased
concentration. Norway’s increasing concentration of exports after 1973, for example, likely relates to its oil exports.
Source: IMF Diversification Toolkit; see also IMF 2014 for a more in-depth discussion of export diversification.
While Maliranta noted that both Finland and Sweden had specialized in basic metal and
paper industries – and speculating that this was related to industry-specific know-how
and forming of forest and metal clusters – Sweden evidently developed its metal
engineering exports earlier than in Finland.500 Considering that Sweden was an important
source for forest resources in international markets – even more so than Finland in some
commodities – Finland could have developed metal exports to a similar degree.501 Of
course, it has to be admitted that Finnish and Swedish paper industries diverged when it
came to their product lines. Sweden ended up focusing on “brown paper” after the oil
crisis whereas Finland tended to produce paper grades that required more processing.502
Yet this does not preclude a growth in other export industries. Since basic metal and
engineering industries were established in Norway as well, I do not think that Swedish
metal exports would have supplied international demand to such an extent that a stronger
and earlier growth in metal engineering exports would have been impossible in Finland.
Here I think that a longer time-frame than the one found in this thesis is required.
It seems that Swedish metal exports developed in stronger terms than in Finland from the
first globalization period up to the Depression of the 1930s. While it is true that Finnish
500 Maliranta 1996, 95
501 Yates 1959, 119–120. Sweden outmatched Finland in its shares of global sawn softwood and wood pulp
exports in the 1950s.
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metal industry did exist in the interwar period, its exports were on a lower scale than in
Sweden. This is most likely related to the fact that metal exports were initially dependent
on Russian markets, which disappeared in the political aftermath of the First World War.
Perhaps this negative demand shock reverberated over the subsequent decades to the
extent that a positive one in the form of war reparations, and its continuation in Eastern
Trade, was required to increase the quality and technological standards, however modest,
of metal engineering industries to an internationally competitive level. Therefore, the
long-term development of metal engineering exports warrants further research.503
5.2 In Conclusion
The economic history of Finnish export structure, even if based on a framework of
economics, has been lacking in empirics. The few empirical studies concerning Finnish
export structure cover only slices of the post-war period and have refrained from using
approaches provided by econometrics. The novelty of this thesis lies not in simply
utilizing modern analytic tools however, although the approach here is also supported by
a variety of traditional statistical tools of economic history, but in discarding the
traditional but misleading measure of gross exports in favour of domestic value-added of
exports. From a purely economic perspective the attention devoted to institutional
features might be considered almost heterodox, but then again Dahmén had a somewhat
similar approach too in his day too.
The approach adopted here resulted in the following observations. First, it is evident that
that the post-war period should be separated to at least two periods. The export structure
of 1956–1970 was characterized by capital intensity related to the mechanization. There
are also some indications that skill intensity, or know-how, may have been important
during this time. The clear decline in the use of natural resources is conversely very
evident. This development does not only reflect the emergence of metal, chemical and
textile exports which were not dependent on forest resources, but also that forest
industries themselves became slightly less dependent on forestry’s inputs in the course of
the early post-war period.
In other words, Finnish industrial development at least concerning export structure was
no longer a product of “a single raw material” even if Haapala and Lloyd claim that this
503 See Schön 2000, 237–238 for a review of Swedish metal exports in 1890–1930 and Oksanen & Pihkala
1975; Pihkala 1969 for Finnish exports during the first globalization and the interwar periods.
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was the case in the entire 20th century. While Finland of the early 2000s still arguably
lives on exports, its livelihood had ceased to depend on forests by the year 1980. It is
quite revealing that the catchphrase, “Finland lives on forests”, originated in the 1980s
when resource intensity was no longer a determinant of export structure.
During the 1980s the determinants of export structure had changed – the conventional
factors of labour, natural resources, physical and human capital were no longer
explanatory. Scale advantage was the only measure during this time which had a positive
and a fairly robust relationship of with value-added of exports, but even there the proof
is less definite than what might be hoped for. Additionally, although previous research
gave grounds to hypothesize that product differentiation was a likely cause of export
structure, the opposite seems to have been the case. Finnish exports were relatively more
homogenous instead of being differentiated. Closer inspection revealed that this arises
from the distinct natures of Eastern and Western Trade.
While Western Trade was evidently homogenous and standardized, Eastern Trade was
somewhat more comprised of export products that were relatively differentiated by R&D.
While determining the nature of product differentiation is difficult, Western Trade seems
to have been more technologically differentiated in the 1980s. However, it has also been
claimed that Eastern Trade was relatively technologically advanced. This was indeed the
case, but more so in the early post-war period when number of innovations was a feature
of Eastern Trade. This finding supports the notion that Eastern Trade raised the
technological level of Finnish exports to a level competitive in the West, at least
considering metal engineering exports.
While the approach of this thesis was never concerned with explicit theory-testing, the
results indicate that the conventional Heckscher–Ohlin model of factor intensities was
explanatory in the early post-war period, but the Chamberlin–Heckscher–Ohlin model,
which adds economies of scale and product differentiation to the set of factors of
production, was not in the late post-war period. Far-reaching conclusions cannot be made
regarding this point, but the results suggest that a different model – or indeed models –
might be needed in order to characterize post-war export structure preceding the 1990s.
When considering this point, it might beneficial to remember Pat Hudson’s criticism that
the supply-side explanations dominate economic history excessively. The implications
that product cycle theory and demand-driven models may be important in analysing the
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Finnish post-war export structure – not least because Eastern Trade clearly affected trade
patterns – suggests that she may be right.
Adapting a cross-country perspective might be fruitful as well. A brief international
comparison of Nordic countries revealed similarities and dissimilarities in post-war
development.  One can witness the emergence of chemical industry in Nordic export
structure. Yet Finland’s relatively stagnant development of metal industries differs clearly
from their growth in Sweden. The Finnish metal engineering industries’ development was
clearly related to Eastern Trade, but a longer-term perspective is warranted. One should
consider not only Eastern Trade, but also the metal industries’ entire trajectory: their birth
in the context of Tsarist Russia, stagnation in the aftermath of the Revolutions of 1917
and resurgence in conjunction with war reparations to the Soviet Union. This
development may still hide unanswered questions.
And speaking of international developments, the findings in this thesis also highlight the
need to conceptually distance the arguments over a country’s position in the international
marketplace and the determinants of its export structure. By this I refer to the observation
that labour intensity’s negative association with exports is only statistically and
historically significant if time fixed effects are excluded. Including time effects largely
negates the impact labour intensity had on exports, which implies that the decline in the
use of unskilled labour was a general phenomenon in all industries alike. This certainly
would have had consequences for where Finland located in the global supply chains, but
from a strictly national, cross-industry perspective labour intensity did not have a clearly
negative or positive effect on exports.
Finally, there are grounds to believe that economic history of Finnish foreign trade should
not only focus on the macro-level of international or Nordic trade patterns, but also on
the micro-level. Modern empirical economic research is increasingly focused on products
and companies, but Finnish quantitative historians has not embarked on such a line of
inquiry as of yet.
The results of this thesis might be greatly altered if such research designs would be
adopted. The evidence here certainly suggests that Rodrik’s exhortation of understanding
economics as a collection of many models, applicable to only some settings and not in
others, must be appreciated. Finnish economic history cannot be studied with one model
alone, economic or not, quantitative or not. Despite the fact that foreign trade and
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industrial development have been the staple topics of Finnish economic history, much
work still remains to be done.
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6. Appendices: Data Sources and Conceptual Issues
6.1 The Industrial Classification System Used in this Thesis
Data collection was based on the industrial classification used in the input-output tables
of the 1980s.504 Due to differences in classification systems, the list had to be modified
in a few instances resulting in the following classification:
1. Agriculture AGR
2. Forestry and logging FOR
3. Fishing and hunting FIS
4. Metal ore mining ORE
5. Other mining OMI
6. Food manufacturing FOO
7. Manufacture of beverages and tobacco products BEV
8. Manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel, except footwear TEX
9. Manufacture of leather, fur garment, leather articles and footwear LEA
10. Manufacture of wood and cork products, including furniture WOF
10a. Manufacture of wood and cork products, excluding furniture WOO
10b. Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, excluding primarily of metal FUR
11. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard PAP
12. Printing, publishing and allied industries PRI
13. Manufacture of chemicals and other chemical products CHE
14. Petroleum refineries OIL
15. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products RUB
16. Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, except of petroleum and coal MIN
17. Basic metal industries MET
18. Manufacture of fabricated metal products and machinery MFM
18a. Manufacture of fabricated metal products FAB
18b. Manufacture of machinery MAC
19. Manufacture of electrical appliances, instruments and other precision equipment ELE
20. Manufacture of transport equipment TRE
21. Other manufacturing OTH
22. Electricity, gas and steam, waterworks and supply EGW
22a. Electricity, gas and steam EGS
22b. Waterworks and supply WAT
23. Building BUI
24. Other construction OCO
25. Trade TRD
26. Restaurants and hotels RES
27. Transport, storage and communications TRC
27a. Transport and storage TRA
27b. Communications COM
28. Financial institutions and insurance FIN
29. Letting and operating of dwellings and use of owner occupied dwellings DWE
30. Other real estate, business services, machinery and equipment rental and leasing BUS
31. Community, social and personal services CSP
504 See for example National accounts 1988:1, 10–11.
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While manufacturing of instruments and other precision equipment are appropriately
grouped among electrical appliances in the 1980s, it is more questionable to assign them
as electrical goods during the years 1956–1970. Therefore, instruments were classified
among “22. Other manufacturing” during these years, which creates a slight break in the
analysis. Additionally, since I–O tables for this earlier period included restaurants and
hotels as a part of personal services, the industry group had to be classified into “34.
Community, social and personal services” for the purposes of the panel covering the
entire time span of 1956–1989. The I–O tables of 1956–1970 classified manufacture of
machinery and fabricated metal products separately, but they were also combined in most
cases.
6.2 Data Sources and Concepts
General Notes on Input-Output Tables and Systems of Classification
A general issue with all statistical sources used in this thesis arises from the fact that
industrial classifications changed more than once during the post-war period. All of the
compiled series could not be classified in a systematic manner, since input-output (I–O)
tables’ input-coefficients, used in calculating factor intensities, were in some cases too
aggregate to allow for reclassification. Within those boundaries and as a rule, all the data
across industries was compiled to match the classification system used in input-output
tables of the 1980s. Some measurement error is still likely to arise from different
classification systems, but this cannot be avoided fully. The statistical sources, on the
other hand, can be considered to be of good quality, since most of them are from
publication of Statistics Finland and the Official Statistics of Finland.
The input-output tables compiled by Statistics Finland cover the years 1956, 1959, 1965,
1970, 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1989. It has been noted that due to poorer information
available in those times, the input-output tables of 1959, and by the same reasoning those
of 1956 as well, are not as reliable as or fully comparable with later input-output tables.505
A case in point might be that the input-output table of 1959 does not include data on
service exports, other than that of insurance, or industries approximately comprising
industrial groups 31. - 34.506 Therefore service export figures for these groups were added
on the basis of balance of payments data from Bank of Finland and I–O tables of 1965.507
Additionally, the I–O tables of 1956 were published on a more aggregated industry level
than the other I–O publications. To ensure compatibility between 1956 and the other
years, but without diminishing the sample size, disaggregated estimates for metal ore
mining and other mining, textile and clothing, leather and footwear, rubber and plastic
product, other manufacturing and letting and operating of dwellings, real estate and
business service and community, social and personal service industries were calculated
on the basis of I–O tables of 1959 and 1965 alongside Industrial Statistics. The estimated
figures for value-added of exports are slightly different from those calculated with the
original values. Usually the discrepancy is negligible, though there are noticeable
differences in textile, clothing, leather and footwear manufacturing and in transportation
services – the new figures are larger by approximately 7% and 11% respectively.
However, on an aggregate level the value-added of exports is only one percent larger
when compared with the original data.
505 Ahde 1990, 28
506 Forssell 1965, 45. Note that input-output studies are listed in statistical sources rather than in literature.
507 See Airikkala et al. 1976 for Bank of Finland data.
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In conclusion, the estimates on the basis of disaggregated 1956 data are reliable enough
though one must exercise due caution in interpreting the results for transportation, textile
and clothing and leather and footwear industries in 1956, which are likely to be
overestimated to some extent. Generally speaking though, since the input-output data are
cross-sections, they might be biased by shocks and developments that took place during
those specific years. Pihkala noted that the amount of exports declined in 1956 and 1982
and prices of exports in 1956 and 1959. In 1985 and 1989 the amount of exports did not
increase either. It is certainly possible that these business cycles affect the results of this
thesis, but the availability of data does not allow for alternatives. The year 1956 might be
especially problematic due to the general strike of that year, but I will discuss why the
bias might not be large in the section concerning labour data.508
On Deflating
The data gathered for the thesis was denominated in nominal values. To nullify the effect
of inflation, all the monetary factors were deflated with producer price indices, with
original base year of 1949, calculated by Statistics Finland. Export prices were deflated
with the export price index, imports with the import price index and most of the other
factors with the wholesale price index. The foreign trade indices only include data on
commodity trade with the result that service trade values are not wholly trustworthy,
except for trade and transportation industries, which revolve around commodities. The
wholesale price index does not account for services either. This is a consequence of the
difficulty in defining services, which can be quite unique, and appraising their value,
which can be prone to change drastically in a short time.509
Wholesale price index for domestic products was ultimately chosen as a deflator in most
cases, since the focus here is on supply-side characteristics of private sector and not on
consequences for consumers reflected by the consumer price index. There are alternative
producer prices indices however, such as producer price index for manufactured products,
but it does not cover the primary sector like the wholesale price index.
However, wages and physical capital were handled in a different manner as I suspected
that wholesale price index had better alternatives, though all of them are Statistics
Finland’s price indices. Wage sums were deflated with the consumer price index since it
corresponds more accurately with the notion that wages are compensation for labour.
Physical capital was deflated by first dividing it to two parts: that pertaining to
construction and that to machinery and transport equipment. Construction capital was
deflated with the building cost index whereas machinery and transport equipment capital
was deflated with the wholesale price index for domestic and imported machinery goods,
including both electrotechnical goods and transport equipment.
Note that excluding electrotechnical goods would raise the value of machinery and
transport equipment.510 Since the electrotechnical industry emerged during the late post-
war period, I opted not exclude its price development here. Regardless, it should be noted
that the actual levels of capital might be underestimated here. However, this is not
necessarily an issue for this thesis since the potential bias does not alter the value of
industries’ machine capital relative to other industries.
508 Pihkala 2001, 246
509 Aulin-Ahmavaara 2007, 92–93
510 This is likely related to the drastic price reductions in ICT products noted by Aulin-Ahmavaara. See
Aulin-Ahmavaara 2007, 92.
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Then again, index series tend to follow each other closely so the choice of one index over
the other does not likely change the results significantly.511 More problematic is that, since
all data disaggregated by industry are deflated with the same aggregate index, industrial
price differences are implicitly disregarded. The producer price index series for
manufactured products does reveal that different industries could differ significantly –
e.g. with 1949 = 100 manufacture of transport equipment has an index score of 1411 and
manufacture of electrical machinery that of 938. However, this index series does not cover
all the manufacturing industries disaggregated for the purposes of this thesis and lacks
most notably any information on chemical industries. While average index scores could
be used to proxy price changes in these cases, the resulting panel data could be
noncomparable in an unpredictable way. Therefore, I prefer to use a single index series
as a deflator for simplicity’s sake, unless otherwise mentioned.512
Labour
Labour intensity of production is measured with one million hours worked in a given
industry – a measure that is preferable to using the number of employees, for instance.
Number of hours worked takes into account part-time work, different lengths of
workdays, and also Finland’s gradual move into a five-day working week from 1966 to
the beginning of 1970,513 that the number of employees would not. The number of
working hours include all employees, not just wage-earners or manual labour. While
manual or unskilled labour reflects labour intensity relative to human capital, as skilled
labour, the difference between salaried employees and wage-earners is not clear-cut, and
there is not enough data on primary and tertiary sectors for such measures.
The input-output tables for 1982, 1985 and 1989 include data on working hours. While
Statistics Finland also has figures for the same period, it follows a revised industrial
classification. Due to possible misclassification, data from input-output tables was used.
Hours worked by industry for the years 1965, 1970 and 1980 was gathered from National
Accounts of Statistics Finland.514 The publication’s figures are revised, and thus
preferable. However, in some cases,515 the data was too aggregate and had to be estimated
to a more disaggregated level. This was done by constructing weights based on working
hours contained in PX-Web dataset of National Accounts of Statistics Finland for 1980.
For 1965 and 1970 weights were calculated from hours worked of wage-earners as
measured in Industrial Statistics. To the extent that working hours of salaried employees
differs from those of wage-earners, this creates some bias in the results.
The years 1956 and 1959 were the most problematic due to lack of data, since the old
National Accounts utilized working-year measures,516 which is not directly comparable
to working hours. In the case of manufacturing industries, it was assumed that hours
worked in total developed similarly to those of wage-earners calculated in Industrial
Statistics. As for primary and tertiary sectors, Pekka Tiainen’s data was used similarly,517
although since it also includes those employed not on the private sector, it had to be re-
estimated to include only private sector employees. The estimates were calculated with
511 Statistics Finland, Producer price indices [e-publication]; Lehtinen & Ranki 1988, 33–34
512 Statistics Finland, PX-Web databases, Prices and Costs, Producer price indices, Producer Price Indices
1949=100
513 Tiainen 1994, L28
514 National Accounts 1981, 1984
515 To be exact in those of mining, food, beverage and tobacco, chemical, petroleum refineries, rubber and
plastic products and fabricated metal products and machinery industries.
516 National Accounting in Finland in 1948–1964, Tables, 1968
517 Tiainen 1994, Table 9.
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proportions of private sector’s working hour figures relative to all sectors’ in the National
Accounts 1981 for the year 1960.
Finally, it should be noted that it is quite probable that the general strike of 1956 also
affects the data for that year, at least when it comes to labour. However, it has been argued
that the strike did not by itself alter the economic life of companies since the Baltic Sea
was frozen, stockpiles were full and the export markets were not booming.518 Other
factors than labour were probably not affected, though wage increases worsened the
economic situation and gave impetus for the devaluation of markka in 1957.519 Yet it is
likely that the decline in labour intensity over 1956–1989 would be even more dramatic
if the starting point would be different.
In conclusion, the working hour data can be considered to be reliable and also a
conceptually appropriate measure for labour intensity.
Physical Capital
Practically speaking capital refers to fixed equipment such as constructions and
machinery etc. but the concept of capital, and the question of how to measure it, is not
clear-cut. For simplicity’s sake, I will disregard the Cambridge controversies and other
theoretical debates and rely on the existing literature of national accounting in Finland.
However, the correct measure for capital is not as self-evident as in labour as even in
national accounting there are different concepts of capital stock. The usual ones are
calculated as the cumulative value of past investments: gross stock of fixed capital and
net stock of fixed capital.
The former concept supposes that fixed capital is valued “as good as new” even if
machines and constructions deteriorate in time. In other words, when using the gross
capital measure, one assumes that capital stock retains its full productive capacity up to
its expiration date. Net stock of fixed capital on the other hand, does not assume this. A
capital good is defined there as “the current purchaser’s price of a new asset of the same
type less the cumulated consumption of fixed capital” where the consumption refers to
loss of value due to “physical deterioration, normal obsolescence, normal accidental
damage and aging”.520 That depreciation of value is not simple to calculate and relies on
age-price profiles and even educated guesses.521
A preferred concept to net stock of capital would be that of capital services, since the net
stock reflects wealth more than productive capacity.522 Pirkko Aulin-Ahmavaara and
Jalava compare capital services to labour in the sense that the latter is “services” flowing
from human capital.523 While capital services would be the best concept for capital
intensity, there is no dataset to cover the time periods nor the industries for this thesis.
Therefore, I prefer net capital stock as the measure for capital intensity, since it accounts
for the age and deterioration.
The main source used was Statistics Finland’s publication “Stock of fixed capital 1960 –
1993: Tables” which includes revised figures on net capital stock. Age-profiles were
revised and moving averages of mileage for machinery used in manufacturing were
518 Mertanen 2004, 334
519 Mertanen 2004, 330–332
520 Jalava 2007, 60
521 Aulin-Ahmavaara 2007, 93–94; Jalava 2007, 55–56
522 Aulin-Ahmavaara 2007, 94
523 Jalava 2007, 61
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adopted. As in the case of working hours, the data was too aggregate in some cases,524
and lacking in 1956 and 1959. Weights based on Industrial Statistics’ data on value of
fixed capital was used to disaggregate these industries. This is admittedly a crude
approach, since the value of fixed capital in Industrial Statistics is priced according to fire
insurance value.525 For the years 1980–1989 I utilized Statistics Finland’s national
accounts’ time series of net capital stock in disaggregating these industries.526
For 1956 and 1959 auxiliary series were used with the assumption that their changes
relative to the year 1960 would correspond to those with the unobserved net capital stock
figures. Tiainen’s data on net capital stock was used to calculate estimates for primary
and tertiary sectors, while also correcting for non-private sector activities.527 Industrial
Statistics’ data on value of fixed capital was used to estimate changes in manufacturing
industries.
In conclusion, the net capital stock data is reliable enough at least for the years 1965–
1989 while there is some uncertainty concerning 1956 and 1959. However, the possible
measurement error is likely not too sizeable.
Human Capital
There are a variety of different measures for human capital, but none are entirely
satisfactory. R&D expenditure, a natural starting point, by industry assumes that research
and development require a great deal of skilled labour. The figures are based on Statistics
Finland’s publications from the series “Research activity” and “Yrityssektorin tutkimus-
ja kehittämistoiminta”. Since these were not published annually, the figures for 1971 are
used as a proxy for 1970, whereas the data across industries for 1980 and 1982 were
calculated as averages of 1979 and 1981, and 1981 and 1983, respectively. It should be
noted that all of these publications utilized company surveys, so the figures are less
reliable as those of national accounts. Not all companies reported all R&D expenditure
for example, which led Statistics Finland to estimate some figures. At any rate, the
response rate was quite high ranging from circa 81% – 92%, and if there was information
on non-responsive companies from past years that data was used instead.528 The rate for
1985 was only 75% though.529
Further estimates had to be calculated since the data on industries was often too
aggregated on certain years, when the publications relied more on product group
classifications. As a solution, disaggregated estimates of R&D expenditure by industries
for 1980 and 1982 were created based on cross-tabulation of R&D expenditure per
industries and product groups for 1985.530 Here I am assuming that the distribution of
R&D expenditure of product groups across industries was stable throughout 1980–1985,
which is not exactly accurate, but probably approximately so. For the year 1971 aggregate
product group figures was used to calculate estimates, since it was classified differently
than in the 1980s publications. The number of salaried employees, or office workers,
obtained from Industrial Statistics, was also used as an auxiliary series when product
group information was not as disaggregate as needed. Due to lack of better information,
524 To be exact in the case of mining, food, beverages and tobacco, textile and clothing, leather and shoe,
and other manufacturing and furniture industries.
525 See for example Industrial Statistics 1970, 14. Power installed measured in kilowatts was also used in
the case of 1956–1960 for disaggregating other manufacturing industry.
526 Statistics Finland, National Accounts in StatFin
527 See Tiainen 1994, Table 13.
528 See for example Koulutus ja tutkimus 1990:24, 3 and Research activity 1981, 7.
529 Liitetaulukot Tilastotiedotukseen KO 1986:13, 2
530 Tilastotiedotus KO 1986:13, Liitetaulukot, Table 5
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this is the most suitable approach, but one that does decrease the reliability of the figures
to some extent.
The lack of similar R&D data for 1956–1965 requires the calculation of another measure
that can be used to compare the entire time period. Additionally, there is some theoretical
uncertainty on the proper factor role of R&D expenditure, since it has been claimed that
it should be conceptually included in capital formation.531 It is also used to measure
product differentiation, as discussed later on.
As mentioned by Wright “it has become a standard convention in empirical trade studies
to take the relative industry wage as a proxy for skill requirements”.532 Indeed, average
wage rate might be a more appropriate proxy for skilled personnel in general than R&D
intensity, which is more reflective of scientific personnel. Wage sum data is available
throughout the period. For the years 1970–1989 wage sums were taken from Statistics
Finland’s national accounts data in StatFin database. As in the capital and working hour
series, National Accounts 1981 Time series for 1960–1981 was used to gather data for
the years 1965 and 1970. Tiainen’s long series and the old national accounts covering
1948–1964 were used for calculating the wage sums of 1956 and 1959, though in some
industries figures were corrected to private sector amounts based on data from “National
Accounts 1981”.533 Old national accounts’ wage sums in manufacturing were in some
cases disaggregated with weights calculated from wage data in Industrial Statistics.
Additionally, the wage-earner and wage sum series in industries BUS and CSP were
interpolated for 1956 and 1959 based on statistics relating to private services.534
Wage sums were divided by working hours per industry, so the measure for human capital
intensity is the average wage per hour. However, the data on working hours used for
labour intensity was not used here, since it includes also data on entrepreneurs’ working
hours. Since they are not wage-earners, including their working hours can bias the results
by entrepreneur/employee -ratios across industries. For this reason, only working hour
data of wage-earners was used. The data sources are the same as the ones used in
calculating labour intensity except that the data covering 1980–1989 was obtained from
Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
A conceptual and empirical problem with wage rates is that they do not simply reflect
skill levels in the presence of high rates of unionization. If some industries were both
export-driven and highly unionized, interpretation of wage rates will be misleadingly
high. There is published data on membership of different unions in up to 1988,535 but
classifying unionization rates by ISIC cannot be done reliably. Unionization was
measured by dividing the trade union members by all employees in a given industry.
Admittedly, the measure is uncertain, but a better approach would require a more
comprehensible dataset.
Since the data on the level of union membership is not accurate, one cannot make strong
statements on the possible biases here. One would expect that wage rates in 1959 are more
reliable reflections of human capital than those in 1989, since union membership was less
common in the 1950s. Paper and woodworking production had similar unionization rates
throughout the post-war era, and on a larger scale than in the manufactures of metal,
531 Aulin-Ahmavaara 2007, 95
532 Wright 1990, 654
533 Tiainen 1994; National Accounts 1981, 1984; National Accounting in Finland 1948–1964 – Tables,
1968
534 See Kaartinen 1970.
535 Yli-Pietilä et al. 1990
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textile and chemistry production. This would imply that the high wage rate of paper
manufacturing in 1989 could be partially a result of trade unions’ bargaining power. It is
likewise possible that woodworking manufacturing’s wages should have been even
lower. Since textile manufacturing seems to have had a higher unionization rate than other
new exports industries in 1989, it is likely possible that its low wage rate also corresponds
with low levels of human capital, though gender of its employees may affect results. As
chemistry and food manufacturing had a relatively similar rate of unionization – the
difference in favour of chemical industry – chemical industry’s rate of human capital is
likely true as well. Metal industries tended to have a relatively high union membership
ratio, except for basic metal industry. However, some of its employees might have been
members in trade unions assigned into metal engineering industries.
Another potential pitfall in wage rates is that there may be a systematic down pressure on
wages of the female workforce. The measure here is calculated as the share of female
employees relative to all employees in a given industry. If such there is a gender bias,
industries with a relatively high ratio of female employees, but a standard level of human
capital, will have lower wages creating a false impression of lower rate of skill intensity.
The same applies to the opposite where a high ratio of male employees results in higher
wages. In order to counter this effect, the share of female employees was calculated on
the basis of general economic censuses of 1953 and 1964 and population censuses of 1950
and 1960 with Statistics Finland’s publication “Economic activity and housing conditions
of the population” containing data for 1970–1990.536
The data concerning the share of women is more accurate than the unionization data. It is
undoubtedly the case that the employees in textile industries were mostly women. Same
can be said of retail and wholesale trade. Conversely, in forest industries the share of
female employees was generally less than 30% and such was also the case in transport
and communications. While the paper industry’s relatively high average wage rate could
be related to its predominantly male workforce, this seemingly was not the case in
woodworking industry.
In metal industries, with the exception of electrotechnical industry, the share of women
was less than 20%. The lack of female workers in these industries perhaps explains why
their wage rates tended to be higher than in ELE, but in comparison with the median of
manufacturing industries these industries’ wage rates do not stand out. This suggests that
gender was not a primary source of wage differences between them and other industries.
Chemical and business and other real estate service industries’ – both relatively high wage
industries – workforce was also more masculine than feminine, but to a lower degree than
in metal or forest industries. While agriculture was also relatively balanced in this respect,
forestry workers were predominantly male, which might explain the higher wage rate in
the latter relative to the former.
The question of how gender interacted with wage rates in the post-war period cannot be
solved here, but one can draw some conclusions here. Gender was not probably the main
source of wage differences across industries, but its effect may have been large in textile
industries for example. Jari Eloranta and Matti Hannikainen have also noted that services
tended to employ a lot of women as well.537 However, the wage gap was also a product
of human capital differences among men and women.538 One could make a similar
536 See OSF: Population 1995:6
537 Eloranta & Hannikainen 2018 (unpublished), 13
538 Hannikainen & Heikkinen 2006, 170
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statement regarding unionization where high wage rates of paper industry may have been
influenced by bargaining power of trade unions, but a general impact remains uncertain.
It should also be mentioned that Finnish post-war wages were affected by so-called “wage
solidarity” where wage differences across industries were curtailed. This most likely
diminished labour flows into more productive sectors, since a wage-earner would not earn
a higher premium in another industry. Thus, it is probable that wage differences observed
are smaller than the differences in true skill intensity across industries. Average wage rate
could be interpreted as “lower bounds” of skill intensity, although wage increases in
unproductive industries may just reflect wage solidarity as well.539
A third method for measuring human capital, is the number of officials and clerks, or
salaried employees. This measure, used for example by Heikkinen in a study concerning
the decades preceding the First World War, assumes that an industry with high technical
requirements also requires educated personnel.540 While the assumption that production
workers have a lesser skill-set rather than office workers is most likely accurate in the
beginning of the 1900s, it is more questionable in modern times, when non-manual
occupations can be relatively monotonous and lower-paying than manual ones.541 For this
reason and for the fact that there is not enough data on office workers for primary and
tertiary sectors – data on manufacturing can be located in Industrial Statistics – hourly
wage rate controlled by unionization is the preferable measure.
In conclusion, average wage rate per hour is used throughout the post-war period to
measure skill intensity. R&D expenditure is perhaps preferable to wage rate in inspecting
technological skills, but it is less reliable due to possible measurement error caused by
estimated figures. Wage rate is a good measure insofar as unionization and gender
variables capture their respective possible biases on wage rates. Share of office workers
is only used as an auxiliary series to reinforce findings of these two measures.
Natural Resources
Possible conceptual issues related to natural resources in H–O framework have already
been mentioned and discarded in the light of importance that this factor likely had for
Finnish export performance. While Varian simply uses share of material inputs relative
to gross output as a measure for natural resources,542 this does not account for all the
indirect use of natural resources. Therefore, the intensity of natural resources is measured
for the purposes of this thesis by the proportion of value-added created in primary sector
industries for export demand relative to all value added necessary for export demand. The
industries include agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining. These figures are obtained
from calculating domestic value-added embodied in exports and can be considered as
reliable as the input-output tables used in this thesis – that is very reliable.
Scale Advantage
Scale advantage is not only hard to measure but intraindustry trade studies have also had
mixed results concerning its empirical validity, which means that any measure here
should be treated with due caution. Regardless, Parjanne recommends average plant size
as the best proxy for scale advantage due to its simplicity, and in her estimated regression
model, it is statistical significance and has the expected sign. Theoretically the measure
is associated with product standardization and homogeneity – and it is negatively
539 See Dahmén 1963, 44 for a discussion of wage solidarity.
540 Heikkinen 1997, 94
541 See Yli-Pietilä et al. 1990, 4, 150–151.
542 Varian 2017, 120
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correlated with product differentiation even if NTT assumes that the existence of
economies of scale is important for intra-industry trade. Thus, scale economies can be an
independent rationale for trade as well. Parjanne measures average plant size in the
following manner:543
= 	
That is, the value-added of an industry is divided by its number of establishments. While
Parjanne studies average plant size, my thesis concerns also primary and tertiary
production. Therefore, I use and refer to establishment data. The distinction between
plants and establishments is not great in manufacturing though. Intuitively if a certain
industry has a lower number of establishments than the other but with same value-added,
establishments must be on a larger scale. On the other hand, Leamer and Levinsohn have
criticized the variable as having no theoretical relationship with economies of scale that
are a feature of New Trade Theory.544
Using establishment data from Industrial Statistics can be misleading since value-added
data from input-output tables takes into account small-scale industries.545 On the basis of
comparing data in Industrial Statistics and general economic census of 1964, Industrial
Statistics seem to contain data only concerning large companies. In other words, only
30% of all establishments in general economic consensus were covered by Industrial
Statistics, but the data covered 94% of both the number of personnel and the value of
sales of the census. Yet there are wide disparities in sectors – paper industry is well
covered by Industrial Statistics, but textile industries are not. Therefore, average
establishment size is overemphasized if one uses Industrial Statistics and the data on
manufacturing would not be comparable with that of primary and tertiary sectors gained
from other sources. Thus, I prefer the general economic censuses and company registers
that cover all sectors, as source material.
The data for scale advantage is gathered from general economic censuses of 1953 and
1964 as well as published company register data of Statistics Finland from 1972, 1980,
1982, 1986 and 1989. That is, the data for 1956 is proxied by 1952 figures, 1965 by 1964,
1970 by 1972 and 1985 by 1986. I do not expect that scale advantage would change
drastically in a few years, but this does create at least a small measurement error.
Additionally, I calculated estimates of average plant size for the year 1959 for mining,
manufacturing and energy industries based on the data from Industrial Statistics of the
same year. The number of establishments and gross value of production for each industry
were weighted based on coverage ratios of Industrial Statistics relative to general
economic census of 1964.546
Despite being preferable to Industrial Statistics, general economic censuses still have
incomplete data on some industries, such as agriculture, forestry and community, social
and personal services.547 The number of establishments might be underestimated insofar
as small-scale services were not covered by the census.548 However, the statistical
material itself was inspected thoroughly and can be considered to be reliable.549 General
543 Parjanne 1992, 131, 134
544 Leamer & Levinsohn 1995, 1378
545 See for instance Statistical Surveys N:o 59, 67 or Forssell 1965, 110.
546 Industrial Statistics of Finland: Volume I 1968, Table A
547 OSF XXXV:1 Volume 3, 9–15
548 See e.g. OSF XXXV:2 Volume 3, 19
549 OSF XXXV:1 Volume 1, 10–12
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economic censuses are comparable to company register data when it comes to
establishments, if not enterprises, with the exception of wholesale trade.550
There are some empirical issues in the company register data beginning in the 1970s. For
example, the data includes companies that were subject to sales tax, which possibly biases
the series, although the number of establishments also includes those which practiced
sales tax-exempt entrepreneurship.551 There was a continuous attempt to improve the
coverage of enterprise data to include not only sales taxable companies, but all units
engaged in entrepreneurship, which means that the series is not systematic.552 Although
the data for 1972–1982 covers manufacturing and certain service industries almost
entirely, the publication calls for caution in interpreting other industries.553 The coverage
of agriculture and forestry was still rather poor in the 1986 and 1989 publications, but
services can be deemed mostly satisfactory.554
In 1986 a revised industrial classification, TOL1988, was adopted which creates a break,
although the publication for 1986 still included figures according to old TOL1979 which
was used here.555 Although industrial classification systems are still fairly similar, the
manner of classifying the main industry of multi-industrial enterprises was revised as
well,556 which solidifies the difference between the data for 1989 and the rest of the series.
The most significant difference between 1982 and 1986 is an over tenfold increase in the
number of establishments in forestry, from 98 to 1053 establishments, with marginal
differences in the labour force of forestry – such a decentralization strikes me as highly
unlikely to arise from real developments. The forestry data must be interpreted with
caution, since it is not clear what causes the break in the series – the collection guidelines
actually incorporate smaller enterprises in 1982 than in 1986.557 It is possible that prior
to 1986, the series only includes forestry activities of manufacturing companies as in the
census of 1953.558 There were other major discrepancies on industries across time in
primary and tertiary sectors as well. As a result, most of the industries that were noted by
Statistics Finland as having low coverage were removed from the regression dataset with
the exception of 1986 and 1989 data.
Another source of incompatibility is that the years 1972 and 1980 include auxiliary
establishments, such as storages, personnel offices or transport sections, in the total
number of establishments.559 While auxiliary establishments could have been added to
the rest of the company register data, I opted not to, since the general economic censuses
of 1953 and 1964 tended to incorporate these auxiliary establishments in the main
establishments unless they were in different municipalities.560 At any rate, the number of
auxiliary establishments seems to have been low, so this is a minor issue.561 Additionally,
data on metal ore mining was missing for the years 1972 and 1980 and estimates were
550 Tilastotiedotus YR 1976:4, 8
551 See Tilastotiedotus YR 1982:22, 11.
552 Tilastotiedotus YR 1985:5, 4
553 See Tilastotiedotus YR 1985:5, 5.
554 OSF: Enterprises 1988:8, 10
555 OSF: Enterprises 1988:8, 6
556 OSF: Enterprises 1988:8, 8
557 OSF: Enterprises 1988:8, 9; Tilastotiedotus YR 1985:5, 5
558 See OSF XXXV:1 Volume 3.
559 Tilastotiedotus YR 1985:5, 5
560 OSF XXXV:2 Volume 1, 32; OSF XXXV:1 Volume 1, 9
561 OSF: Enterprises 1988:8, 15
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calculated on the basis of Industrial Statistics and its coverage ratio of company register
data concerning the year 1982.
In conclusion, incompatibility and coverage issues create statistical breaks and
measurement errors in the data for scale advantage. On the other hand, the data covers a
wide range of industries and was compiled by official statisticians and with evident
expertise. Although the approach here is preferable to the most obvious alternative of
using Industrial Statistics, and it utilizes the best data available, the results cannot be
interpreted without due caution.
Product Differentiation
Although conceptually important in New Trade Theory, product differentiation is one of
the hardest variables to measure for the purposes of this thesis. Parjanne notes that there
are not many satisfactory proxies for it, but marketing and R&D expenditure are often
used. Even they have some conceptual issues though. Marketing could be an outcome of
product differentiation as well as its cause. Furthermore, there is some uncertainty
whether its intensity is a fundamental requirement for only strictly non-durable
consumption goods instead of investment goods, even if there have been studies where
advertising has been statistically significant in the latter case.
As for R&D expenditure, even disregarding technological differentiation, it can be related
to vertical or horizontal differentiation. While the latter is the key concept in NTT, it has
been suggested that R&D inputs only reflect it up to a certain threshold after which R&D
intensity corresponds with technological differentiation which is negatively associated
with IIT. Yet the choice of measures is constricted here by the availability of data more
so than conceptual appropriateness – a problem shared by R&D studies in general.562
R&D expenditure by industries and product groups were gathered to calculate human
capital intensity, which can be used as a measure for product differentiation too.
Conceptually this might mix up the interpretation of human capital and product
differentiation and H–O and NTT models to some extent. Yet since this thesis is not
focused on testing theories but on empirics, this is not too problematic as long as possible
correlation between them is kept in mind. Since product differentiation refers more to
nature of products rather than the nature of industries, R&D expenditure based on product
group data is preferable here. That product group data was scaled by industry size
however.
The other statistical source for research-oriented product differentiation were the
SFINNO and H-INNO datasets of innovations that cover the entire post-war period.563
Here the primary factor is the number of innovations by industry, which is a cruder
measure than R&D expenditure. Also, there is a break in the series, since SFINNO data
for 1985 and 1989 utilized company surveys. On the other hand, only innovations that
were classified into industries in SFINNO were included in the data here – there were no
innovations without classification in H-INNO. The total number of innovations was
substantially larger in 1985 and 1989, which is likely partly due to the switch in data
collection techniques. Since the two biases go into opposite directions, the innovation
activities of the late 1980s will not be overblown, and the series is comparable supposing
that some industries were systematically more likely not have innovations classified in
the SFINNO. The number of innovations is focused on manufacturing though. While
562 Parjanne 1992, 88–91
563 See Saarinen 2005.
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primary sector’s products were not necessarily differentiated, the same cannot be said
about services. Marketing might be a more suitable type of expenditure there.
Yet marketing expenditure is a factor that is more problematic to measure. Parjanne
utilized unpublished data from Markkinatutkimus Oy for 1985,564 but considering that
this company does not exist anymore, there is no possibility for collecting data for earlier
years.565 Statistics Finland has a publication related to marketing expenditure by
industries, but only for the year 1985.566 As a result, marketing intensity cannot be studied
in thesis in detail, although it can be examined for 1985 with Parjanne’s disaggregated
data.567
In conclusion, product differentiation is the most troublesome factor when it comes to
measurement. R&D expenditure and number of innovation series are not without
problems and are likely to disregard developments in services. At any rate, within the
scope of this thesis there are no better alternatives due to lack of proper data.
Monopolistic Competition
The measure for monopolistic competition was a tricky one to construct. Empirical work
on monopolistic competition tends to use share of five largest companies’ sales in an
industry as a proxy for its level of concentration. The rationale is that a high level of
product differentiation in an industry ought to correspond with low levels of
concentration, or a high number of firms in the n-5 group. However, the concentration
variable – popular measure or not – does not actually reveal the number of firms in that
category nor does it take into account relative market positions. And a low level of
concentration can reflect perfect, not monopolistic, competition. Hjerppe criticizes this
ratio as unsuitable for long-term studies, since it usually just illustrates a truism that small
markets tend to be more concentrated. In other words, as the number of companies rise
so too will concentration ratios decline by default.568
Parjanne, on the other hand, argues that concentration measures tend to be correlated with
each other, and therefore the choice between measures is not too critical. She uses
unpublished data of Industrial Statistics to construct a three-firm concentration ratio, but
this approach was considered too time-consuming for the purposes of this thesis. Another
source that was considered is the turnover data in the series “The… Largest Companies
in Finland” and “Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt”, but it was deemed to be unsuitable for
a concentration measure. A serious problem here is that the largest Finnish companies
throughout the post-war period were multi-industrial conglomerates and using their data
would clearly inflate the concentration ratio for many industries. These companies’
departmental or establishment data could be gathered, but this would be too time-
consuming as well.569
It is worth pointing out here that in a textbook model of intraindustry trade neither
monopolistic competition nor concentration ratio actually cause intraindustry trade.
Rather monopolistic competition, or a market with many companies with some market
564 Parjanne 1992, 202
565 https://www.kauppalehti.fi/yritykset/yritys/markkinatutkimus+oy/01113365 (27.3.2018)
566 See Tilastotiedotus KO 1987:16.
567 Parjanne 1992, Appendix 5
568 Parjanne 1989, 92–94; Hjerppe 1979, 17. See Hjerppe 1979, 15–17 for a succinct overview of
concentration measures.
569 Parjanne 1989, 92–94. Take for example, chemical industry where many forest companies also engaged
in sulphite spirit production that might be classified as chemical production. Based on Industrial Statistics
of 1959, sulphite spirit production only accounted for 1.2% of chemical production.
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power, is a result of product differentiation. The nature of differentiated products ensures
that companies in a given industry enjoy some ability to set their own prices, and that
there are many companies instead of a monopoly. Thus, product differentiation should
coincide empirically with low barriers of entry and many companies, and a concentration
ratio of n companies’ factor relative to total is not the obvious measure.570
Hjerppe herself uses number of employees as a criterion for the size of companies, and
maintains that it and gross value of production or value-added tend to be highly correlated
with each other. The number of employees is a superior criterion compared to the
monetary ones, since it is not affected by inflation – for example the Industrial Statistics’
data on different levels of value-added is not comparable over time for this reason.571
Conversely, she does note that using the number of employees by itself is not an adequate
measure, since large companies tend to be relatively more capital intensive than labour
intensive, which can unduly deflate a labour-based concentration ratio.572
For the purposes of this thesis, an ad hoc concentration ratio was calculated on the basis
of number of employees in large establishments relative to all employees in an industry.
A large establishment is defined as having as much as or more than 200 employees on its
payroll, which is the closest rank to Statistics Finland’s definition of a company that is
not a small or medium sized enterprise.573 The measure is calculated as follows:
= 	
Where  is number of employees in establishments employing more than 199 or 200
personnel and 	is the total number of employees, both in a given industry.574 The
advantages of this measure, collected from Statistical Yearbooks of Finland, is that it is
consistent over time, although the industrial classification system changes twice in 1980
and 1989. Conceptually this measure captures high barriers of entry, though the question
of number of companies is less than certain. The measure should be negatively correlated
with the number of companies as a low employment share of large establishments should
reflect a large number of small and medium sized companies. Of course an industry could
still be concentrated into five or ten large establishments, which have differentiated
products, so the measure is not perfect by any means.
There are a number of possible issues with the measure. The effect of fusions, which were
numerous at least in 1949–1975,575 are only captured if they increase the number of
employees in large-scale establishments relative to small or medium-sized ones. Another
is that the measure is susceptible to the capital intensity bias noted by Hjerppe, which
570 See Feenstra & Taylor 2012, 170–177
571 Hjerppe 1979, 15
572 Hjerppe 1979, 15
573 https://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/pienet_ja_keski.html (4.4.2018). The major difference is that the definition
used in the thesis only refers to employees and disregards turnover or gross output levels.
574 Beginning in the year 1970 the number of employees is measured as 49 or fewer due to change in the
classification used by the Statistical Yearbooks. It is also uncertain if the figures include small-scale
handicraft manufacturing employing less than five persons, which is not measured by Industrial Statistics.
See e.g. Industrial Statistics 1956, 7–8. On the other hand, the fact that the tables explicitly give a starting
point of one and refer to additional sources argues for the opposite case. See e.g. Statistical Yearbook of
Finland 1961, 422.
575 Hjerppe 1979, 67
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refers to large companies saving labour through capital.576 Even in that case, the labour-
ratio can be interpreted as a lower bound of the actual phenomenon. At any rate, I stress
that the conceptual importance of this measure is in the number of small companies and
in low barriers of entry rather than simply market power proxied by concentration ratio.
The main problem with the labour-ratio of large establishments is the implicit assumption
that establishments correspond with companies. It is possible that a single company has
more than one small establishment in the same industry. However, using establishment
data solves the multi-industrial conglomerate problem, since these large companies’
market power is proxied only by the amount of personnel they have in large-scale
establishments in the industry in question.
As a result, the labour-ratio of large establishments is not a perfect measure for
monopolistic competition. It does not measure market power of large companies, or the
lack thereof, adequately, but it does quantify the low amount of companies and especially
high barriers of entry better than the usual concentration ratio of n companies.
Eastern Trade
The motivation for Eastern Trade was to control for potential distortions of trade with
communist economies in models assuming perfect competition. Note that Eastern Trade
refers only to exports, not exports and imports. The level of these exports’ confounding
effect was measured by calculating the share of so-called Eastern group countries’ exports
out of total exports.577
= 	
Where the denominator reflects the sum of gross exports to communist economies and
the numerator total gross exports, each by a given industry. The data was collected from
official foreign trade statistics gathered by Finnish Customs.578 While the numbers can be
viewed as reliable, there is only information on commodity exports. As a result, one
implicitly has to assume that there were no service exports to the East. While one might
object based on so-called project exports to the Soviet Union, it seems that they were
classified into different commodity categories, machinery in particular, in the foreign
trade data here.579
Official foreign trade publications classified exports and imports for the 1980s according
to the industrial classification system, but not during the prior decades. Therefore, exports
had to be classified into industries with data either on the product group level for 1956
and 1959 or on the product level for 1965 and 1970. The data concerning the 1950s is
therefore less reliable due to being more aggregated. Furthermore, despite the
correspondence between trade data, classified as Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, and
industrial data, classified more or less according to the Standard Industrial Classification,
being a standard issue in historical trade studies, there is no published correspondence
table available. Therefore, a correspondence table had to be constructed for the purposes
576 On the basis of eyeballing the data, this does not seem to constitute a major issue, since there are not
many industries with high capital intensity and a high ratio of employees in small establishments, though
the energy industry could be a case like this.
577 The countries in question are Albania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Mongolia and North Vietnam / Vietnam. The list was
determined on the basis of official foreign trade statistics. See OSF I A: 1988 Volume 2, 5.
578 OSF I A: 1956–1989
579 OSF I A: 1988 Volume 2, 45
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of classifying exports during 1956–1970, but it is probably not identical with the one
official statisticians used for classifying foreign trade in the input-output tables or in the
figures published in the foreign trade statistics of the 1980s.
An additional issue with the data regarding the 1980s was that it was too aggregated. As
a solution estimates following the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) were
calculated on the basis of disaggregated data following the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature
(BTN) for certain industries.580 In other cases unit price and volume indices were used to
calculate current price series with the help of archived statistical data.581 The archival
material consisted of the original Board of Customs data, concerning exports across
industries and countries for 1975, obtained from the National Archives of Finland.582
While this procedure created some measurement error, the resulting series corresponded
very closely with the series of exports across industries in 1980–1985 which was obtained
from the archive of the Board of Customs.583 The archival data obtained from Board of
Customs lacked figures for exports across industries and countries so it was not possible
to calculate measures for Eastern Trade on its basis.
In conclusion, the ratio of Eastern Trade to total exports can be viewed as reliable and as
broadly comparable throughout the period. The lack of service exports is likely not to be
a problem since there is no evidence that it was an important factor in Eastern Trade.
Tariff Rates and Customs Barriers
The level of protectionism by industries was calculated through the same official foreign
trade statistics publications as in Eastern Trade. Since the tables for 1956–1980 use the
same BTN classification system as product group data used in Eastern Trade, the same
correspondence table was used to classify tariffs into industrial classification.
However, the problem with the published statistics of tariff rates is that only the most
important tariffs are listed. The discrepancy between the sum of showcased data and total
tariffs is not great, but I have scaled up the calculated series to match the total tariff
level.584 Here I assume that the sectoral differences in the samples in official foreign trade
publications reflect the actual differences in tariff levels industry-wise.
The published data for 1982–1989 switched to using HS classification, which is similar
to BTN in many respects. However, since the product group data was too aggregated to
reclassify the figures according to industrial classification, weights based on 1980 data
were used to disaggregate the data for the latter years.
However, nominal tariff rates do not account for the effects tariffs have on input prices.
Using effective rate of protection arises from the need to quantify how tariffs alter the
production costs of the industrial value-chain. Kauppila defines effective rate of
protection as “the percentage addition made possible by the existence of the tariff to the
580 To be exact foodstuff and beverage and tobacco industries and metal ore mining and other mining
industries. Certain instruments were reclassified into electrotechnical goods.
581 These industries included oil industry, rubber and plastic industries, other machinery and chipboard
production.
582 National Archives of Finland: Tullihallitus, Kcaa Vientitilastot kategorioittain, 1974-1978, Kcaa:4,
Viennin kategoriat maittain I-XII 1975
583 E.g. Archives of the Board of Customs: Tullihallitus, Vienti toimialoittain, Vienti tammi - joulukuu
1980.
584 For example, in 1959 the sum of disaggregated customs duties covered 81% of all customs duties
collected, but in 1956 the same ratio was 89%. See OSF I A: 1959, Appendix 5 and See OSF I A: 1956,
Appendix 5.
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value-added of the domestic industry, with prices at free-trade levels”.585 It reflects the
immediate increase in domestic prices and imported inputs due to tariff policy. It follows
that a higher degree of value-added, or a lower degree of input use, makes an industry
more resistant to increases in tariff rates. A higher nominal tariff rate increases an
industry’s output price and value-added by the same amount, but a tariff-driven increase
in input prices makes production costlier. Since value-added can in simple terms be
defined as the difference between output and inputs, costlier inputs reflect lower value-
added and lower effective rate of protection.586
−	∑
1 − ∑
In order to compare his interwar tariff rates with post-war rates, I follow Kauppila’s
approach who calculates the standard measure for effective rate of protection:587 Where
 is the nominal tariff rate, measured by the value of collected duties relative to the value
of imports in a given industry,588  is the final product industry and  is likewise the
nominal tariff rate for any input industry of industry . The input coefficients for that
industry are reflected by , though it should be noted that these include both domestic
and imported inputs rather than only domestic ones as in rest of this thesis. Kauppila
modifies this standard equation by weighting the nominal tariff rates by proportion of
domestic sales by industry to correct the unchanging export prices, which is done here as
well by taking the proportion of gross exports of total gross output and subtracting it from
one.589
585 Kauppila 2007, 66
586 Kauppila 2007, 66–67
587 Kauppila 2007, 66–67. See Kitson, Solomou & Weale 1991 for another approach.
588 Kauppila 2007, 138
589 Kauppila 2007, 66–67
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7. Appendices: Statistical Tables
Table A 1. Domestic Value-added of Exports in Finland 1956–1989, in Constant Prices
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 12.1 49.5 139.8 175.5 223.9 253.6 511.0 271.1
2. FOR 225.0 221.4 55.2 60.1 61.2 26.2 54.6 29.1
3. FIS 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.3 2.9 4.5 19.7 12.1
4. ORE 26.9 34.7 64.2 39.9 19.4 25.7 21.4 30.6
5. OMI 1.9 1.0 3.8 10.2 30.3 35.3 39.8 48.3
6. FOO 113.5 259.2 367.9 443.1 441.0 492.4 619.5 583.8
7. BEV 0.0 0.8 7.4 21.8 61.4 51.2 57.0 60.2
8. TEX 4.8 17.4 88.8 308.2 657.6 650.1 603.7 424.6
9. LEA 0.9 0.6 8.3 40.2 142.3 149.8 161.5 89.8
10. WOF 635.7 738.6 852.9 1 100.1 1 957.8 1 354.5 1 214.4 1 257.0
a. Woo 625.7 743.4 838.1 1 062.8 1 834.0 1 221.1 1 113.2 1 180.4
b. Fur 20.0 4.9 21.2 51.2 141.8 140.9 106.1 80.6
11. PAP 1 183.5 1 362.3 2 117.5 2 668.4 3 499.3 3 460.8 4 219.9 5 291.8
12. PRI 1.8 2.1 7.9 37.5 167.1 154.9 171.0 205.0
13. CHE 21.5 31.1 71.5 135.1 505.8 514.9 716.1 954.9
14. OIL 0.0 0.1 0.7 14.0 105.8 95.3 117.2 78.9
15. RUB 0.6 1.9 14.6 45.7 125.6 110.0 147.1 176.0
16. MIN 7.8 15.5 29.0 43.8 168.1 201.4 144.7 268.2
17. MET 15.2 42.9 151.4 300.2 634.4 568.4 761.8 1 127.5
18. MFM 76.4 161.3 218.0 488.6 1 265.4 1 746.2 1 954.9 2 322.0
a. Fab 13.0 13.9 37.8 128.3 . . . .
b. Mac 64.1 148.2 181.7 365.4 . . . .
19. ELE 19.3 28.7 65.3 146.2 517.4 609.5 779.9 1 199.4
20. TRE 163.6 174.4 193.4 396.2 572.6 1 051.4 1 210.2 1 163.1
21. OTH 1.9 2.8 22.2 42.8 71.1 70.0 92.0 63.2
22. EGW 0.0 1.0 1.2 31.5 35.1 34.5 22.8 5.3
23. BUI 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 1.3 2.0 0.0
24. OCO 0.0 0.0 16.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25. TRD 10.7 9.5 96.1 140.4 274.5 302.7 397.5 232.7
26. TRC 427.6 364.4 672.9 891.2 1 185.7 1 193.1 1 226.4 1 661.0
27. FIN 39.2 23.4 23.4 37.3 145.8 140.5 -48.2 133.5
28. DWE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29. BUS 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.9 409.4 619.2 573.8 568.6
30. CSR 2.4 26.5 57.6 8.8 79.8 82.1 118.4 124.2
Total 2 992.4 3 571.4 5 347.1 7 685.1 13 362.0 13 999.4 15 910.1 18 381.7
Notes: In millions of 2017 euros, deflated with Statistics Finland’s export price index. Note
that the sub-industries 10a., 10b., 18a. and 18b. do not sum up to their parent industry
because the share of value-added changes when combining industries in input-output
calculations. The aggregation bias is rather small generally speaking though. The sum of all
industries’ value-added does not completely match the total due to rounding errors. “.” refers
to a missing value.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Airikkala et al. 1976.
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Table A 2. Direct Working Hour Requirements in 1956–1989, in 1 000 hours
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 179.8 208.6 167.0 127.5 85.9 78.3 73.3 60.5
2. FOR 147.6 139.7 72.2 48.7 26.0 28.6 25.6 19.4
3. FIS 103.9 77.8 103.9 105.6 38.8 37.8 78.0 69.7
4. ORE 64.8 38.6 25.1 15.6 17.8 25.3 19.3 7.1
5. OMI 58.3 57.0 36.0 23.9 29.3 18.2 15.4 10.6
6. FOO 16.3 15.9 14.0 11.3 9.5 9.0 8.4 7.4
7. BEV 33.5 31.9 25.4 17.8 13.3 12.6 10.2 7.8
8. TEX 58.9 63.6 63.5 40.2 32.1 31.2 28.2 24.6
9. LEA 60.7 60.9 70.3 47.0 26.1 29.1 26.3 23.6
10. WOF 53.0 52.9 43.8 32.7 19.4 22.1 19.2 13.6
11. PAP 19.4 20.1 15.5 11.7 7.8 7.9 6.5 5.7
12. PRI 57.4 52.6 42.1 33.4 19.6 18.9 16.7 13.3
13. CHE 22.4 19.4 18.7 15.3 7.7 10.5 9.1 7.7
14. OIL 18.9 11.3 6.4 2.9 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.3
15. RUB 50.1 52.4 40.6 38.1 29.6 22.9 20.6 15.0
16. MIN 53.8 58.2 41.3 33.0 19.8 18.5 18.3 12.9
17. MET 20.1 15.2 14.7 8.2 7.2 7.9 6.8 4.8
18. MFM 67.9 63.1 47.1 33.0 24.2 22.1 19.5 14.2
19. ELE 62.6 57.3 44.8 34.2 23.3 23.2 19.8 13.9
20. TRE 48.0 39.4 30.4 30.2 22.3 20.1 18.5 13.5
21. OTH 136.2 108.1 63.4 30.2 28.6 28.4 25.6 20.6
22. EGW 17.4 23.9 16.4 12.6 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.8
23. BUI 77.2 81.0 63.9 39.9 26.1 25.0 23.4 17.6
24. OCO 75.8 75.8 48.8 36.7 28.9 28.6 25.0 20.0
25. TRD 128.7 134.9 126.7 62.8 41.8 40.0 37.0 28.7
26. TRC 61.2 57.5 43.4 42.6 27.0 26.4 25.4 20.8
27. FIN 52.7 68.0 45.1 42.9 22.7 22.7 19.0 14.7
28. DWE 18.6 11.3 6.5 4.2 5.0 4.6 4.0 3.3
29. BUS 148.7 99.7 73.5 22.4 25.1 19.4 16.6 12.4
30. CSR 406.2 266.7 156.7 49.5 40.5 37.1 31.0 23.7
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for labour.
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Table A 3. Total Working Hour Requirements in 1956–1989, in 1 000 hours
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 314.4 329.2 254.8 190.3 112.2 103.3 94.7 78.1
2. FOR 169.2 161.0 82.2 54.6 28.4 31.5 27.8 21.1
3. FIS 108.1 80.5 118.5 114.3 45.1 44.1 84.9 75.6
4. ORE 106.4 55.9 41.7 22.5 24.7 34.6 26.4 13.3
5. OMI 80.7 78.1 62.4 37.9 42.3 31.2 27.7 20.2
6. FOO 199.6 185.8 168.3 126.4 84.2 75.8 74.6 60.5
7. BEV 96.2 74.5 57.9 50.1 38.3 35.7 29.1 23.2
8. TEX 91.8 93.1 91.6 61.4 44.4 42.4 39.5 34.6
9. LEA 116.2 117.3 112.2 73.5 41.0 43.9 46.4 37.0
10. WOF 149.7 137.8 94.1 64.1 38.1 43.5 38.7 27.1
11. PAP 96.4 89.3 64.8 39.4 26.1 27.5 23.5 18.3
12. PRI 112.0 95.9 71.1 53.3 38.4 37.9 33.3 26.5
13. CHE 53.3 56.2 42.7 30.0 19.1 21.9 19.6 16.7
14. OIL 49.8 30.1 15.3 6.4 2.8 2.6 3.1 6.9
15. RUB 71.6 69.7 52.6 45.4 38.5 31.7 29.9 23.0
16. MIN 92.8 91.0 69.1 51.7 33.8 31.7 30.8 22.3
17. MET 69.7 56.2 51.6 27.7 22.4 25.1 21.4 13.6
18. MFM 96.4 83.3 65.5 45.2 37.1 34.3 30.6 22.5
19. ELE 98.5 81.5 61.1 48.8 32.8 31.4 27.6 20.9
20. TRE 78.7 56.9 48.7 45.4 35.3 32.4 29.0 22.2
21. OTH 163.4 132.6 87.6 41.4 38.0 37.8 34.2 29.5
22. EGW 61.9 48.9 41.3 26.0 18.6 17.5 16.5 16.4
23. BUI 126.7 126.4 100.3 66.2 44.8 41.8 38.5 27.7
24. OCO 126.1 112.2 81.0 58.8 44.6 43.8 37.7 29.6
25. TRD 151.6 146.1 140.5 76.7 55.2 51.3 46.6 36.2
26. TRC 86.1 78.5 61.8 57.2 39.2 38.5 35.0 29.4
27. FIN 63.8 85.2 61.0 58.9 32.7 32.5 28.2 22.0
28. DWE 51.4 42.2 28.5 16.1 13.5 12.0 11.6 10.0
29. BUS 170.6 144.9 108.6 40.5 40.2 32.6 28.0 20.3
30. CSR 424.9 275.5 177.6 77.8 59.4 52.7 44.3 34.1
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for labour.
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Table A 4. Direct Net Capital Stock Requirement in 1956–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 1 318.9 1 568.5 1 525.6 1 322.6 2 054.4 1 925.7 1 997.0 2 017.1
2. FOR 696.7 1 140.4 827.5 1 016.7 1 524.1 1 757.4 1 718.9 1 612.5
3. FIS 360.4 354.2 451.6 932.3 605.6 586.8 568.3 530.7
4. ORE 2 007.4 1 807.4 1 115.8 934.7 1 750.7 1 904.7 1 558.5 1 182.7
5. OMI 1 465.5 1 424.2 856.4 758.2 1 305.9 1 386.1 1 473.8 1 336.0
6. FOO 270.7 302.9 316.9 285.4 375.8 385.7 401.5 427.7
7. BEV 691.2 771.1 777.4 835.2 417.6 445.3 419.1 470.1
8. TEX 269.2 388.4 445.2 341.8 350.0 408.2 418.5 492.3
9. LEA 184.5 236.2 314.5 226.4 350.0 400.1 375.8 578.9
10. WOF 389.3 417.0 380.7 416.0 489.8 679.7 668.9 517.2
11. PAP 726.9 901.0 1 050.3 797.8 722.7 860.4 797.9 965.2
12. PRI 286.9 289.4 312.1 308.8 315.9 339.8 407.8 409.4
13. CHE 783.3 871.2 857.7 897.4 598.8 705.5 667.1 712.9
14. OIL 694.8 1 395.5 1 669.6 855.6 298.3 330.0 321.2 656.3
15. RUB 343.7 453.4 499.4 554.1 800.8 879.2 949.6 899.2
16. MIN 678.9 788.6 733.3 830.3 710.8 732.5 840.4 748.2
17. MET 573.1 499.1 636.1 562.1 638.3 740.2 643.6 577.6
18. MFM 541.3 593.2 441.9 414.0 432.5 431.5 440.4 390.9
19. ELE 285.8 284.0 325.8 324.0 433.7 487.1 483.5 403.0
20. TRE 724.2 693.8 492.4 571.9 667.1 585.4 655.5 622.0
21. OTH 747.1 601.3 441.5 548.7 368.7 413.0 442.8 561.8
22. EGW 2 769.9 5 695.6 4 116.5 3 653.1 2 384.4 2 284.3 2 251.2 2 723.7
23. BUI 83.3 104.7 75.3 76.4 99.7 107.7 123.4 93.3
24. OCO 292.3 238.6 275.1 301.2 353.1 362.1 343.0 319.1
25. TRD 1 349.8 1 761.0 1 651.9 1 123.9 1 069.0 1 088.4 1 145.6 1 136.2
26. TRC 1 325.5 1 586.9 1 389.6 1 817.0 1 695.2 1 752.2 1 693.9 1 430.0
27. FIN 1 653.5 2 035.3 1 410.2 1 409.3 962.5 985.0 833.0 597.9
28. DWE 15 694.4 11 114.7 10 659.7 8 815.0 16 586.6 16 725.0 16 828.0 18 002.6
29. BUS 4 068.8 2 857.4 4 141.1 1 918.7 1 906.1 1 505.3 1 335.4 1 638.4
30. CSR 3 701.9 2 693.7 1 766.8 636.4 963.0 931.2 840.5 683.0
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated by wholesale price index of engineering goods,
including electrotechnical goods, for machinery and construction cost index for buildings and
other capital. The net capital stock requirements reflect the amount of capital required to
produce one million 2017 euros worth of production.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for physical capital.
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Table A 5. Total Net Capital Stock Requirement in 1956–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 2 559.0 2 757.4 2 592.8 2 259.9 2 971.0 2 855.5 2 863.4 2 903.2
2. FOR 876.9 1 374.4 955.8 1 132.6 1 604.1 1 869.0 1 812.7 1 699.7
3. FIS 422.5 411.4 685.2 1 825.6 815.4 810.1 818.7 812.1
4. ORE 3 144.5 2 524.7 1 731.3 1 378.5 2 385.8 2 749.8 2 182.5 1 820.3
5. OMI 2 012.4 2 108.5 1 723.8 1 541.2 2 112.7 2 301.1 2 379.6 2 225.1
6. FOO 1 953.3 1 965.3 2 121.3 1 866.1 2 612.2 2 517.7 2 703.6 2 751.8
7. BEV 1 707.9 1 542.4 1 542.2 1 560.9 1 413.8 1 426.5 1 266.6 1 309.0
8. TEX 617.3 809.2 891.4 711.4 719.7 785.4 819.8 986.5
9. LEA 716.1 834.9 879.4 650.5 831.0 929.7 1 016.0 1 222.5
10. WOF 1 219.9 1 467.2 1 234.2 1 212.4 1 518.5 1 927.3 1 901.0 1 542.9
11. PAP 2 264.6 2 806.8 2 717.0 2 033.7 2 191.3 2 620.5 2 434.9 2 362.3
12. PRI 1 150.0 1 202.9 1 065.1 956.6 1 239.2 1 392.4 1 432.9 1 416.1
13. CHE 1 506.9 1 839.9 1 714.6 1 629.7 1 416.8 1 578.1 1 490.9 1 499.8
14. OIL 1 414.0 2 014.9 2 015.9 1 014.3 402.0 418.7 446.9 1 048.2
15. RUB 732.2 929.7 883.7 848.9 1 339.1 1 434.5 1 588.8 1 552.1
16. MIN 1 534.1 1 714.8 1 646.7 1 605.1 1 503.7 1 564.8 1 679.0 1 505.5
17. MET 1 975.3 2 103.2 2 103.5 1 705.3 1 800.9 2 118.7 1 865.9 1 484.4
18. MFM 1 110.7 1 152.8 982.7 868.0 1 081.9 1 090.4 1 078.3 972.4
19. ELE 977.7 920.6 809.7 750.6 907.2 924.7 913.0 887.6
20. TRE 1 200.9 1 112.5 964.0 1 058.6 1 276.4 1 190.1 1 204.3 1 158.1
21. OTH 1 238.0 1 215.4 1 001.7 925.1 833.0 917.5 939.4 1 132.8
22. EGW 4 923.8 6 869.1 6 385.2 5 272.3 4 404.6 4 188.8 4 092.2 4 922.1
23. BUI 862.8 914.1 850.4 732.8 877.3 887.9 901.1 744.0
24. OCO 1 129.1 1 000.9 1 096.0 1 016.5 1 071.8 1 134.1 1 075.3 987.8
25. TRD 1 846.7 2 253.6 2 059.9 1 722.9 1 794.5 1 779.7 1 795.8 1 774.1
26. TRC 1 696.7 2 012.9 1 829.1 2 214.2 2 171.5 2 452.4 2 423.4 2 377.4
27. FIN 1 907.0 2 500.8 1 880.1 1 955.1 1 448.0 1 487.8 1 349.5 1 109.4
28. DWE 16 227.9 12 026.8 11 577.5 9 223.4 17 087.0 17 207.4 17 369.5 18 513.0
29. BUS 5 458.7 4 162.2 4 717.8 2 411.1 2 531.1 2 171.8 2 055.0 2 263.3
30. CSR 4 788.9 3 342.5 2 207.9 1 275.6 1 670.3 1 598.7 1 502.4 1 361.4
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated by wholesale price index of engineering goods,
including electrotechnical goods, for machinery and construction cost index for buildings and
other capital. The net capital stock requirements reflect the amount of capital required to
produce one million 2017 euros worth of production.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for physical capital.
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Table A 6. Direct Total Net Machinery and Transport Equipment Stock Requirement in
1956–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 207.8 234.6 311.1 302.2 559.9 543.3 548.1 529.5
2. FOR 93.8 145.5 83.0 91.2 107.8 126.8 116.3 129.6
3. FIS 360.4 354.2 451.6 932.3 605.6 586.8 568.3 530.7
4. ORE 993.2 921.7 550.7 435.9 857.3 1 030.2 785.3 747.0
5. OMI 742.8 735.1 497.5 435.3 512.3 492.4 621.9 476.2
6. FOO 103.5 112.6 129.8 128.7 121.9 130.2 139.3 161.6
7. BEV 322.4 378.9 414.8 422.8 440.7 442.3 420.9 416.4
8. TEX 125.5 190.9 226.9 179.6 163.9 192.5 198.9 255.9
9. LEA 60.7 71.4 110.0 95.3 63.9 82.5 84.8 141.8
10. WOF 210.3 226.6 178.8 183.8 216.6 287.4 256.5 185.9
11. PAP 364.0 460.6 650.1 491.5 432.8 527.0 495.0 642.1
12. PRI 161.4 175.5 174.7 169.7 177.5 187.1 222.3 259.3
13. CHE 411.3 488.6 443.2 498.7 279.1 322.7 299.7 334.7
14. OIL 47.4 155.1 489.5 310.3 109.1 122.6 125.0 286.5
15. RUB 115.1 148.8 248.8 296.0 394.9 440.9 492.2 518.6
16. MIN 283.2 324.9 358.5 424.8 331.2 344.5 404.6 377.3
17. MET 371.0 345.0 373.8 320.1 349.0 398.8 345.2 334.7
18. MFM 200.4 213.7 178.5 188.0 167.5 164.9 168.0 158.9
19. ELE 97.1 103.7 142.4 160.9 163.2 193.5 202.1 188.4
20. TRE 154.8 144.1 103.0 145.7 162.5 135.1 156.5 141.7
21. OTH 1 087.4 863.5 723.0 821.5 757.8 816.8 771.7 818.3
22. EGW 532.4 932.2 886.9 824.1 701.4 654.0 636.6 804.6
23. BUI 67.9 79.2 59.5 48.7 39.4 40.1 46.9 39.7
24. OCO 176.6 166.3 205.7 222.1 201.4 203.6 187.4 191.8
25. TRD 394.1 492.0 443.0 300.7 272.9 285.8 322.0 387.7
26. TRC 764.6 891.4 700.0 881.1 695.0 705.6 634.4 521.8
27. FIN 105.3 122.4 95.6 125.1 102.5 110.8 122.3 156.6
28. DWE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29. BUS 569.7 379.3 265.4 112.9 102.5 92.2 110.4 165.0
30. CSR 333.2 229.3 167.6 73.0 144.5 127.1 111.3 109.0
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated by wholesale price index of engineering goods,
including electrotechnical goods. The net machine stock requirements reflect the amount of
capital related to transport equipment and machinery required to produce one million 2017
euros worth of production.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for capital.
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Table A 7. Total Net Machinery and Transport Equipment Stock Requirement in 1956–
1989, in 1 000 Euros
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 469.5 490.7 585.1 571.1 832.3 830.0 808.7 800.8
2. FOR 131.2 186.9 115.1 123.9 129.4 157.9 142.3 154.2
3. FIS 381.3 369.7 523.2 1 150.3 671.8 660.7 649.2 617.1
4. ORE 1 387.6 1 133.5 730.0 570.3 1 037.0 1 270.5 954.9 919.6
5. OMI 924.3 961.4 803.6 683.7 745.2 757.0 880.5 724.1
6. FOO 467.5 474.7 586.8 572.9 773.2 771.9 812.8 838.8
7. BEV 641.8 612.8 642.8 666.6 767.6 778.1 703.2 681.5
8. TEX 257.2 334.7 386.2 326.9 288.9 323.3 337.3 423.5
9. LEA 232.0 241.9 278.6 243.7 215.5 254.6 282.4 343.0
10. WOF 412.9 461.1 389.1 361.8 427.9 554.1 506.1 402.2
11. PAP 796.6 973.3 1 217.3 904.6 909.9 1 091.2 1 010.1 1 090.7
12. PRI 459.1 509.2 489.4 435.5 495.5 559.0 576.7 602.9
13. CHE 661.0 771.9 728.6 783.4 562.1 621.0 574.3 596.3
14. OIL 326.5 359.5 589.9 360.0 137.2 150.0 160.5 394.8
15. RUB 234.5 284.4 369.0 393.2 578.7 628.2 699.1 730.8
16. MIN 611.6 648.5 687.9 731.4 608.3 632.5 684.8 618.3
17. MET 1 028.7 1 118.6 1 030.4 847.0 834.2 969.4 833.8 712.3
18. MFM 433.9 428.6 384.5 367.7 400.7 404.2 388.4 358.7
19. ELE 391.3 376.4 331.4 333.7 314.5 338.4 340.7 340.5
20. TRE 338.7 276.6 265.2 329.1 365.9 342.8 332.7 315.1
21. OTH 1 303.6 1 111.1 976.1 967.4 928.9 1 013.4 940.4 1 037.3
22. EGW 990.3 1 197.4 1 451.4 1 235.6 1 310.1 1 224.9 1 161.0 1 453.7
23. BUI 332.7 363.2 307.8 289.5 292.2 293.3 288.5 237.7
24. OCO 495.8 498.6 542.3 504.2 447.9 462.3 420.0 392.7
25. TRD 538.2 565.1 525.3 466.8 468.5 475.3 488.4 536.5
26. TRC 886.3 1 020.1 823.9 1 008.9 830.1 842.5 761.4 655.2
27. FIN 170.1 255.7 237.9 274.4 225.5 242.0 247.8 275.1
28. DWE 114.9 176.9 242.4 102.3 142.7 135.4 149.0 142.8
29. BUS 667.0 616.9 516.0 263.4 286.0 292.6 300.5 323.0
30. CSR 426.6 274.9 296.6 254.9 340.6 309.8 277.6 269.3
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated by wholesale price index of engineering goods,
including electrotechnical goods. The net machine stock requirements reflect the amount of
capital related to transport equipment and machinery required to produce one million 2017
euros worth of production.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989;
Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for capital.
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Table A 8. Direct R&D Expenditure Requirements in 1970–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
2. FOR 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5
3. FIS - - - - -
4. ORE 0.3 0.2 2.4 10.8 2.8
5. OMI 0.2 0.1 1.2 6.8 3.9
6. FOO 1.1 1.5 1.8 3.1 4.9
7. BEV 2.2 3.1 3.8 5.6 7.4
8. TEX 0.6 1.3 1.6 1.7 4.1
9. LEA 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8
10. WOF 1.6 1.2 1.5 2.3 4.6
11. PAP 4.7 2.6 3.0 4.8 5.3
12. PRI 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
13. CHE 17.0 10.1 13.3 21.4 35.0
14. OIL 9.9 1.8 3.2 8.9 25.4
15. RUB 7.0 34.3 39.7 22.0 18.9
16. MIN 2.6 6.7 8.5 14.4 14.3
17. MET 9.4 6.3 7.3 7.9 4.4
18. MFM 9.5 13.8 15.0 23.8 17.2
19. ELE 39.2 39.3 48.1 52.0 83.5
20. TRE 2.1 7.5 7.8 17.4 13.0
21. OTH 1.2 2.2 2.8 6.7 15.3
22. EGW 1.3 1.0 1.7 3.3 8.3
23. BUI 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6
24. OCO - - - - -
25. TRD 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.4
26. TRC 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.5
27. FIN 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5
28. DWE - - - - -
29. BUS 3.0 6.3 3.9 3.4 9.1
30. CSR 5.3 4.9 4.1 6.2 5.9
Notes: “-” refers to a zero value. “0.0” are very small amounts of R&D expenditure. In
constant 2017 euros deflated by Statistics Finland’s Wholesale Price Index. The R&D
expenditure requirements reflect the amount of R&D expenditure required to produce one
million 2017 euros worth of production.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland: Input-Output Tables 1970–1989; see
the appendices for human capital.
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Table A 9. Total R&D Expenditure Requirements in 1970–1989, in 1 000 Euros
1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.9 6.9
2. FOR 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.2
3. FIS 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.8
4. ORE 1.8 1.5 4.4 13.2 6.7
5. OMI 2.7 3.7 5.2 12.2 11.2
6. FOO 3.6 5.2 6.1 9.6 14.5
7. BEV 4.6 6.3 7.2 9.8 12.6
8. TEX 2.0 2.8 3.3 4.1 8.4
9. LEA 2.7 3.4 4.3 4.2 5.1
10. WOF 3.3 3.3 4.4 6.7 9.5
11. PAP 8.4 6.3 7.5 11.7 13.3
12. PRI 2.6 3.3 3.6 5.2 6.4
13. CHE 22.2 14.2 18.3 28.7 45.0
14. OIL 10.5 2.2 3.6 9.7 29.1
15. RUB 8.2 37.9 43.6 28.2 27.8
16. MIN 5.7 10.2 12.7 20.7 21.1
17. MET 20.1 13.0 15.8 18.5 12.0
18. MFM 13.7 19.7 21.4 32.9 25.7
19. ELE 45.1 44.7 53.6 59.7 94.3
20. TRE 7.0 13.3 14.2 26.1 22.6
21. OTH 3.7 4.7 5.9 10.9 22.1
22. EGW 3.7 3.4 4.6 8.3 17.8
23. BUI 4.0 5.9 6.4 8.1 8.2
24. OCO 5.2 5.7 6.4 7.2 8.0
25. TRD 1.4 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.2
26. TRC 2.2 2.5 3.0 4.7 5.5
27. FIN 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.9 3.4
28. DWE 0.9 1.2 1.3 2.2 2.9
29. BUS 4.6 8.1 5.7 6.1 12.5
30. CSR 6.8 6.9 6.2 9.0 9.8
Notes: “-” refers to a zero value. “0.0” are very small amounts of R&D expenditure. In
constant 2017 euros deflated by Statistics Finland’s Wholesale Price Index. The R&D
expenditure requirements reflect the amount of R&D expenditure required to produce one
million 2017 euros worth of production. Total requirements could be biased by
untrustworthiness of data on primary and tertiary sectors.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland: Input-Output Tables 1970–1989; see
the appendices for human capital.
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Table A 10. Average Wage Rates in 1956–1989, in Euros per Hour
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 4.3 3.2 3.4 6.3 6.1 6.9 6.8 7.9
2. FOR 5.1 4.7 6.1 7.9 11.2 11.6 11.8 13.2
3. FIS 0.0 0.0 4.6 6.1 12.7 13.8 11.8 11.5
4. ORE 6.6 7.3 9.3 11.8 16.5 17.4 18.5 21.6
5. OMI 5.3 5.5 6.2 9.4 11.9 12.6 14.3 15.7
6. FOO 4.8 4.8 6.0 7.6 11.5 12.1 13.2 15.6
7. BEV 5.7 5.6 7.8 10.3 14.1 15.1 16.6 19.1
8. TEX 4.7 4.6 5.4 6.6 9.2 10.1 11.0 12.5
9. LEA 5.0 5.0 5.4 6.7 9.2 10.1 10.7 12.4
10. WOF 5.2 4.9 5.9 7.1 10.9 11.5 12.4 14.4
11. PAP 6.1 6.2 8.0 9.7 15.8 16.7 18.3 20.8
12. PRI 6.2 6.4 7.3 9.9 14.2 15.3 17.4 19.9
13. CHE 6.9 8.3 7.9 10.2 13.9 14.4 16.6 18.7
14. OIL 7.8 7.6 11.4 15.1 15.8 16.1 18.1 22.6
15. RUB 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.3 11.9 12.7 13.7 16.1
16. MIN 6.1 6.0 7.1 9.3 12.3 12.6 14.0 16.2
17. MET 6.0 5.9 7.8 10.3 14.4 15.2 16.5 18.5
18. MFM 6.1 6.1 7.6 9.6 13.0 13.7 15.1 17.4
19. ELE 5.1 5.1 7.1 9.3 12.6 13.5 14.7 16.8
20. TRE 8.8 8.8 7.9 10.4 13.6 14.1 15.6 17.0
21. OTH 3.9 4.0 8.3 8.0 11.5 11.7 12.7 15.0
22. EGW 6.3 6.4 8.6 11.3 14.8 15.1 17.1 19.2
23. BUI 5.6 5.6 8.3 8.9 13.9 14.2 16.3 19.6
24. OCO 6.0 5.9 7.0 9.0 13.2 13.3 14.1 15.9
25. TRD 4.7 4.6 6.5 7.6 11.3 11.6 12.4 14.8
26. TRC 5.8 5.7 7.6 10.2 12.7 13.1 14.4 16.4
27. FIN 6.3 6.2 10.6 11.7 15.9 15.4 17.0 19.2
28. DWE 2.3 2.4 6.8 3.2 9.3 9.0 9.4 10.4
29. BUS 7.6 7.8 7.4 10.0 14.9 15.1 16.3 19.0
30. CSR 4.3 4.2 5.5 6.5 10.6 11.2 12.3 14.1
Notes: In constant 2017 euros deflated with Statistics Finland’s Cost-of-Living index.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Tiainen 1994; see the appendices for
human capital.
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Table A 11. The Share of Office Workers in Total Workforce 1956–1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR . . . . . . . .
2. FOR . . . . . . . .
3. FIS . . . . . . . .
4. ORE 16.9 20.5 24.0 27.7 30.8 29.5 31.7 31.6
5. OMI 10.1 12.5 12.2 15.4 19.5 24.2 28.3 29.4
6. FOO 15.4 16.2 17.8 18.8 23.9 25.0 25.9 25.0
7. BEV 17.0 18.9 21.5 24.0 31.4 32.8 35.1 34.2
8. TEX 9.6 11.7 14.3 14.2 16.3 17.0 17.2 19.2
9. LEA 9.8 10.1 13.4 12.8 14.1 13.9 13.3 15.3
10. WOF 10.8 10.7 11.7 12.3 15.7 17.6 19.2 23.5
11. PAP 14.8 15.7 17.2 19.6 23.5 23.5 24.1 26.2
12. PRI 25.6 25.5 29.2 33.2 35.0 35.8 37.1 38.0
13. CHE 23.6 26.8 28.6 32.3 37.6 39.8 42.1 47.0
14. OIL 20.9 23.4 41.3 46.6 46.0 44.4 50.8 59.1
15. RUB 15.5 17.4 20.0 19.2 20.8 23.6 22.5 25.4
16. MIN 17.2 18.5 18.1 19.9 22.8 23.1 24.5 24.1
17. MET 16.1 17.7 18.8 22.2 24.7 27.5 28.4 28.6
18. MFM 16.8 18.7 21.0 23.2 27.6 28.5 31.1 31.8
19. ELE 21.5 23.1 24.2 24.6 31.9 35.0 38.5 43.1
20. TRE 15.5 17.4 19.8 22.7 26.0 25.4 27.2 28.0
21. OTH 15.7 18.9 18.2 21.3 20.0 20.1 19.8 24.4
22. EGW 24.5 25.9 27.2 31.3 40.0 39.8 41.4 43.3
23. BUI . . . . . . . .
24. OCO . . . . . . . .
25. TRD . . . . . . . .
26. TRC . . . . . . . .
27. FIN . . . . . . . .
28. DWE . . . . . . . .
29. BUS . . . . . . . .
30. CSR . . . . . . . .
Notes: “.” refers to a missing value. The share of office workers also includes owners
working in establishments.
Source: The author's own estimates; Industrial Statistics; see the appendices for human
capital.
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Table A 12. The Share of Value-added originating from the Primary Sector in Domestic
Value-added of Exports in 1956–1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 81.5 83.0 81.5 78.2 74.2 72.4 76.3 72.3
2. FOR 97.6 96.5 97.6 96.1 97.3 96.1 96.3 96.1
3. FIS - 97.7 87.0 84.0 91.5 90.7 89.6 87.0
4. ORE 61.7 84.0 81.4 87.2 79.7 67.8 75.3 77.4
5. OMI 79.1 80.7 67.3 77.1 69.1 65.4 61.8 63.3
6. FOO 52.1 45.6 51.8 50.4 51.1 48.2 54.1 45.7
7. BEV - 8.0 7.2 10.6 10.8 10.5 10.4 9.2
8. TEX 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1
9. LEA 4.8 7.4 6.8 5.0 4.9 4.8 6.0 5.3
10. WOF 47.5 43.5 45.7 39.3 35.9 35.8 35.8 30.2
11. PAP 32.5 27.5 32.7 27.4 22.7 23.3 20.9 20.8
12. PRI 7.1 5.3 5.5 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.2
13. CHE 7.4 7.0 5.8 4.4 3.5 3.7 3.7 2.7
14. OIL - 2.1 2.9 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3
15. RUB 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.6
16. MIN 8.4 8.9 8.4 7.2 4.4 3.8 3.5 3.4
17. MET 12.8 25.9 22.5 21.9 10.6 7.6 8.8 7.4
18. MFM 3.0 3.3 3.0 4.4 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.4
19. ELE 4.3 5.6 4.5 3.5 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.1
20. TRE 2.9 2.1 2.5 3.4 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.3
21. OTH 5.7 5.7 5.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.4 1.9
22. EGW - 5.2 4.1 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.6 2.4
23. BUI - - - 6.4 6.1 4.7 4.3 -
24. OCO - - 4.4 - - - - -
25. TRD 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
26. TRC 2.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
27. FIN 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5
28. DWE - - - - - - - -
29. BUS - - - 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7
30. CSR 1.6 0.7 1.2 6.8 5.8 4.2 3.8 3.5
Notes: “-” denotes that industry did not have any exports in that year and as such had no
figure corresponding with resource intensity. Primary sector is defined as the industries of
agriculture (AGR), forestry (FOR), fishing (FIS), metal ore mining (ORE) and other mining
(OMI).
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland: Input-Output Tables 1956–1989; see
the appendices for natural resources.
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Table A 13. Average Establishment Size in 1952–1989
1952 1959 1964 1972 1980 1982 1986 1989
1. AGR . . . . . . . .
2. FOR . . . . . . 3.1 3.5
3. FIS . . . . . . . .
4. ORE 10.6 16.7 17.2 25.7 11.6 7.8 18.6 25.1
5. OMI 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.3
6. FOO 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
7. BEV 0.6 1.8 3.4 1.3 6.1 6.2 10.9 15.4
8. TEX 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3
9. LEA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
10. WOF 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5
11. PAP 4.1 4.6 6.0 6.7 5.9 7.3 10.8 14.9
12. PRI 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8
13. CHE 0.9 1.4 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.3 3.8 6.9
14. OIL 0.5 4.3 6.2 5.0 17.3 17.5 21.8 15.4
15. RUB 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
16. MIN 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4
17. MET 2.4 1.7 2.5 4.1 4.6 4.1 5.9 11.1
18. MFM 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
19. ELE 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
20. TRE 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.7
21. OTH 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
22. EGW 0.8 0.7 1.0 3.2 5.9 6.4 4.9 3.1
23. BUI 0.5 . 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9
24. OCO . . . . . . 1.0 1.2
25. TRD 0.1 . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
26. TRC 0.1 . . . . . 0.7 0.9
27. FIN . . . . . . . .
28. DWE . . . . . . . .
29. BUS 0.1 . 0.1 1.6 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.7
30. CSR 0.0 . 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
Notes: “.” refers to a missing value. Measured as value-added in millions of 2017 euros,
deflated by Statistics Finland’s Wholesale Price Index, divided by the number of
establishments. Several industries were dropped due to unreliability of data and possible
systematic breaks in the series.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; Input-Output Tables 1956–1989; see
the appendices for scale advantage.
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Table A 14. Direct R&D Expenditure Requirements across Product Groups in 1970–
1989, in 1 000 Euros
1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9
2. FOR 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.6
3. FIS - - - - -
4. ORE 3.9 10.7 11.1 12.5 2.8
5. OMI 2.9 5.2 5.5 7.9 3.9
6. FOO 1.1 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.9
7. BEV 2.2 3.9 4.8 5.6 16.9
8. TEX 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.7 3.0
9. LEA 1.7 0.3 0.4 1.1 4.3
10. WOF 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.3
11. PAP 6.7 4.0 4.6 5.2 7.5
12. PRI 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
13. CHE 19.3 14.9 19.4 10.9 32.0
14. OIL 11.2 2.0 3.5 9.8 21.4
15. RUB 7.9 12.3 12.4 71.1 58.4
16. MIN 3.9 4.5 6.5 10.7 13.1
17. MET 8.1 6.2 7.2 7.2 6.9
18. MFM 9.2 13.2 13.8 18.9 20.2
19. ELE 36.5 51.8 63.9 74.4 93.7
20. TRE 1.9 4.8 5.2 12.1 9.0
21. OTH 6.3 4.7 5.8 16.6 10.4
22. EGW 1.3 1.0 1.8 3.2 6.7
23. BUI - 0.2 0.2 - 0.9
24. OCO 0.3 - - 1.3 -
25. TRD 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
26. TRC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 3.1
27. FIN 1.9 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.2
28. DWE - - - - -
29. BUS 2.2 0.9 2.0 2.5 3.5
30. CSR 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9
Notes: “-” refers to a zero value. “0.0” are very small amounts of R&D expenditure. In
constant 2017 euros deflated with Statistics Finland’s Wholesale Price Index. While R&D
expenditure is calculated according to product groups it is weighted according to industry
size, or gross value of production. Total requirements that also cover backward linkages are
disregarded here, since in the case of product differentiation only the end product’s qualities
matter.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland: Input-Output Tables 1970–1989;
Vuori 1994; see the appendices for product differentiation.
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Table A 15. The Number of Innovations in 1956–1989






6. FOO 1 6
7. BEV
8. TEX 1 1 2 1
9. LEA 1 1
10. WOF 2 1 3 4 3 1 1
a. Woo 2 1 3 4 3 1 1
b. Fur
11. PAP 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
12. PRI
13. CHE 3 5 2 1 2 7 4
14. OIL 1 1 1
15. RUB 1 1 2 5 2 2 2 6
16. MIN 1 1 2 1 3
17. MET 2 2 3 1
18. MFM 15 15 22 11 18 29 25 21
a. Fab 4 4 4 1 1 4 6 3
b. Mac 11 11 18 10 17 25 19 18
19. ELE 1 2 6 2 16 22 15 22
20. TRE 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 3
21. OTH 2 2 6 2 1 2 1
22. EGW 1 1 1 2 1
23. BUI 3 2
24. OCO 1
25. TRD 3
26. TRC 3 1 1
27. FIN 1
28. DWE
29. BUS 2 2 5 18 11
30. CSR 1
Total 27 33 44 36 59 77 89 82
Notes: There is a statistical break in 1980 and 1982 due switching from historical innovation
data to survey-based data.
Source: SFINNO; H-INNO data included there was gathered in Saarinen 2005; see the
appendices for product differentiation.
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Table A 16. The Share of Employees working in Large Establishments in 1956–1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR . . . . . . . .
2. FOR . . . . . . . .
3. FIS . . . . . . . .
4. ORE 78.3 80.7 78.7 85.4 87.3 82.0 85.1 42.4
5. OMI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 15.0 0.0 6.4
6. FOO 14.0 17.2 28.3 28.2 34.2 35.1 32.7 36.0
7. BEV 50.6 61.5 73.4 81.8 82.9 82.6 73.9 81.3
8. TEX 54.2 51.0 48.3 46.2 45.2 40.5 40.7 36.3
9. LEA 36.9 28.6 22.6 26.5 26.6 30.2 27.7 19.9
10. WOF 37.5 41.9 44.7 50.6 42.8 38.2 37.4 37.6
11. PAP 70.0 78.1 81.1 81.3 83.3 81.9 81.0 85.5
12. PRI 27.8 33.0 37.3 41.4 41.1 40.8 40.1 48.4
13. CHE 30.7 43.2 54.5 56.9 57.4 57.6 58.7 61.4
14. OIL 0.0 60.3 70.2 68.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 76.4
15. RUB 83.1 79.8 71.4 70.9 51.0 45.9 46.0 34.0
16. MIN 43.1 48.7 49.9 52.4 38.1 37.5 31.7 37.1
17. MET 68.3 73.6 84.4 84.7 86.1 84.5 84.0 78.3
18. MFM 47.4 54.0 57.0 57.0 52.1 100.0 45.9 44.6
19. ELE 56.1 58.9 65.7 70.2 73.4 81.4 65.0 67.4
20. TRE 58.4 58.3 54.6 47.7 76.1 76.3 75.9 74.5
21. OTH 20.7 16.5 25.2 24.5 26.8 27.8 25.4 23.8
22. EGW 18.3 25.7 30.6 29.5 35.3 38.9 39.2 44.5
23. BUI . . . . . . . .
24. OCO . . . . . . . .
25. TRD . . . . . . . .
26. TRC . . . . . . . .
27. FIN . . . . . . . .
28. DWE . . . . . . . .
29. BUS . . . . . . . .
30. CSR . . . . . . . .
Notes: “.” refers to a missing value. Large establishments are defined as having more than
200 employees. Note that shoe manufactures are classified in TEX, not in LEA, in 1959–
1970.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; Statistical Yearbooks of Finland
1956–1989; see the appendices for monopolistic competition.
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Table A 17. The Ratio of Customs Duties Relative to Imports in 1959–1989, %
1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 45.2 26.0 10.7 5.1 5.5 5.4 6.5
2. FOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3. FIS 1.6 2.7 2.8 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.4
4. ORE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5. OMI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. FOO 118.0 43.0 25.8 6.7 4.3 2.0 4.2
7. BEV 141.0 58.2 60.9 16.6 10.6 9.8 9.0
8. TEX 24.4 15.9 4.9 3.3 4.6 3.0 5.0
9. LEA 33.6 21.0 8.2 4.8 5.2 4.3 5.1
10. WOF 5.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5
11. PAP 9.2 8.5 3.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3
12. PRI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
13. CHE 1.5 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3
14. OIL 19.7 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15. RUB 9.0 6.1 3.6 2.1 3.3 1.5 1.4
16. MIN 5.1 0.8 1.6 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.8
17. MET 7.1 5.1 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
18. MFM 4.0 2.7 1.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.6
19. ELE 7.6 8.7 4.8 2.5 2.4 1.8 2.1
20. TRE 11.2 12.6 4.5 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.5
21. OTH 12.0 6.0 4.0 5.4 4.2 4.6 2.7
22. EGW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
23. BUI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
24. OCO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25. TRD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
26. TRC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
27. FIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
28. DWE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29. BUS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
30. CSR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: The industrial classification used here is not identical to one in Table 18. which was
classified differently in order to match it with Kauppila’s data for 1934.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input–Output Tables 1959–1989;
Board of Customs; see the appendices for customs barriers.
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Table A 18. Effective Rates of Protection in 1959–1989, %
1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 48.6 30.2 11.5 6.7 8.1 7.5 9.4
2. FOR -2.6 -0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
3. FIS 1.6 3.0 3.1 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.4
4. ORE -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
5. OMI -0.5 -1.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
6. FOO 277.6 109.2 76.8 32.3 5.2 -22.7 0.9
7. BEV 224.7 96.1 110.7 32.6 20.4 15.9 13.3
8. TEX 27.8 17.6 4.2 2.2 3.2 2.2 4.5
9. LEA 18.0 25.8 5.7 3.0 3.7 3.4 3.7
10. WOF 4.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6
11. PAP 7.4 8.8 2.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.0
12. PRI -1.5 -1.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
13. CHE -7.7 -5.4 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1
14. OIL 41.9 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
15. RUB 8.8 3.9 5.1 2.8 4.7 2.0 1.8
16. MIN 6.8 0.2 2.3 0.8 1.7 0.8 1.1
17. MET 11.3 10.6 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0
18. MFM 1.9 1.5 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3
19. ELE 8.0 10.6 5.8 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.6
20. TRE 9.9 15.2 3.5 1.8 0.7 0.6 0.7
21. OTH 12.1 4.6 4.1 5.7 4.3 4.6 3.4
22. EGW -0.8 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
23. BUI -3.5 -1.6 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3
24. OCO -1.7 -2.4 -1.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2
25. TRD 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
26. TRC -2.0 -1.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
27. FIN 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
28. DWE -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29. BUS 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
30. CSR 0.0 -0.3 -8.2 -1.9 -1.0 -0.5 -0.7
Notes: The industrial classification used here is not identical to one in Table 18. which was
classified differently in order to match it with Kauppila’s data for 1934. Therefore the figures
for EFP differ slightly in a few cases.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Input–Output Tables 1959–1989;
Board of Customs; see the appendices for customs barriers.
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Table A 19. The Share of Eastern Trade in Exports 1956–1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 2.9 0.3 12.6 5.8 5.0 4.7 14.8 4.7
2. FOR 16.6 10.9 8.1 0.9 13.6 0.0 8.8 6.0
3. FIS 5.4 0.0 46.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. ORE 34.7 23.3 10.9 19.0 5.7 37.0 6.3 6.6
5. OMI 49.6 53.1 16.0 6.8 5.5 7.8 2.5 3.4
6. FOO 16.0 18.6 37.8 25.7 40.4 48.6 45.4 21.6
7. BEV 99.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 21.8 31.7 28.8 15.4
8. TEX 5.0 4.4 21.0 12.7 21.7 35.2 32.3 19.9
9. LEA 4.4 10.5 4.1 12.8 43.1 71.3 64.5 41.4
10. WOF 16.6 5.8 2.3 2.5 4.5 12.8 3.9 3.5
11. PAP 17.6 15.3 17.4 16.0 21.8 22.3 17.0 11.8
12. PRI 71.8 8.0 63.8 32.7 17.4 23.4 24.4 12.5
13. CHE 71.4 50.8 26.6 44.4 33.4 36.8 30.4 19.7
14. OIL 15.0 2.4 16.0 13.2 1.9 9.7 6.3 14.5
15. RUB 5.8 0.0 6.0 3.3 27.1 23.7 22.9 15.7
16. MIN 2.5 0.7 0.1 4.3 20.2 33.4 17.9 15.9
17. MET 29.1 18.2 18.5 2.6 10.8 10.9 10.0 6.5
18. MFM 78.8 82.0 54.6 30.9 28.2 45.7 34.4 20.2
19. ELE 49.3 82.8 43.2 25.0 25.5 31.2 25.0 22.1
20. TRE 93.1 87.4 79.2 44.6 41.1 46.7 55.6 43.6
21. OTH 13.8 2.5 20.7 5.7 2.9 3.3 1.5 2.7
22. EGW . . . . . . . .
23. BUI . . . . . . . .
24. OCO . . . . . . . .
25. TRD . . . . . . . .
26. TRC . . . . . . . .
27. FIN . . . . . . . .
28. DWE . . . . . . . .
29. BUS . . . . . . . .
30. CSR . . . . . . . .
Notes: “.” refers to a missing value. Board of Customs does not have data on service exports.
“East” refers to Albania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Mongolia and North Vietnam / Vietnam.
Source: The author's own estimates; Board of Customs; see the appendices for Eastern Trade.
.
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Table A 20. The Share of State-Owned Companies’ Gross Value of Production of Total
in 1956–1985, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985
1. AGR . . . . . . .
2. FOR . . . . . . .
3. FIS . . . . . . .
4. ORE 98.0 98.4 97.8 92.8 95.4 94.4 100.0
5. OMI 5.0 2.6 2.5 1.1 20.0 33.5 32.2
6. FOO 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
7. BEV 28.3 22.3 20.3 18.1 19.1 18.9 16.7
8. TEX 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 4.8 4.8 4.3
9. LEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10. WOF 13.2 15.3 11.4 9.0 8.1 7.8 8.4
11. PAP 24.6 28.1 27.7 24.2 23.4 22.9 21.7
12. PRI 2.8 2.5 2.5 0.1 2.7 2.8 2.6
13. CHE 27.9 33.1 39.6 44.1 50.6 52.0 52.6
14. OIL 0.0 74.5 80.6 89.1 96.4 95.1 95.3
15. RUB 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
16. MIN 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2
17. MET 54.3 58.6 62.8 73.0 78.0 80.1 79.5
18. MFM 11.4 12.8 11.5 10.2 11.8 12.7 12.1
19. ELE 3.1 3.3 2.9 1.3 7.2 5.6 4.7
20. TRE 31.3 28.9 25.8 24.4 22.9 20.7 24.3
21. OTH 2.3 3.8 2.7 3.2 0.0 0.0 5.8
22. EGW 28.6 27.2 28.1 19.4 28.3 28.4 27.7
23. BUI . . . . . . .
24. OCO . . . . . . .
25. TRD . . . . . . .
26. TRC . . . . . . .
27. FIN . . . . . . .
28. DWE . . . . . . .
29. BUS . . . . . . .
30. CSR . . . . . . .
Notes: “.” refers to a missing value. Including both state-owned joint stock companies and
other state-owned establishments. The Industrial Statistics of 1989 have no data on the nature
of ownership.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; Industrial Statistics.
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Table A 21. Propensity for Cartelization in 1956–1989
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2. FOR 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3. FIS 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
4. ORE 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
5. OMI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
6. FOO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
7. BEV 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
8. TEX 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 2
9. LEA 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
10. WOF 2 1 3 3 2 2 3 3
11. PAP 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
12. PRI 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
13. CHE 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2
14. OIL 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3
15. RUB 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
16. MIN 3 4 4 4 1 2 1 2
17. MET 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 4
18. MFM 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
19. ELE 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
20. TRE 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
21. OTH 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2
22. EGW 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3
23. BUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
24. OCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25. TRD 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
26. TRC 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
27. FIN 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
28. DWE 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
29. BUS 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
30. CSR 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
Notes: The variable for propensity for cartelisation is calculated first by checking if the
industry exceeds the 1956 median in capital intensity, natural resource intensity, the
employment share of large establishments, or if it was under the average of the number of
innovations in 1956. The values reflect the number of conditions fulfilled with “4” as the
maximum.
Source: The author's own estimates; Statistics Finland; SFINNO; see the appendices for
sources regarding product differentiation, capital, natural resources and monopolistic
competition.
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Table A 22. Estimates of Trade Union Membership in Workforce in 1956–1989, %
1956 1959 1965 1970 1980 1982 1985 1989
1. AGR 1.7 1.3 2.9 5.3 12.2 10.2 10.2 12.5
2. FOR 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 14.8 15.6 17.5 22.2
3. FIS 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
4. ORE 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
5. OMI 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
6. FOO 22.0 18.7 22.3 48.9 69.5 70.7 72.3 76.7
7. BEV 22.0 18.7 22.3 48.9 69.5 70.7 72.3 76.7
8. TEX 20.2 17.9 41.8 50.9 80.0 82.6 89.1 105.5
9. LEA 25.4 25.5 44.0 52.5 69.5 67.8 70.8 114.0
10. WOF 51.1 41.4 60.9 82.4 93.8 106.2 110.8 111.8
11. PAP 54.9 57.3 60.5 82.4 94.4 107.7 114.7 114.0
12. PRI 51.3 53.7 53.9 56.9 77.7 70.7 70.4 77.8
13. CHE 39.1 39.1 39.1 70.7 77.5 73.2 71.0 83.2
14. OIL 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
15. RUB 57.4 56.9 91.3 45.0 59.4 64.5 67.7 60.7
16. MIN 18.2 19.5 16.0 24.7 26.9 26.0 23.5 24.3
17. MET 9.6 9.5 6.6 6.2 6.6 6.8 6.7 7.4
18. MFM 38.8 37.2 40.9 68.7 79.1 75.9 75.7 81.0
19. ELE 38.8 37.2 44.7 57.5 67.9 74.5 72.8 82.6
20. TRE 38.8 37.2 44.7 57.5 67.9 74.5 72.8 82.6
21. OTH 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
22. EGW 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7
23. BUI 30.6 32.0 47.5 62.1 83.1 77.2 77.3 69.1
24. OCO 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
25. TRD 12.7 14.4 4.6 23.8 52.3 50.5 47.9 47.5
26. TRC 37.6 24.4 46.3 24.1 34.5 49.8 51.2 47.7
27. FIN 25.8 21.5 32.6 50.4 71.7 69.9 68.7 66.9
28. DWE 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
29. BUS 21.7 19.5 22.6 51.6 82.1 68.3 56.3 54.8
30. CSR 8.0 7.1 7.7 19.6 30.6 31.0 30.7 32.6
Notes: The estimates are not without problems. For example, the data on trade union
members across industries had to be deduced based on the names of different unions. The
resulting figures suffer from measurement error as can be observed from how the estimates
suggest that wood-processing industries had unionized members in excess of their total
number of employees. In metal engineering industries it is assumed that all of them had
similar rates of unionization. If there was no data on union membership the unionization ratio
was changed to 1% since it was assumed that there were some trade union members in all
industries, but this likely makes no difference one way or another.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; Yli-Pietilä et al. 1990; see the
appendices for labour.
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Table A 23. The Share of Female Employees in Workforce in 1953–1989, %
1953 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1989
1. AGR 46.6 41.8 37.9 38.6 45.5 43.1 46.5
2. FOR 4.3 1.4 0.9 2.2 7.7 17.7 16.7
3. FIS 11.7 5.7 5.7 8.1 18.4 18.6 18.2
4. ORE 9.2 11.0 12.8 13.3 14.2 14.0 12.1
5. OMI 19.2 9.4 14.9 12.2 10.9 13.8 12.8
6. FOO 50.5 49.8 54.4 52.3 55.2 53.8 54.3
7. BEV 55.6 46.5 44.5 42.7 43.3 41.3 39.5
8. TEX 77.5 80.2 78.3 79.9 83.2 83.8 82.1
9. LEA 47.8 48.9 55.3 54.9 57.8 58.0 58.7
10. WOF 22.9 23.1 27.6 26.3 25.8 24.8 23.0
11. PAP 28.9 26.2 27.6 25.1 28.6 26.3 25.4
12. PRI 50.3 46.3 48.8 46.9 48.2 48.6 49.1
13. CHE 40.8 39.9 41.1 41.2 38.6 38.6 37.9
14. OIL 22.7 14.3 19.0 22.5 18.5 21.8 15.9
15. RUB 51.9 43.0 41.4 41.8 44.2 41.7 39.9
16. MIN 24.3 22.7 23.9 22.2 23.9 23.5 23.0
17. MET 14.2 12.7 14.4 13.3 18.7 18.6 18.3
18. MFM 17.3 15.3 17.1 17.9 19.5 18.4 17.9
19. ELE 30.3 30.9 33.5 35.8 45.0 40.8 41.7
20. TRE 10.3 9.0 11.6 11.7 17.1 16.7 15.9
21. OTH 31.7 28.2 33.1 38.5 48.2 43.8 44.7
22. EGW 12.1 13.5 13.6 16.1 20.2 21.3 19.6
23. BUI 7.2 6.1 8.7 7.2 8.0 8.4 9.3
24. OCO 6.2 5.3 7.3 6.6 11.2 12.1 13.2
25. TRD 54.8 54.1 61.1 56.4 56.0 55.2 55.2
26. TRC 22.4 20.6 30.5 23.0 24.8 26.8 28.4
27. FIN 56.8 67.4 62.6 72.2 76.1 76.2 74.9
28. DWE 22.0 41.7 . 72.0 62.6 60.7 59.6
29. BUS 33.3 39.0 39.9 39.5 42.7 44.1 45.4
30. CSR 81.2 86.8 84.0 71.3 60.3 63.7 59.6
Notes: Figures for AGR and FIS in 1953 are actually from the census of 1950.
Source: The author's own estimates, Statistics Finland; see the appendices for labour.
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Table A 24. Grubel-Lloyd Indices, Unit Price Dispersion and Capital Intensity in 1980–
1989
1980 1985 1989
G-L X/M K G-L X/M K G-L X/M K
AGR 0.5 7.0 2 054.4 0.9 1.0 1 997.0 0.6 37.4 2 017.1
FOR 0.7 22.4 1 524.1 0.4 9.2 1 718.9 0.2 21.6 1 612.5
ORE + OMI . 42.6 . . 36.6 . . 40.1 .
ORE 0.3 . 1 750.7 0.2 . 1 558.5 0.2 . 1 182.7
OMI 0.0 . 1 305.9 0.0 . 1 473.8 0.1 . 1 336.0
FOO + BEV . 7.1 . . 4.3 . . 0.7 .
FOO 0.9 . 375.8 0.9 . 401.5 1.0 . 427.7
BEV 0.8 . 417.6 0.9 . 419.1 0.8 . 470.1
TEX 0.8 . 350.0 0.8 . 418.5 0.5 . 492.3
Textiles . 6.0 . . 3.5 . . 6.8 .
Clothing . 8.8 . . 10.9 . . 34.1 .
LEA 0.9 11.4 350.0 . 14.6 375.8 0.6 5.3 578.9
WOO 0.1 12.8 489.8 0.2 7.5 668.9 0.3 1.9 517.2
PAP 0.1 8.3 722.7 0.1 9.0 797.9 0.1 .8.9 965.2
RUB 0.5 6.6 800.8 0.6 6.4 949.6 0.5 0.2 899.2
CHE 0.5 1.1 598.8 0.5 3.4 667.1 0.5 3.8 712.9
OIL 0.2 8.3 298.3 0.2 11.5 321.2 0.2 13.3 656.3
MIN 0.9 3.6 710.8 0.8 13.9 840.4 0.9 30.4 748.2
MET 0.8 0.0 638.3 0.9 3.4 643.6 0.9 4.3 577.6
FAB+MAC 0.6 . 432.5 0.8 . 440.4 0.7 . 390.9
FAB . 9.5 . . 5.2 . . 1.1 .
MAC . 7.5 . . 13.1 . . 25.8 .
ELE 0.6 11.9 433.7 0.6 23.6 483.5 0.7 69.9 403.0
OTH 0.5 5.9 368.7 0.7 14.9 442.8 0.4 32.1 561.8
Notes: G–L refers to Grubel-Lloyd index, X/M to unit price dispersion and K to capital
intensity. Note that K refers only to direct capital/output -ratio. “.” refers to a missing value.
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